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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the theory of ontological emergence; a theory that posits a new 
kind of entity – usually an emergent property – that occurs in complex systems and can 
explain some system-level behaviour. The theory holds that these emergent entities are 
dependent on, but novel with respect to, the components of those systems. Such entities 
have been invoked to explain behaviours as diverse as symmetry breaking in molecular 
physics to the possibility of personal agency. As a metaphysical theory it is useful wherever 
there is a lack of understanding about how system-level behaviour can occur based on what 
we know about the parts of that system. Besides its usefulness, the theory, if true, would 
profoundly impact our understanding of fundamental ontology. 
The first half of this thesis aims to do three things: first, identify a problem that emergence 
can explain; second, identify what emergence must do in order to solve that problem; third, 
identify a theory of emergence capable of doing it. The first and second of these aims will 
require us to outline issues in fundamental ontology and metaphysical methodology that are 
critical to any assessment of the possibility of emergence. They both also require making 
some commitments on these issues. Among such commitments will be a commitment to an 
ontology of properties as causal powers. 
I argue that emergence is a theory of macro-properties and that the primary problem it 
solves is the Problem of Reduction. I thereafter defend the theory of causal powers 
emergence against charges that it is incoherent and inconsonant with science and natural 
unity; these and other conflicts are shown to be unproblematic once the theory is properly 
explicated. In these respects, this thesis finds no fault with the coherence of emergence. The 
key claims in the second half of the thesis instead pertain to the necessity of emergence to 
solve the problem that I have identified. The argument is that even if causal novelty, holistic 
effects and top-down causation are apparent in a system, a properly developed causal 
powers ontology can account for them without positing new fundamental properties. I 
develop an option called non-reductive inherence based on a theory of powers admitting a 
plurality of compositional principles. The thesis ends by expounding this alternative to 
emergence and setting out some of the trade-offs between the positions.  
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Introduction 
Emergence is a scientific and philosophical term of art. It can be roughly characterised as 
the theory that some entities (the emergent ones) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities 
(the emergent base) and yet are ‘irreducible’ or ‘novel’ with respect to those entities. The 
theory was popular in the 19th century when emergentists were primarily concerned with 
theories of vitalism. They believed that life was a ‘macro-level’ phenomenon that emerges 
from the more ‘fundamental’ entities studied by chemistry and physics. Nowadays there is no 
question of vitalism, but the notion of emergence is still employed to explain how various 
‘macro-level’ phenomena emerge from the same ‘lower level’ entities, wherever that 
connection is ill-understood. The potential uses of the theory include, but are not limited to, 
theories in physics such as symmetry breaking, the renormalisation group, the quantum Hall 
effect; and features of mental life like consciousness, mental causation, and personal 
agency.  
The first difficulty with the concept of emergence is that it is used to refer to wildly different 
theories. Most especially these differences occur at the intersections between physics, 
metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. Even the most avid emergentist in the 
Department of Physics can regard metaphysical theories of emergence as absurd and 
impossible. Similarly, a fascinating and novel phenomenon to a philosopher of science might 
be considered of no metaphysical import to their metaphysician colleagues within the 
philosophy department. Even when one gets more specific about the type of emergence to 
which one refers, the problem remains. What a physicist calls ‘strong’ emergence is often 
deemed ‘weak’ by someone who theorises about fundamental ontology.  
This is a thesis about metaphysics. There are two aims: the first is to develop a 
metaphysically robust theory of emergence and to evaluate it; the second is to develop a 
new alternative to emergence based in the theory of causal powers. This does not mean that 
this investigation will be useful or relevant to an emergentist in the physics department; and 
that is okay. While the conclusions reached here cast doubt on the existence of emergence, 
the alternative proposed is capable of providing metaphysical explanations for the same 
phenomena. Surprising and novel macro-phenomena are, in all important respects, just as 
surprising, novel, and macro under one theory as they are under another. It is true that the 
different branches of science and philosophy all incorporate – implicitly or explicitly – 
ontological claims; but I hope and believe that the results of our enquiry into emergence and 
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causal powers do not imply any adjustments to the terms of our scientific theories, or 
whether we think they are true. 
This thesis advances new criticisms of several different theories of emergence throughout, 
but especially in chapters 4, 7, 10 and 11. Also, the alternative to emergence that is 
advanced in chapters 9 and 10, the view about the composition of powers that I call non-
reductive inherence, while based in the work of Mumford and Anjum, is largely my own. It 
departs significantly from Mumford and Anjum’s view in its analysis of the implications of a 
causal powers theory of causation. It also differs from Shoemaker’s latent dispositions view 
and constitutes a more powerful epistemological problem for emergence than previously 
dealt with in the literature. 
When it comes to emergence as a metaphysical theory, we have to make choices regarding 
our fundamental ontology, our theory of properties, and our theory of causation. The central 
issues in the debate about emergence all turn on these choices. Arguments about 
emergence that divorce themselves from ontology or which are based on ad hoc 
metaphysical reasoning are unlikely to succeed. Therefore the first part of this thesis – The 
Problem of Reduction - examines what it is that a theory of emergence explains about 
macro-phenomena. The first three chapters in particular play an introductory role by defining 
the motivations, the methodology, and many of the core concepts in the thesis. 
Chapter 1 starts by setting out the plan for the first part. I then describe some of the macro-
phenomena we are talking about – chaotic systems, causal novelty in Conway's Game of 
Life, holistic effects in quantum mechanics, top-down causation, complexity theory, and 
some problems in the philosophy of mind like the combination problem. Some of these are 
often held up as examples of emergence, while some are only rarely the target of emergent 
explanations. All are instructive.  
Chapter 2 presents the background picture. This is a chapter about our methodological 
assumptions and here we make some important choices about fundamental ontology. These 
choices include: atomist foundationalism; fundamentalism, or the no-levels view; a two-
category ontology of substance and mode; deflationism about derivative entities; and a 
sparse account of properties that essentially involves causal powers. In this chapter I provide 
some brief reasoning behind these choices. To be clear, these background assumptions are 
compatible with either the truth or falsity of powers emergence. Some of the time this 
reasoning is intimately tied up with the very possibility of emergence - or to generate the 
situation where emergence would have an explanatory function - other times the choices are 
made for independent reasons. Along the way I argue against some theories of emergence 
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that do not make the above assumptions on the grounds that they must assume a theory of 
properties that renders emergence superfluous. 
Chapter 3 investigates the success conditions for a theory of emergence, or any theory 
attempting to do the same job. A variety of different problems the theory is supposed to 
solve are analysed within the ontological framework established, and the problems are found 
to gain varying amounts of traction within that framework. There then follows an analysis 
about the nature of philosophical explanation and a general statement of the problem to be 
solved in this thesis – the Problem of Reduction. This takes a somewhat novel form 
compared with the explananda of emergent theories more commonly found in the literature. 
Correspondingly, there is an analysis about what a solution to this problem must look like. 
Chapter 4 is a rundown of the features of different theories of emergence. These are 
analysed within the ontological framework we’ve established, and compared with the settled-
upon explananda and our requirements for an explanation. In the process I closely analyse 
some of the key features of a theory of emergence and make some novel observations 
about their implications. We also dismiss many theories that are either incompatible with our 
background picture or insufficient for our explanatory requirements. 
Chapter 5 presents a coherent and sufficiently specified theory of emergence - Causal 
Powers Emergence - and explicates how this theory meets our requirements. It is this theory 
upon which the second half of the thesis is based; it provides a foil for our argument in 
favour of an alternative to emergence. Chapter 6 elaborates on the theory of emergence by 
comparing it with some of the failed theories from chapter 4 and demonstrates how Causal 
Powers Emergence avoids these pitfalls. 
Chapter 7 is the turning point of the thesis. We develop and evaluate a critical problem for 
Causal Powers Emergence called the Epistemological Problem. In this chapter we will 
advance a new, underexplored form of this problem and its implications as well as covering 
some of the major metaphysical arguments that emergentists have employed to defend their 
theories against the problem. I argue that the epistemological problem is not merely an 
epistemic problem. In this chapter we’re not seeking to prove that the theory of emergence is 
incoherent or incongruous with any established theories, the aim is show that there is an 
alternative to emergence. The final three chapters of the thesis are all about this alternative, 
which we shall call Causal Powers Inherence. 
Chapter 8 takes us back to our theory of properties as essentially involving causal powers. 
Here we analyse causal powers and say more about what they are and the epistemic issues 
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involved with their individuation. We make some choices about our theory of causal powers 
in line with the major proponents of Causal Powers Emergence. 
Chapter 9 is all about how powers work and what they can do. This is crucial to evaluating 
the force of the Epistemological Problem and the responses to it. We learn that the problem 
is very serious and the responses to it wholly inadequate. I also make an original powers-
based analysis of P. W. Anderson’s classic example of a macro-phenomenon using vector 
diagrams. Additionally, in the course of this investigation it’s argued that our theory of 
causation must include a range of compositional principles, which has the effect of further 
compounding the problem. 
Chapter 10, the final chapter, brings together some of the threads in the previous chapters to 
present the new theory of Causal Powers Inherence as a viable alternative to emergence. A 
clearer explication of this view is attempted, with important implications for the individuation 
conditions for powers and our theory of causation. 
In the end I conclude that, given this metaphysical background, emergence is unnecessary. 
When the two competing theories are compared, according to some selected criteria for 
theory choice, emergence loses. This is largely because the theories of powers and 
causation that we have assumed (and that I believe are implied by the choices made in 
developing a theory of emergence) are necessary to explain a vast range of macro-
phenomena ranging from the simplest interactions between powers. The emergentist is 
faced with a dilemma: they must either assume that emergence is ubiquitous, or they must 
accept a theory of causation that undermines the need for emergence. My aim is not to 
settle the debate, but merely to show that there is a strong competitor to emergence that is 
underexplored and worthy of further consideration - to come to a settled conclusion would 
require me to address meta-philosophical questions about the relative weighting of different 
theoretical virtues, which would probably require a thesis in itself. The thesis ends with some 
thoughts on the epistemic values evidenced in the theories of emergence and inherence. It 
is also indicated that with more work we might discover other applications for this view of 
causal powers in the same areas in the philosophy of mind that invoke emergence. 
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The Problem of Reduction 
1. Motivations 
One of the aims of this thesis is to give an answer to the question “What is emergence?” The 
chief difficulty in answering this question is that apart from the vaguest definitions there isn’t 
a settled idea about what ‘emergence’ means. There are several different theories of 
emergence, without a consensus about their comparative success.  
A potential strategy would be to catalogue the different theories and give a taxonomy. If one 
were to pursue this strategy, one would notice as soon as starting that the theories are often 
radically different to each other in their basic ontological features (like their theory of 
causation or theory of property individuation). One could seek to judge the success of each 
theory within that theory’s metaphysical framework, but if each theory is internally consistent 
with respective to each of their metaphysical frameworks it is a much more difficult task to 
evaluate such theories with respect to each other. The varying accounts of emergence rest 
on these frameworks, and the success of each theory often turns on the success of their 
ontologies in terms of wider ontological considerations; the evaluative criteria for an ontology 
brings in a whole host of other metaphysical issues. Theories of emergence can pack a lot of 
ontological baggage. 
All this makes it very difficult to respond to the question “What is emergence?” with a 
definitive investigation that could conclude that *this* is emergence. Putting aside the 
comparative exercise, this first half aims to define the most general features of emergence in 
a coherent and plausible way. Some of these features are not shared by all theories of 
emergence, which reflects the variety of such theories. Sometimes theories that have been 
called ‘emergence’ will simply turn out not to be such. 
What is in common between the theories of emergence? I argue that they broadly fulfil 
certain criteria for dependence and novelty, as we shall see in chapter 4, and they do so in 
similar ways. What similarities there are is the direct result of the main motivating factors that 
lead one to posit a theory of emergence – for instance, in philosophy of mind, an attempt to 
resolve conflicts or to do justice to certain intuitions about mental properties – and of 
emergence’s proposed position within this debate relative to other theories that seek to solve 
the same problems.  
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If we look just at the theories of emergence involving mental properties, we find that the point 
of these various theories is to provide an explanation for (mostly) the same basic set of 
explananda. So, while finding the set of evaluative criteria for competing ontological 
systems, when looked at as a whole, is a vexed question, finding the set of evaluative 
criteria for theories of emergence, within their respective ontological systems, is much more 
manageable, and such judgements can go beyond mere internal consistency. As such, this 
thesis begins by setting out a metaphysical background picture that will be used to assess 
the proposed theories of emergence and to develop some problems that such a theory must 
resolve. This is the task in chapters 2 and 3. 
Before that it will be useful to get a better handle on what we mean when we talk about 
‘macro-phenomena’ and give some examples of the system-level behaviour for which we’re 
seeking to provide an explanation. The first point to make in this vein is that it does not 
suffice for this behaviour to be strikingly ‘new’, as is the case, for instance, with liquidity or 
life. We can illustrate this using the example of the Game of Life, the cellular automaton 
devised by the mathematician John Conway.1 The universe of this game is a 2D infinite grid, 
with one of two basic properties occurring at each position: live or dead. The universe has 
an iterative time progression governed by three rules of causation: birth, survival and death. 
These rules govern which of the two properties a particular position will have in the next time 
slice according to whether that position currently has too many or too few live properties 
occurring in neighbouring positions.  
With just these three basic rules the Game of Life is capable of producing an extraordinary 
variety of system-level behaviour and macro-phenomena. These include stable ‘living’ 
entities that oscillate in complex recursive patterns and life-like cellular automata that travel 
across the universe spawning gliders and other moving ‘organisms’, or even exact replicates 
of themselves using instruction tapes. This is extremely novel behaviour given the simplicity 
of the rules governing the universe. Yet no emergent explanation is necessary. 
In this case we already know all of the rules that govern the universe. There is nothing that 
emergence is required to explain. We can take a complex self-constructing pattern of living 
properties occurring across millions of positions and we can analyse it time slice by time 
slice and observe that the only rules required to explain its behaviour are birth, survival and 
death. All of the behaviour observed will reduce to those rules and the pattern of occurrent 
properties.  
                                               
1 Gardiner 1970 
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Yet still, it might be very useful once we start analysing the patterns in the Game of Life to 
refer to general rules that govern certain patterns – like those patterns that produce 
movement. These rules are patterns of behaviour that hold at a system-level rather than at 
the level of the positions and properties themselves; but we know that we can always revert 
to the brute-force method to demonstrate that birth, survival and death are the only rules 
necessarily involved in the evolution of this universe. The rules holding at the system-level 
are causally redundant. 
One way of getting a handle on the type of macro-phenomena that necessarily involves an 
explanation like emergence is to imagine an alternative Game of Life where birth, survival 
and death are not the only rules. In this alternative universe we would be able to observe a 
divergence from these rules wherever the additional rules affect behaviour. From one time 
slice to another, we would see instances where positions have the properties live or dead, in 
a way that violates the rules birth, survival and death. If we do not know all of the rules 
governing this universe, we must find an explanation for this behaviour.  
If, let’s say, these rule violations are associated with certain system-level patterns, we might 
reasonably identify the rule violations with these system-level patterns. Let’s call those rule 
violations system-level behaviour. Hence we have a novel macro-phenomenon – the rule 
breaking behaviour - that motivates an emergent (or an inherent) explanation. It raises the 
question: is it the case that the rules of this alternative Game of Life are themselves more 
complicated than in the original game?; or are they incomplete (so that birth, survival and 
death are different in this universe, or not the only rules at work)? As we shall see, these 
could both be considered forms of inherence. 
Alternatively, perhaps it is the case that the system-level pattern identified with this 
behaviour is a new property, in addition to live and dead - a macro-property that might 
feature in its own rules. A property that is had by a whole region consisting of many positions 
that are live and dead, but which somehow does not merely consist in them. This is a form 
of emergence. In effect, the arguments in this thesis are about how we should figure out the 
rules to this game. 
Now let’s give a few examples of macro-phenomena in our own universe.2 Here are three to 
get us started: correlated particles in quantum mechanics;3 non-linear dynamical systems in 
                                               
2 There will be other examples given throughout the thesis. 
3 We’ll mostly be relying on the arguments in Silberstein and McGeever 1999 
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chaos theory, complexity studies or connectionist modelling;4 and the nonstructurality of 
conscious experience.5 
Let’s start with EPR–Bohm systems: 
A simple example is as follows. If two spin-half particles (an electron and a positron) 
are produced by the decay of a single spin-zero particle at some central point and 
move directly outwards in opposite directions, by conservation of angular momentum 
the spins of the electron and positron must add up to zero, since that was the angular 
momentum of the initial particle. Therefore when we measure the spin of the particles 
in some chosen direction, the particle spins will always have opposite values. This is 
true (for both correlated and anticorrelated particles) regardless of how far apart the 
particles are. It is clear that such anti-correlations are not mere coincidence, for the 
‘change’ in the particle’s spin will occur every time. Constant-correlation guarantees 
that if the two measurement events on separate parts of an EPR–Bohm system 
should employ the same types of measurements, their outcomes will be opposite. 6 
Silberstein and McGeever go on to argue that this correlation can only be explained by the 
particles interacting non-locally – which would seem to be ruled out by special relativity – or 
by the emergence of some sort of holistic correlation property. They argue that entanglement 
between parts and wholes in quantum field theory contradicts philosophical atomism and 
also “completely explodes the ontological picture of reality as divided into a ‘discrete 
hierarchy of levels’”,7 which they take to imply emergence.8 I admit that quantum 
entanglement is a motivating phenomenon for a theory of emergence, but I think the 
argument in Silberstein and McGeever’s paper is invalid. In chapters 2 and 3 I argue that it is 
necessary to assume fundamentalist atomism in order to motivate a theory of emergence. 
Silberstein and McGeever’s ontology is unclear, but if evidence from quantum field theory 
really did imply the rejection of atomism – and I don’t think that it does – then not only does 
this not imply emergence, it seems to render emergence unnecessary.9 
The second example we are going to cover in this chapter is chaos theory. Chaos theory is a 
form of dynamical systems theory focussing on systems with chaotic behaviour. It studies 
                                               
4 See e.g. Wolfram 1994 
5 This is just one of the combination problems presented in Chalmers 2016 
6 Silberstein and McGeever 1999, p. 187 
7 See chapter 2 for explanations of both these ideas. 
8 Silberstein and McGeever 1999, p. 189. Indeed, they even say that the spin properties of the 
individual particles “literally no longer exist at the same time as the emergent property instance” – the 
real property is the property of the whole system. 
9 My arguments to this conclusion start in section 2.2. 
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unstable aperiodic behaviour in deterministic non-linear dynamical systems.10 But it does not 
study the system in basic causal terms, or try to quantitatively predict the next time slices in 
the system’s evolution. Instead, chaos theory provides qualitative and structural 
characterisations of classes of systems and predicts the general kinds of behaviour that 
these kinds of systems would be expected to produce. The non-linearity of the systems 
studied by chaos theory practically prohibit explicit causal understanding, so they can appear 
random. But even aperiodic dynamical behaviour can be described as trajectories in phase 
space11 that converge on certain complex shapes, usually a fractal with a non-integer 
dimension. These convergences on certain ‘strange attractors’ in phase space are a 
universal feature of certain kinds of chaotic systems consisting in otherwise physically 
disparate properties. Yet the multiple realisability of these macro-phenomena is rarely 
advanced as a motivation for emergence.12 
The reason it is rarely taken as motivation is that it is broadly acknowledged to be 
compatible with the reductionist situation we saw in the original Game of Life: 
It is important to clarify that chaos theory argues against the universal applicability of 
the method of micro-reductionism, but not against the validity of the philosophical 
doctrine of reductionism. That doctrine states that all properties of a system are 
reducible to the properties of its parts.... Chaos theory gives no examples of ‘holistic’ 
properties which could serve as counter-examples to such a claim.13 
Indeed: 
chaos theory introduces no new postulates about the physical world at all. Chaotic 
models are built in a strictly ‘classical’ world, using modelling equations ... in a 
thoroughly Newtonian manner.14 
Other dynamical systems are amenable to this philosophical interpretation too. 
Connectionism is an example. It attempts to model cognition using complexity theory by 
treating the brain as a dynamical system exhibiting self-organisation. The modelling of the 
reinforcement of individual neural connections is supposed to explain how relatively simple 
individual parts can achieve self-organising criticality without much prior structure or 
                                               
10 See, e.g. Kellert 1993 
11 The abstract space comprising the possible values of the variables of a system. 
12 Silberstein and McGeever do attempt such an argument, see Silberstein and McGeever 1999, pp. 
194-8. And Newman 1996 also argues that being in the basin of a strange attractor is an emergent 
property. 
13 Kellert 1993, p. 90 
14 Ibid, p. 41 
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organisation. But this and other applications of complexity theory, while they seek to 
discover universal rules that apply to the behaviour of all systems of a requisite complexity, 
are again, in many respects, like the models of cellular automatons in the original Game of 
Life. They achieve the formation of meta-rules for complex systems, but are at least 
compatible with the causal redundancy of those rules.15 
We are just starting to see the relevant considerations when approaching a case of novel 
system behaviour. Only those cases that are incompatible with our extant metaphysical 
picture are relevant to the question of ontological emergence. This is why we must first 
develop a metaphysical framework, as we do in chapters 2 and 3. Indeed it is only by 
developing the finer points of that metaphysical picture – as we do in chapters 8 and 9 – that 
we can come to a principled final judgement about the truth of emergence. The motivation of 
this thesis is the observation that this issue turns on our metaphysical theories about 
fundamental ontology. 
In the previous two cases we have made quick assessments based on the criterion of 
‘causal non-redundancy’.16 But there are other motivations for emergence. An instructive 
example is the case of the non-structurality of conscious experience. If one supposes that 
the direct acquaintance we have with the intrinsic character of conscious experience 
indubitably reveals to us the existence of meta-properties that are non-structural, then this 
seems to be a problem for all accounts of conscious experience that are micro-constitutive, 
since those micro-constitutive parts of experience must somehow come together.17 
It might be the case that inherence in a complex object gives emergent properties an 
advantage when it comes to solving the combination problem. We already seem to be half-
way to explaining subjective experiences if we can talk about radical new kinds of properties 
of the subject of experience, rather than the properties of the simples comprising that 
subject. But even if emergence has no power to explain combination-type issues, it can still 
provide an explanation for the existence of mental properties, if they are thought to be a 
radically different kind of entity; furthermore, it does so in a way that guarantees those 
properties causal efficacy, which is a perennial problem in the metaphysics of mind, as we 
will discuss in chapter 3. The problem of mental causation has been perhaps the most 
important motivation for work on emergence in this area – the causal closure argument and 
its variants are analysed in sections 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, and 6.1. This has been a brief warm 
                                               
15 See Wolfram 1994 for more on complexity theory and the Game of Life. 
16 Wilson 2013 includes a more sophisticated critical analysis of chaos theory and the Game of Life 
vis-à-vis ontological emergence which includes other criteria for reduction. In chapters 3 and 4 we will 
make similar points. 
17 This is a version of the combination problem for panpsychism, see e.g. Seager 1995 
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up to the subject, and an outline of what we mean by macro-phenomena and the putative 
macro-properties of emergence. Our conclusion at first blush is that we are motivated to 
posit a theory of emergence where there are system-level features for which our best 
evidence apparently contradicts our metaphysical background picture. 
2. The Background Picture 
2.1 Fundamental Ontology 
A key commitment of this thesis is that work in fundamental ontology is required to develop 
and evaluate the theories trying to explain the phenomena described in chapter 1. To get 
started we will make some assumptions. Some of these assumptions will be simply stated, 
others will be short expositions of major positions countenanced in various metaphysical 
debates. 
It is a common contention that, in metaphysics, one thing leads to another. Theses that are 
independently attractive might be incompatible or incommensurable and so cannot always 
be bolted together. For this reason I have chosen to make assumptions now that will 
constrain the possibilities to come. Since the congruence of the overall picture of reality is 
critical to the success of any particular metaphysical theory, at least some of the rest of the 
picture needs to be set out.  
This picture is realist (the universe is not mind-dependent) and naturalistic (reality is 
exhausted by nature).18 The realist methodology of the thesis precludes explanations that 
are about mere concepts rather than reality itself. Conceptual analysis is required, but the 
theories employing these concepts are descriptions of how we think the world is, not how we 
think about the world. Metaphysics should not conflate the epistemological issues that bear 
on explanations with truths about the nature of the universe. More specifically, this means 
that the categories of being that will be explored and defined, while being guided by what is 
required to be able to think intelligibly about the universe, are not mere constructs.  
We are primarily concerned with the reality that is represented by the language, not with the 
representations themselves. A metaphysical theory of emergence is taken so seriously 
because it is supposed to be about the way the world actually is. If the dispute can be 
resolved by conceptual analysis alone then the dispute has become relatively trivial.19 The 
                                               
18 This will be fleshed out as we proceed through the chapter. 
19 For discussion, see, e.g. Lowe 1998, Ch. 1; Hirsch 2005 
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methodology followed by most metaphysicians is quasi-scientific rather than conceptual-
linguistic. Sider describes it so:  
They treat competing positions as tentative hypotheses about the world, and assess 
them with a loose battery of criteria for theory choice. Match with ordinary usage and 
belief sometimes plays a role in this assessment, but typically not a dominant one. 
Theoretical insight, considerations of simplicity, integration with other domains (for 
instance science, logic, and philosophy of language), and so on, play important 
roles.20 
Epistemic worries may arise about the criteria for theory choice and there are different 
positions concerning how realist metaphysics should be done,21 but broadly this is the 
ontologically realist position to which we adhere. 
The naturalistic methodology of the thesis precludes explanations that are supernatural or 
magical. Insofar as appeals to intuitions and everyday experiences are used as guides, they 
will be used only where it seems that they cannot be debunked by cognitive scientists, 
experimental philosophers or other work on, for example, cognitive biases. The work here 
will be constrained by science, since what knowledge anyone has of the universe is 
tempered by scientific enquiry. The fundamental ontology developed here will constrain 
science only in the sense that, if it is true, it will set limits on scientific theorizing that could 
not in any case be crossed, because for the universe to be any other way22 would be 
metaphysically impossible. The only time this would seem to be a limiting constraint for, say, 
a physicist, is when the physicist has, in their work, slipped into doing metaphysics. And 
once it is metaphysical theories that are being posited, it is quite right that metaphysical 
reasoning should constrain those theories.  
A theme of the thesis will be the tendency for the elision of physics and metaphysics to pass 
unnoticed, or for metaphysical claims to be made based on straightforward translation from 
scientific theory. There will be several examples of when metaphysical implications are 
posited based solely on scientific evidence and without the reflexive equilibrium between that 
constraining empirical evidence and the metaphysical reasoning that is necessary for 
implications of that sort to be discovered. The above commitment to naturalism does not 
mean that fundamental physics is a royal road to fundamental ontology. The requirements 
                                               
20 Sider 2009, p. 385 
21 See, e.g. Manley 2009, pp. 4-8 
22 In terms of the general categories of being. 
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for truth in the two types of theory are not the same.23 Perhaps most importantly they differ in 
modality: the truth of metaphysical theories is that they are true with metaphysically 
necessity; scientific theories are not required to meet this standard to be true. And so, given 
the above, if any scientific theory is true then our fundamental ontology should be true. At 
least that is the aim. Metaphysics is required to tell us about the fundamental ontological 
categories and also the ontological status of whatever putative entities are posited by 
scientific theories. 
For the purpose of an investigation into the metaphysics of emergence, it is assumed that 
properties are real and that they are one of the fundamental categories of being. If this were 
not the case it would be difficult to motivate a theory of emergent properties.24 It will also be 
assumed that substance is a fundamental category of being.25 It would be an error to 
assume that we can achieve clarity on a phenomenon like emergent properties without first 
achieving clarity on the fundamental ontology of property and substance. I am going to 
assume that there are such things as properties, where, speaking generally, properties are 
understood as ways things are. Unless otherwise stated, ‘entity’ should be understood as 
meaning either an object, a property inhering in an object, or a property-entity (e.g. tropes). 
The term ‘property’ is used to denote the additional something that makes the fact of 
similarity true. This allows for a discussion of properties without adopting a position on 
whether they are universals, particulars, tropes, etc. It is assumed that when two ways of 
being differ, that difference is a difference in the properties that are present. The special 
sciences - and many other human enterprises - are often interested in these difference and 
similarities. It is of particular relevance to this thesis that one of the aims of fundamental 
physics is to discover the fundamental properties in nature. 
2.2 Fundamentality and Dependence 
2.2.1 Ontological Dependence 
The ideas of fundamentality and dependence are central to the concept of emergence.26 
Often this is a matter of ontological dependence – of one entity depending for its existence 
on other entities. When entitiy x is dependent on entities y1…yn, this can mean several 
things. One form of dependence is where, had it been the case that some of the entities 
y1…yn had not existed, x would not exist now - in the same manner as my existence now is 
                                               
23 See also Paul 2012. 
24 Because emergent properties are a subset of properties. 
25 It is possible that this assumption is not necessary for us to proceed; it is nonetheless made for 
convenience. It may well be the case that substances are really bundles of tropes, for example. I do 
not think that this has much bearing on the discussion, and where I think it does it is noted. 
26 Sometimes these ideas are essential, e.g. Barnes 2012. But there are also varieties of emergence 
where fundamentalism is not assumed. 
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dependent on my parents existing at some point in the past. This is not ontological 
dependence. The idea is that x is continually sustained by entities y1…yn. My continued 
existence is not sustained by my parents’ continued existence (except perhaps in some 
loose financial sense.)  
Maintenance is required, but ontological dependence means something stronger still, 
something like the dependence of a complex object on its parts. One key difference is that 
an ontologically dependent entity, x, is dependent on the current existence of some entities 
y1…yn, synchronically, rather than being merely counterfactually dependent on the past 
existence of y1…yn. Another is that this relation is stronger than causation.27 Here is a 
working definition: 
(OD) An entity x is dependent iff for all possible worlds w and times t at which a 
duplicate of x exists, that duplicate is accompanied by other concrete, contingent 
objects in w at t28 
The key is that it is impossible for x to exist by itself, as a matter of metaphysical necessity. It 
is part of the intrinsic nature of x that it bears this relation to certain other objects. But note 
that (OD) does nothing to explain the dependence of x on entities y1…yn: it merely stipulates 
the dependence of x simpliciter. One cannot duplicate x without having at least something 
else, but (OD) does not explain why x is dependent on any particular y,29 nor what the 
necessary and sufficient existence conditions are for x. This reflects the fact that x is 
necessarily dependent, but not necessarily dependent on the particular set of entities y1…yn. 
Duplicates of x could exist in other worlds with some or all of the entities y1…yn, or with some 
other entities entirely.  
(OD) also reflects that while x is not dependent on any particular entities as a matter of 
necessity, it is necessarily dependent on some entities such that if those entities were taken 
away, x would no longer exist. In contrast, an ontologically independent entity could have a 
duplicate existing in a world by itself, i.e. they are capable of ‘lonely existence’.30  
2.2.2 Foundationalism 
If one entity is dependent on a second entity, one could plausibly claim that the second entity 
is more fundamental than the first.31 If one then proceeds to follow this chain of dependence 
                                               
27 For more on the relationship between counterfactuals and causation, see section 8.2. Causation is, 
however, still a candidate for the emergence relation, see sections 4.6 and 6.2. 
28 This is from Barnes 2012, p. 880. 
29 Or z, or anything else for that matter. 
30 Langton and Lewis 1998 
31 For example, the part-whole relation is considered a paradigm of ontological dependence. 
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one might expect to ‘bottom out’ somewhere by discovering an entity that is ontologically 
independent. There are theories that call themselves metaphysical emergence that do not 
assume a bottom level. I will propose that these are not theories of ontological emergence, 
but rather theories of properties that do similar explanatory work.32  
Why should we suppose that there is a fundamental level? There is the problem of an 
existential regress. If one entity existentially depends on another that means that it would not 
exist without it. The existence of any entities at all therefore seems to require the existence 
of some entities that do not existentially depend on another.33 If fundamentality and 
ontological dependence are linked like this then a clearer understanding of how some 
entities are ontologically independent and some dependent will help us to understand the 
putative hierarchy of being that terminates in the bottom level. 
Identifying ontological independence and fundamentality lead some,34 to reject the possibility 
of emergence.35 But making this assumption does not in itself rule out emergence. And so 
long as supporting arguments about the nature of substances - like those in section 6.5 - are 
successful, the possibility of emergence remains open. Others argue that the ontologically 
independent objects and the fundamental objects are not necessarily coextensive.36  
Those that believe that the chains of ontological dependence must have a well-founded 
termination in entities that are ontologically independent hold a view called metaphysical 
foundationalism. Usually it is thought that the “bottom level” is at the smaller end of the 
scale, like it is in ordinary mereology. This is the atomist view (though the fundamental 
objects are not atoms but subatomic particles, presumably whatever would be identified at 
bottom by a perfected fundamental physics.) 
Atomism is not the only form of metaphysical foundationalism. The fundamental level might 
not be at the bottom but rather at the top. Jonathan Schaffer has defended the view that the 
universe as a whole is fundamental and is a substance in its own right.37 The proponents of 
                                               
32 A theory of emergence that does not assume a bottom level may be possible, but such ‘emergence’ 
would be unexceptionable because without a bottom level there would be no Problem of Reduction, 
see chapter 3. 
33 For more on this see, for example, Campbell 1976, 1990; Lowe 2006a; Robb 2009. 
34 e.g. Heil 2012 
35 The reasoning is slightly more complicated. It follows from positions regarding the nature of 
ontological independence, i.e. that substance is the category of ontological independence and that 
substances are simple. Therefore the properties of complex objects cannot be ontologically 
independent. See section 6.5. and Heil 2012, Ch. 3. Heil does hold a theory of ‘emergence’ that is 
compatible with these positions, which is discussed in chapter 4. However I contend that this is also 
not emergence. 
36 See section 4.6. 
37 Schaffer 2010a, and also Trogdon 2009 for a discussion. 
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foundationalism that see the direction of ontological dependence as running from the top to 
the bottom (larger objects depending on smaller ones) are pluralists, the proponents of 
foundationalism that see the direction reversed are monists. I will assume an atomistic 
pluralism because emergence seems both unnecessary on a monist view – monism 
certainly encounters no problem of reduction as described in chapter 3 - and also, more 
pertinently, impossible by definition: to be a monist is to believe that there is only one 
fundamental entity, the universe.38 
There is speculation that the chain of ontological dependence does not need to end in a 
foundation of ontologically independent entities. It might be possible for the chain of 
dependence to go on ad infinitum without threatening the existence of all the entities in the 
chain; in other words, the regress identified above might be real but not vicious.39 Let’s call 
this view metaphysical infinitism. If the direction of dependency runs from the big to the 
small, then this infinitism violates atomism – atomism posits an ontologically independent 
foundation of simple entities at the bottom of the chain of dependency. One illustration of a 
universe of endless complexity is David Lewis’s universe of ‘atomless gunk’40, or, as D.C. 
Williams puts it: 
The universe might have been the same size that it is, and included exactly the same 
number of individuals, variously discrete, overlapping, and included, in the same way, 
and yet have been perfectly homogeneous throughout, one great blob of blanc-
mange, say (i.e., of stuff which really is the way blanc-mange seems to be).41 
There might be good reasons to suppose the actual universe includes simples, and therefore 
is not infinitely divisible.42 But even if this were not so, the possibility of this kind of 
metaphysical infinitism is at least relevant - given what is said above about the methodology 
of metaphysics - to our metaphysical picture. For instance, the possibility of an infinitely 
divided,43 gunky, universe might alone provide support for priority monism.44 This – reversing 
the direction of dependence - would be one way to bring non-dependent existence into our 
picture of the universe in a way that would not seem to be threatened by infinite divisibility.  
                                               
38 Schaffer would disagree with this (see 2010a), but that is because of a difference in his position on 
inflationism vs deflationism about derivative properties, see section 2.4. 
39 See Bliss 2013 and Morganti 2014 for more on this possibility 
40 Lewis 1991, p. 20 
41 Williams 1986, pp. 3-4 
42 See Cameron 2008a 
43 Divided in the sense of substantial division rather than spatial division. 
44 Schaffer 2010a 
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Nonetheless, we do not need to consider the possibility of an endlessly divided universe 
when examining ontological emergence. This is because in a universe without simples – or 
with only one simple, a la priority monism – there is no need for ontological emergence to 
account for the presence of putatively ‘emergent’ phenomena. This is because without 
atomic simples there is no ontologically privileged set of objects that might in turn privilege 
certain properties. In other words, without an atomistic foundation of simple substances, 
there isn’t the same strong motivation for restricting the reification of properties, so the 
problem of chapter 3 does not arise.  
What is called ‘emergence’ in a non-atomic universe would be comparatively 
unexceptionable; and furthermore, no special theory is needed. Whatever the theory of 
properties developed under the alternative positions on foundationalism, it is unlikely to 
motivate a metaphysically deep distinction between emergent properties and any other kind 
of property.45 I will argue later that a theory of properties which holds that all properties are 
emergent is not a theory of emergence, so we assume atomism for our discussion. This will 
become clear in sections 3.5-9. We will also return to consider the possibility of metaphysical 
infinity in a different category in section 8.4, an analogy to which the possibility of infinitism 
here will be useful. 
2.2.3 Fundamentalism and Levels of Being 
In the previous section the notion of fundamentality was fleshed out in terms of ontological 
dependence and the positions within the metaphysical foundationalism vs metaphysical 
infinitism debate. I will maintain that a variety of foundationalism – namely, atomism - is a 
necessary assumption in developing ontological emergentism. 
There is another way of fleshing out the notion of fundamentality; a way that many who 
employ it (but not all) would argue is necessarily linked to the first. The crucial distinction 
here is not between entities for which existence is dependent and entities for which 
existence is independent, but rather between entities that exist derivatively and entities that 
exist fundamentally.46 Alternatively, as Kit Fine characterises the present, latter, division, the 
distinction is between what exists and what exists in reality.47  
The two distinctions, dependent/independent and derivative/fundamental, seem closely 
related. Ontological dependence is at least one way that we might analyse what we mean by 
                                               
45 As I mentioned in chapter 1, this observation renders the argument in Silberstein and McGeever 
1999 invalid. I take Contextual Emergence (see Silberstein 2014) to also suffer from this lack of 
motivation. 
46 e.g. Williams 2010 
47 Fine 2001 
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derivative (arguably ontological dependence is the best way of analysing the 
derivative/fundamental distinction48). But since there are some conceptions of emergence 
that rely on a separation between the two,49 it will be given a separate treatment here. 
This second kind of fundamentalism posits that there is a single division in nature between 
what exists at a fundamental level and everything else. It does not admit degrees of 
existence. The relevant contrast to this conception of fundamentalism is a picture where the 
distinction between the fundamental and the derivative is, at the very least, less sharp. A 
non-fundamentalist might admit degrees of fundamentality, for instance, or describe reality 
as comprising ‘levels of being’. If a non-fundamentalist were also a metaphysical 
foundationalist in the context of the previous debate, we might imagine that they believed 
that there are levels of being with a foundation at bottom but with a relation other than 
ontological dependence operating between the levels of being. That the relation could not be 
ontological dependence is necessary so that the resultant/fundamental distinction does not 
collapse into the dependent/independent distinction.  
Alternatively, Barnes argues50 that one might conceivably hold entities to be ontologically 
dependent but still fundamental, i.e. a philosopher who was a metaphysical foundationalist 
and a fundamentalist might also posit a relation other than ontological dependence which 
can be used to analyse the distinction between fundamental and derivative entities. Barnes 
postulates that such an ontologically dependent but fundamental entity would count as 
emergent. Her arguments will be examined in section 4.6., where we will conclude that the 
greatest obstacle for a theory of emergence along these lines is to give an analysis of the 
relation between fundamental and derivative entities that would make possible that 
ontology.51  
In the meantime let’s provide a naïve, first-blush description of fundamentalism that is 
independent of the notion of ontological dependence. Fundamentalism in this case is the 
view that things are not more or less fundamental, but rather things are either fundamental 
or they are not. And everything that is not fundamental has its existence derivatively from the 
fundamental things. 
One way to get a handle on the fundamental/derivative distinction is by appeal to God. The 
theological metaphor goes like this: the fundamental entities are all and only those entities 
                                               
48 See, for example, Heil 2012 
49 e.g. Barnes 2012 
50 Barnes 2012 
51 Note, however, that this does not preclude the possibility of emergence - it will also be argued that 
is not necessary for an emergent entity to be ontologically dependent to count as emergent. 
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that God needs to create in order for the world to be how it is. God would not need to create 
the derivative entities of that world. The existence of the fundamental entities of any world, 
w, are necessary and sufficient for that world to exist, and any differences between that 
world and a different world, w’, are differences in the fundamental entities (and possibly the 
way that they are arranged, depending on what composition relations are set.) 
2.3 Properties 
2.3.1 Real Properties 
Properties are postulated in order to account for apparent similarity between objects.52 As an 
example, there is a similarity shared by two blue chairs that they do not share with a red 
chair; in addition, there is a similarity shared by all three chairs that none of them shares with 
a table. We might say that all the chairs have the property of being a chair, and two of them 
have the property of being blue. David Armstrong takes that there are real similarities in the 
world to be a ‘Moorean’ fact,53 that is, following G. E. Moore, the fact of “sameness of type” 
is a common-sense truism which philosophers should not deny, though they might argue 
about the philosophical account of these facts.54 This is not supposed to be a logically 
necessary or indubitable truth, but nonetheless a compulsory question of which any 
comprehensive philosophy must give some account. Without similarity between things, we 
would be living in a world devoid of structure; an amorphous lump.55 If we take similarities 
between things to be a feature of the world, then we should have some way of accounting 
for them. That is: we must give some account of how numerically different particulars, like 
chairs, can have the same properties, like being blue, or being a chair. The question also 
arises for relations, for instance, standing in the relation of being between two chairs, which 
can also belong to numerically different particulars. In realist metaphysics the result of this 
accounting for similarity is a theory of properties. 
This function of a theory of properties can be given the following formulation: “what 
ontological structure, what array of real entities, is necessary and sufficient to account for the 
likeness among different objects which ground the use on different occasions of the same 
general term”.56 Although Campbell stresses that the problem is primarily an ontological 
rather than a semantic issue, this formulation is vulnerable to misunderstanding because it 
seems to suggest that our task is a semantic one: to explain how ‘general terms’—or 
                                               
52 It should be noted that properties are not just unifying but also characterising entities. This second 
function will become clear once we start looking in more detail at theories of properties. 
53 Armstrong 1984, p. 250; 1997b, p. 102 
54 Moore 1925; 1939, p. 295 
55 Note the differences between this and the picture of reality as atomless gunk, as in Section 2.2.2; 
see Eklund 2007. 
56 Campbell 1981, p. 483 
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predicates—are grounded. Nelson Goodman’s ‘grue’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘games’ show us 
that predicates are not necessarily grounded in a single feature of the world, i.e. they do not 
necessarily share a single property.57 In the terminology of David Lewis,58 being grue and 
being a game are prime examples of ‘abundant’ properties, which may be “as extrinsic, as 
gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive” as one pleases; they “pay no 
heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way. Sharing of them has 
nothing to do with similarity.”59 When we are giving an account of the actual similarity 
between things we are concerned with the ‘sparse’ or ‘natural’ properties that most closely 
carve nature at the “qualitative joints”. We will assume that, contra Goodman,60 the similarity 
accompanying the sameness of such sparse properties is ontological and objective: it has 
nothing to do with the language or system of representation we use. 
2.3.2 Fundamental Properties 
Similarly, there is an idea going back to at least Plato that it is the business of science to 
‘carve nature at the joints’. If one is able to wield the scalpel at will, the number of different 
ways of ‘carving nature’ is potentially endless, but most of these ways of carving are arbitrary 
and of no use or interest (including arbitrary conjunctions, like the part of nature that is the 
Eiffel-Tower-and-my-right-arm.) Other ways of carving are functional for certain purposes; 
they capture similarities between parts of nature that are important or useful, and the 
decision about which ways are important and useful depends on your perspective and what 
interests you.  
The first step to a realist criterion for property identification is to show how structure can and 
should determine meaning, because of the advantages of our language carving nature at the 
joints. In so far as we seek truth, the groupings we use in our language should reflect 
nature’s structure. Like Lewis, we shall think of the structure of the world as the distribution 
of ‘natural’ properties and relations.61 These properties and relations determine similarity and 
therefore the natural groupings. If parts of nature being carved up are similar, then they 
share some properties.62 If this is true then there are some other groupings in the world that 
are better than others: similarity is not flexible.63 On the atomistic picture assumed above, if 
the carving is done at those joints which themselves have no joints, then the parts of nature 
                                               
57 Goodman 1983: 74; Wittgenstein 1953, pp. 66-71 
58 Lewis 1983, pp. 346-7; 1986, pp. 59-63 
59 Lewis 1986, p. 59 
60 Goodman 1972, p. 438 
61 Lewis 1986, pp. 59-69 
62 This assumption is stretched for complex systems – where system-wide similarities can occur 
without much in the way of underlying similarity, but it is assumed that there is underlying similarity, in 
some respects, in all such circumstances. 
63 Contra Goodman 1972: 443-4 
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carved thusly will be fundamental properties. One kind of fundamentality for a property is 
thus defined as the indivisible natural divisions in the world that can be made on the basis of 
natural similarity. 
2.3.3 Structural Properties 
Armstrong’s ‘structural property’ is a useful term of art in metaphysics when talking about 
derivative properties, where: A property, S, is structural if and only if proper parts of 
particulars having S have properties not identical with S and jointly stand in relation R, and 
this state of affairs is the particular’s having S.64 S is constituted by the properties of the 
parts of the composite and their relation to one another. 65 A fundamental property, identified 
by carving nature at the joints that themselves have no joints, inheres in an object that by 
definition has no proper parts and so cannot be constituted this way. Structural properties 
inhere in objects that stand in the relation of mereological products to the objects having 
fundamental properties. They are therefore, since mereological products are ontologically 
dependent on their parts, ontologically dependent on their parts having fundamental 
properties (and standing in certain relations). Structural properties are had by ordinary 
mereological complex objects, which are prima facie derivative entities. This is an example 
of how fundamentality is commonly defined in contrast to ontological dependence. Whether 
or not structural properties can be fundamental will depend on whether mereological 
products are necessarily derivative, which will determine whether the mereological relation is 
a good candidate for the emergent relation.66 There are three options for someone wishing 
to maintain a distinction between fundamentality and ontological independence: either deny 
that indivisible natural divisions are sufficient for fundamentality, deny that mereological 
products are necessarily derivative, or affirm a non-mereological relation of ontological 
dependence between objects. 
2.4 Deflationism about Derivative Entities 
I want to be clear that this is a thesis that both the emergentists and non-emergentists can 
accept. It is crucial that these background assumptions do not rule out emergence from the 
start. So before discussing deflationism I just want to emphasise that emergent entities 
would not be derivative in the sense discussed here.67  
                                               
64 Armstrong himself thought that structural properties corresponded to genuine universals and are 
non-mereologically composed. 
65 Armstrong 1978 
66 See chapter 4 
67 For instance, for the emergentist, emergent properties will be non-structural properties. 
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2.4.1 The Ontological Status of Composite Objects 
Here I’ll briefly mention the debate about the ontological status of composite objects. This 
will be essential background for assessing the compositional view of inherence developed 
later in chapters 8-10 in opposition to emergence. It is also useful background for the 
discussions about existence and identity conditions throughout the thesis.  
On one side there is Willard Van Quine and David Lewis, who argue that if there are some 
objects nothing need be done to make another object with those objects as parts.68 On the 
opposite extreme are the mereological nihilists, who say that there is nothing you could do to 
make a new object using the others as parts; composite objects (e.g. tables, chairs, 
molecules) simply don’t exist: there are only simples. Proponents of this view include Cian 
Dorr and Peter van Inwagen,69 among many others. That van Inwagen is a mereological 
nihilist and yet accepts the addition of living things in his ontology is a clue to the 
compatibility of mereological nihilism and the existence of entities outside the domain of 
fundamental physics.70 To abruptly parse the debate, Lewis says “There exist tables”, and 
the nihilist says “There do not exist tables, there exists only simples arranged table-wise”. 
2.4.2 The Ontological Status of Derivative Entities 
Not all derivative entities are necessarily composite objects or structural properties. There is 
a wider debate about the ontological status of derivative entities. Like with composite 
objects, we can be either inflationary or deflationary about derivative entities. Inflationary 
accounts71 have it that both derivative and fundamental entities really exist, but there is a 
difference between how they exist, or there is a difference in the nature of their existence. 
Deflationary accounts have it that both derivative and fundamental entities can be truthfully 
said to ‘exist’, but in some metaphysically privileged sense only fundamental entities really 
exist. One way to cash out the deflationary claim is that we can say true things about 
derivative entities, but the only things that make up the world are the fundamental entities. 
We’ll look at this distinction in section 3.8. Ross Cameron72 goes further and argues that we 
can not only say true things about a derivative entitiy, x, without an ontology that includes x, 
but even the truth of the proposition ‘x exists’ does not require an ontology that includes x.  
                                               
68 Quine 1976; Lewis 1986: 212-3 
69 Dorr 2003, 2005; van Inwagen 1990 
70 van Inwagen 1990. Another strong clue is, for instance, O’Connor arguing that emergent properties 
are not structural properties. See, e.g. O’Connor 1994, 2000b; O’Connor and Jacobs 2003; O’Connor 
and Wong 2005; O’Connor and Churchill 2010 
71 E.g. Schaffer 2010a, 2010b 
72 In Cameron 2008a, 2010 
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This brings us to another position in the debate about the ontological status of fundamental 
and derivative entities: an appeal to equivocation about the term ‘exists’ that dissolves the 
debate. We might argue that the deflationary and inflationary positions are using the term 
‘exists’ in different ways without there being a corresponding difference in reality. This is not 
an inflationary claim because, while the inflationist believes that the proposition ‘x exists’ has 
multiple meanings, the inflationist also believes that at least some of those meanings 
correspond to differences in the nature of the existence of entities. It is not a deflationary 
claim because, while the deflationist might hold that the true proposition ‘x exists’ does not 
imply that x really exists, and so also believes that the proposition ‘x exists’ has multiple 
meanings, the deflationist also believes that some of the entities that the inflationist believes 
really exist (namely the derivative ones) do not, in fact, exist.  
The trouble is, given our commitment to realism, equivocation about the meaning of the 
proposition ‘x exists’ could make it difficult to have a real debate about the ontological status 
of derivative entities (and thereby emergent entities.) Equivocation threatens to dissolve the 
debate between inflationary and deflationary claims if the key term at issue is equivocal not 
just between the multiple senses of the term ‘exists’ held by the two positions, but also 
between the two positions themselves. 
Equivocation is intuitively appealing, it can seem that the term ‘exists’ is equivocal in this 
debate; the inflationary and deflationary positions above are just different ways of describing 
the same reality.73 To conduct a metaphysical investigation into the ontological status of 
derivative entities, we need to be able to make meaningful truth claims that correspond to 
differences in that ontological status. 
2.4.3 Equivocation About the Term ‘Exists’ 
Let’s call this intuition about the equivocal meaning of metaphysical terms like ‘exists’, 
‘Equivocation’. Equivocation amounts to a denial that anything is really at issue between the 
disputants of a metaphysical debate. The apparent opposition is like that of the ‘verbal’ or 
‘terminological’ disputes encountered in ordinary conversation. The actual, substantive 
situation posited by the two opponents is really the same; they have merely found different 
ways to describe it. Eli Hirsch advocates for a form of Equivocation, he describes the 
intuition as follows: “The first thought... is this: There can’t be anything deep or theoretical 
here. The facts are, so to speak, right in front of our eyes. Our task can only be to remind 
ourselves of relevant ways in which we describe these facts in our language”.74 The task 
then becomes a matter of conceptual analysis, to ‘command a clear view of the use of our 
                                               
73 Which would be contrary to the proclaimed methodology in section 2.1 
74 Hirsch 2002, p. 67 
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words’.75 The dispute is ‘merely verbal’. David Manley argues that a dispute is verbal just in 
case, when holding the facts the same, the closest world in which they do not semantically 
deviate is the one in which they agree.76 Equivocation is strongly revisionary because it 
denies the professed aims of the disputants. 
To use the debate about composite objects as an example, someone who was subject to the 
Equivocation intuition may suspect that, since the table-related facts before Lewis and, say, 
Dorr, seem so obvious and well established, they must be “talking past each other”; they 
simply mean different things when they say “There exist tables”. For instance, perhaps for 
Lewis the proposition ‘There exist tables’ means the same as what the proposition ‘There 
exist simples arranged table-wise’ means for Dorr; each makes claims that are true given 
what he means; so the debate is merely verbal. The argument will dissolve by resolving the 
differences in the way the disputants use certain terms of their propositions.  
To defend this discussion of the ontology of mereology - and realist metaphysics in general - 
we must examine what Equivocation could mean. If Equivocation is true then the dispute 
between Dorr and Lewis is merely verbal; the propositions they express regarding the 
existence of tables must mean different things: “There exist tables” means something 
different in the mouth of Lewis than it does in the mouth of Dorr.  So where does this 
disagreement lie?  
Holding the quantifier ‘there exist’ the same, for the proposition “There exist tables” as 
spoken by Lewis to mean “There exist simples arranged table-wise”—a proposition accepted 
by Dorr—the predicate ‘table’ in Lewis’ mouth, ‘tableLEWIS’, must mean ‘simples arranged 
table-wise’. However, this misses the point of the debate over composite objects, which is 
concerned with whether mereological collections exist. ‘TableLEWIS’ might instead mean 
‘collection of simples arranged table-wise’,77 but then it is clear that the disagreement 
persists. Furthermore, it is possible to retain the substance of the debate even when it is 
recast in terms of a world in which there exists only two simples. In this world, would there 
be just two objects, the simples, or three objects, the two simples plus a mereological 
collection? Since the disagreement between Lewis and Dorr persists, we can see that Dorr 
and Lewis also mean the same thing by the predicate ‘table’: tableDORR = tableLEWIS. 
                                               
75 Wittgenstein 1953 
76 Manley 2009, p. 14 
77 As long as ‘collection’ is understood to mean mereological collection rather than set-theoretical 
collection, see Sider 2009, p. 389 
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Equivocation must instead imply that the quantifier varies between the two propositions.78 In 
the languages of Lewis and Dorr, existsLEWIS means something different to existsDORR. 
Specifically in this example it might be tempting to say that the domain of the quantifiers 
differs as follows: existsLEWIS is unrestricted, whereas existsDORR is restricted to simples. This 
would make it possible for both propositions to be true, making the debate merely verbal. 
However, note that, while Lewis would accept Dorr’s proposition when ‘exists’ =  existsDORR 
because it does not contradict ‘exists’ =  existsLEWIS, the same cannot be said for Dorr, who 
would seem to have no reason to accept a restricted domain for his quantifier. Furthermore, 
it seems to do unnecessary violence to the point of the debate over mereological parts. Dorr 
is not referring only to simples when he says that ‘There do not exist tables’. His quantifier is 
in some sense unrestricted. It is a mistake to think about quantifier variance here in terms of 
the domains, like restricted and unrestricted. Also, we cannot say that one unrestricted 
domain is larger than another, because this would mean that something could somehow 
exist outside everything.79 In what sense can unrestricted quantification vary? 
David Chalmers shows that at least two senses of unrestricted quantification can be 
distinguished: these are heavyweight and lightweight quantification.80 The difference 
between the two is that lightweight existential assertions are trivially true (or false) whereas 
heavyweight existential assertions aren’t. Again, this doesn’t seem to help us; Dorr and 
Lewis will presumably both be using heavyweight quantification. The problem is that Dorr 
and Lewis think they have a substantial dispute on their hands because they intend to mean 
the same thing with their terms; they intend to use the same quantifier. Various candidate 
meanings for unrestricted quantifiers do exist, but the speakers in this case seem to want to 
refer to the same existential quantifier.  
The Equivocationist accepts that the metaphysicians are trying to fix on a single 
distinguished quantifier meaning, but, the Equivocationist argues, the metaphysicians’ 
equivocation needn’t be transparent to them.81 The key problem for us is if there are multiple 
(inferentially and materially adequate) interpretations of quantifiers82 and these candidate 
meanings for quantifiers are not sufficiently metaphysically distinguished. As we shall see, 
we need a realist content-determiner to show that in this is not the case.  
                                               
78 As per Hirsch 2002, 2009 
79 Sider 2007 
80 Chalmers 2009, p. 95-7 
81 Though the hostility of this interpretation makes it clear that ontological equivocation is unlike other 
forms of merely verbal dispute. 
82 see Chalmers 2009; Sider 2007, 2009, pp. 391-3 
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Whether the debate is substantial or not turns on whether existsLEWIS and existsDORR really 
mean different things. If we assume that such candidate meanings exist we can explore 
another premise of the Equivocation position: the denial that some of the candidate 
meanings are better than others in terms of their fitness to the world. We need 
metaphysically realist criteria for choosing among the potential domains. If the realist criteria 
are available and strong enough, then the correct quantifier is fixed within the linguistic 
community. Let’s call this meaning ‘existsN’. This is the candidate meaning that Lewis and 
Dorr are referring to. Their actual usage of ‘there exists’ might not fit with ‘existsN’, but 
nonetheless ‘existsN’ is what they mean. The best candidate meaning is such because of its 
intrinsic eligibility based on naturalness.83 This outweighs ordinary usage as a determiner of 
meaning. If such a content determiner is available then the quantifier is invariant and the 
dispute must be substantial. 
We’ve already argued that there are advantages to our language carving nature at the 
joints.84 More than this, Lewis argues that the natural properties and relations are a factor in 
determining content. In order to decide what Dorr and Lewis’s words mean, we have to look 
at more than just their past usage, or the usage of their community, in order to fix their 
references. Past usage is consistent with a range of possible interpretations of the meaning 
of their words and some of these possible interpretations could be true while others plainly 
false. However, the problem disappears if one of the candidate meanings is metaphysically 
distinguished. Lewis argues that the best candidate is distinguished by its ‘naturalness’.  In 
this sense natural properties and relations act as ‘reference magnets’ that can fix the 
meaning of our words where there is uncertainty. In our example, the candidate meaning 
distinguished by naturalness is ‘existsN’. 
This reference magnetism goes over and above past language use, so it can help explain 
why, when old words are applied to new situations, we think of language users as “going on 
in the same way”. They are like Wittgenstein’s “rails invisibly laid to infinity”.85 A semantic 
sceptic might deny these sorts of natural criteria, but this creates difficulties for realist 
metaphysics. Without something like the “rails invisibly laid to infinity”, there is nothing about 
past usage of the predicate ‘exists’ that would ensure that it will behave in the future the 
same way it has behaved in the past.86 There are too many candidate meanings that are 
consistent with past use for us to be able to judge the truth value of a new proposition (“too 
many” insomuch as the past usage criteria are consistent with both a set of meanings that 
                                               
83 See Manley 2009, pp. 30-1 
84 Section 2.3. 
85 Wittgenstein 1958, p. 218 
86 Hirsch 2002, p. 53 
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would render the new proposition true and a set of meanings that would render it false). 
Furthermore, consistency with the inferences of true statements made in the past will also be 
insufficient. Sure, consistency with past usage and inferential adequacy are requirements for 
selecting among the candidate meanings, but we need something more.87 With the past 
usage and inferential adequacy requirements alone, quantifier variance remains trivially 
correct.  
Returning to Lewis’s doctrine of reference magnetism based on naturalness: If naturalness is 
to distinguish a single quantifier meaning, existsN, the force of reference magnetism must be 
strong enough to outweigh a failure of existsN to match the use of ‘there exists’ in English.88 
The realist can make an assumption about content determination such that the naturalness 
receives a greater relative weight compared with use.89 A strong reference magnet would be 
sufficient for ‘existsDORR’ and ‘existsLEWIS’ to actually mean existsN, even if this does not fit 
Dorr or Lewis’s usage. This would be sufficient, but it is not required to defend realism. Even 
if the magnetic force is too weak to compensate for any significant mismatch with English 
usage, it is possible to recast the debate between Dorr and Lewis so that naturalness will 
sufficiently determine content. 
If the force of reference magnetism is weak, the realist can concede to the proponent of 
Equivocation that naturalness does not outweigh other considerations in determining the 
meaning of ‘there exists’ in English. However, the debate between Dorr and Lewis is not 
about the meaning of the English term ‘there exists’, it is a quasi-scientific search for what 
actually exists.90 To avoid some of the irrelevant considerations involved in ordinary English 
usage we can introduce a new language in which to conduct the debate. While this new 
language must obey the core inferential role of quantifiers in English, other sources of 
mismatch with naturalness will be given a low weighting in content determination. Highly 
natural meanings that are broadly in line with core inferential roles will be given a strong 
weighting, strong enough to accommodate weak magnetism.91 We could call this new 
language ‘Ontologese’. 
Breaking from ordinary usage seems justified here in order to anchor the debate to let us get 
on with the substantive questions that ordinary usage might obscure. It also seems to better 
reflect the quasi-scientific methodology being employed in realist ontology. As described 
                                               
87 This is the argument in Sider 2007 
88 See Sider 2009, p. 413 
89 See Sider 2004 
90 As per section 2.1. 
91 See Dorr 2005 
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above, in realist metaphysics, theoretical insight, considerations of simplicity and integration 
with other domains are more important considerations than the fit with ordinary usage. In 
Ontologese we appeal to the actual structure of the world for the meaning of our terms. If the 
world has a distinguished quantificational structure, then the meaning of quantifier terms will 
reflect that structure.  
Returning to Cameron’s deflationary account of derivative entities,92 he argues that the truth 
of the proposition ‘x exists’ does not require an ontology that includes x. The basis for that 
distinction is that the proposition ‘x exists’ is a natural language proposition, not a proposition 
in Ontologese. In this case use has trumped naturalness; the quantifier expressed does not 
correspond to the non-linguistic structure of reality – it does not carve nature at the joints. 
We are interested only in true sentences in Ontologese, so we assume that derivative 
entities on the deflationary account do not, in fact, exist. It is still possible to cash out the 
deflationary position by saying that we can say true things about derivative entities, but the 
only things that make up the world are the fundamental entities;93 however, for a derivative 
entity, x, whatever else we can truthfully say about it, we cannot say ‘x exists’. 
It is crucial for a theory of emergent properties that derivative entities do not exist. If our 
existence conditions really are equivocal, or if they imply an inflationary account of derivative 
properties, then emergence is a relatively trivial matter. This discussion moves us some way 
towards the necessary existence and identity conditions for a sparse property ontology in a 
realist metaphysics. We will go on to refine these conditions and to argue that the existence 
conditions for properties, while involving considerations about integration with our best 
scientific theories, are, like with the truth of natural language propositions, not a matter of 
quantification over scientific usage.94 A property ontology suffices to explain observed 
scientific macro-phenomena, or to be congruent with the terms in our best scientific theories, 
wherever truthmakers exist for propositions involving those phenomena and theories.95 We 
will also argue that the existence and identity conditions for properties are such that they 
involve the causal profiles of properties, but much more fine-spun argumentation concerning 
our theory of causation is required to individuate causal properties.96 
                                               
92 In Cameron 2008a, 2010; referred to in section 2.2.4.2. 
93 As in section 2.4.2, see section 2.5. 
94 This thread runs through sections 2.4.4, 2.6, 3.1, 3.7. 
95 See section 3.8. 
96 This thread runs through 2.6, 4.4, and chapters 8-11 
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2.4.4 The Relevance of Derivative Entities 
There is more natural structure in the world than that provided by the joints demarking 
fundamental entities. Investigating this larger structure involves other, derivative groupings 
sharing similarities.97 It is assumed that, while fundamentalism implies that ontologically 
there is one distinction in nature - between the fundamental and the derivative – this 
distinction does not imply that all derivative entities are equal in their interest or usefulness. 
There are derivative entities that have a greater or lesser fitness to the world. 
Sider argues that, while we can use arbitrary groupings and in so doing we might be able to 
get at the truth, truth-seeking is best served by adopting the best groupings; progress is 
more difficult using ill-chosen concepts. In any case, the truth-seeker wants more than to 
merely believe many true propositions and few false ones. They want to discern the 
structure of the world. If we lack the appropriate groupings we cannot be said to have 
properly understood this structure.98 Sider is making this link in relation to the basic logical 
structure of quantification and terms like ‘exists’. And in the domains of logic, metaphysics 
and fundamental physics, we might expect the best groupings, the most indispensable 
concepts, to correspond to not just the structure of the world, but to the fundamental 
structure of the world, i.e. the existence of fundamental entities, and this is what we should 
want, since these domains of enquiry are concerned with fundamental structure. However, 
the ideal criteria for the terms used by the truth-seeker will not necessarily be the same in all 
domains and it is not at all clear that this link between fundamental structure and truth-
seeking holds more generally. 
The truth-seeker in metaphysics and fundamental physics may well be best served by 
concepts that correspond to fundamental entities. (Though even in fundamental physics 
there are concepts that are gainfully employed that do not correspond to fundamental 
entities.) In the special sciences beyond fundamental physics, as Jerry Fodor helped point 
out,99 there are many non-fundamental concepts that are indispensable. And if we accept 
Sider’s link between usefulness and correspondence to real structure, their explanatory 
indispensability is a good clue that they do correspond to real structure in the world. We 
might be tempted to go further than this, as Fodor does, and argue that not only does 
explanatory indispensability indicate a correspondence with real structure in the world, it also 
indicates the existence of real entities.  
                                               
97 The view espoused in this section owes a lot to Heil 2003 
98 Sider 2009, pp. 400-2 
99 Fodor 1974 
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Fodor argues that some who have accepted “the generality of physics vis-à-vis the special 
sciences: roughly, the view that all events which fall under the laws of science fall under the 
laws of physics”100 have mistakenly assumed that this implies “that every property mentioned 
in the laws of any science is a physical property, where a physical property is one mentioned 
in the laws of physics”.101 Here it’s clear that Fodor takes properties to be more-or-less 
implied by their mention in laws of science. 
The realist methodology of this thesis102 involves various criteria. Integration with other 
domains is an important criterion, but there are others. And integrating a metaphysical theory 
with special science domains does not in any case require a match with the usage in those 
domains, or taking those concepts seriously as claims about fundamental ontology. He 
argues that special science concepts are not replaceable by concepts belonging to 
fundamental physics. But this is a thesis about predicates, not a thesis concerning properties 
or groupings of properties. At first blush, the explanatory indispensability of concepts within 
the special sciences should not be taken as a threat to deflationism about derivative entities. 
If we take Fodor’s claims ontologically seriously, we might portray him as holding that the 
special sciences each concern themselves with separate domains of real properties. Some 
of which form a hierarchy of levels which depend on each other, but also possess some 
degree of autonomy with respect to lower domains. This is the levels-based picture that we 
rejected in section 2.2.3. 
Given a fundamentalist interpretation, Fodor’s argument amounts to the claim that 
explanatory indispensability is a good clue to the correspondence of concepts with 
fundamental properties. But even if we hold something like the reference magnetism of Sider 
and Lewis, this need not be the case. This section started with the assumption that in 
domains not concerned with fundamental properties, explanatory indispensability might 
indicate correspondence with natural structure, but that that structure could be either 
fundamental or derivative - derivative structure, while never being more or less fundamental, 
can still be more or less natural. There is more natural structure in the world than that 
delineated by fundamental entities. Concepts can correspond to groupings of fundamental 
entities that are more or less gerrymandered. The choice is not between concepts that pick 
out only arbitrary groupings and concepts that pick out only fundamental properties.  
                                               
100 Ibid, p. 97  
101 Ibid, p. 100 
102 See sections 2.1 and 2.4.3. 
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Fodor’s argument will be mentioned again in chapter 3. While such observations do not 
commit us to a particular ontology, like, say, an inflationary position on derivative entities or a 
levels-based conception of reality, the basic insight in Fodor – that there is seemingly 
irreducible causal behaviour - is used to formulate some explananda for a deflationist 
ontology. We will there see that, with our background, there are two broad categories of 
explanation available to a deflationist in this regard – they are emergence and inherence. 
While emergence is of course inflationist when it comes to emergent properties, emergence 
is compatible with deflationism in general.    
In summary, there are many other ways of carving and many other parts of nature that have 
striking similarities that are hidden from the perspective and techniques of fundamental 
physics. While the special sciences are not precluded from discovering fundamental 
properties,103 unless metaphysical emergence is widespread,104 these non-fundamental 
natural groupings are the standard domains of the special sciences. Observations like 
Sider’s about the correspondence between the concepts most useful for truth-seeking and 
the naturalness of those concepts do not pose a threat for our background picture.   
We have so far assumed foundationalism, the existence of ontologically independent 
entities; fundamentalism, the existence of a clear dichotomy between fundamental and 
derivative entities; and deflationism about derivative entities, here defined as the claim that 
derivative entities do not, in fact, exist. We have distinguished between arbitrary structural 
properties, which are not distinguished by Lewis’s ‘naturalness’ and whose identification is 
not useful to the truth-seeker; natural structural properties, which have a greater fitness to 
the world’s structure and references to which are useful to the truth-seeker in the special 
sciences; and fundamental properties, which carve nature at the joints which themselves 
have no joints. The distinction between fundamental properties and structural properties is 
perhaps a subset - and at least analogous to - the distinction between fundamental and 
derivative entities. The relation between fundamental properties and structural properties is 
one of ontological dependence. But we have not ruled out that there may be other relations 
of ontological dependence that are unlike that underlying structural properties and therefore 
could be the relation of Barnes’s emergence.105 To say more about ontological dependence 
and about the difference, if any, between properties and entities, we will first have to say a 
little bit about substances. 
                                               
103 This would beg the question against emergentism. 
104 To be clear, Fodor 1974 could imply ether non-fundamentalism, inflationism about derivative 
entities, or widespread emergence. 
105 Barnes 2012 
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2.5 Substance 
Like property, substance is a category in fundamental ontology. The idea of substance is 
derived from the notion of individual things or objects. These are the things in which 
properties inhere, or which exemplify or instantiate properties. But substances have also 
performed other roles, depending on whether substances are the fundamental entities or 
whether they depend on something else.106 Kim defines substance as the ‘constitutive 
object’ of an event, the category that exemplifies properties.107 There is debate as to whether 
the fundamental entities are substances or something else (in Kim’s case, events). At issue 
is the nature of objects, and whether objects are a basic entity, or one that is characterized 
by more fundamental entities, like states of affairs, events or a bundle of property-entities. 
The ontological status of objects in relation to events and whether substances are necessary 
for objects are both important questions for fundamental ontology. The following are some 
options in that debate. 
2.5.1 Objects as Bundles of Properties  
Do substances have to be ontologically additional entities? One of the main supposed 
functions of substances is to give objects particularity. Campbell108 argues that if properties 
themselves are particulars then substances are not needed at all, and if substances are not 
needed, then the desire for ontological economy would suggest against substance as an 
ontological category. Objects would instead be entirely constituted by bundles of their 
properties. 
However, Armstrong argues109 that it is a category mistake to substantialise properties. 
Properties are just incapable of independent existence. And this problem remains whether 
properties are tropes,110 as held by Campbell, or universals, as held by Armstrong. The 
central idea here is that properties are the way that things are, properties are not things in 
themselves. Substances function not just to individuate individual objects: they also enable 
the existence of the property instances exemplified by an individual substance. The 
significant feature of a substance is that it is capable of independent existence in a way that 
properties are not. While an individual substance can exist independently of the property 
instances it bears, those property instances cannot exist without the individual substance of 
which they are properties. 
                                               
106 We’ll establish a less liberal notion by the end of this section, which will be relevant to the 
arguments in section 4.5. 
107 See 'Events as Property Exemplifications' in Kim 1993 
108 1990 
109 1989 pp. 114-5, 1997 p.99 
110 ‘Module’ tropes, as opposed to ‘modifier’ tropes. 
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2.5.2 Substances as Thin Particulars  
Armstrong instead argues that substance is a substratum or thin particular. The fundamental 
entity here is a state of affairs comprising a thin particular and the properties it exemplifies. 
The thin particular possesses properties, but it is distinct from those properties. In 
Armstrong’s ontology, it is the thin particular that particularises the property-universal’s 
individual objects, but the thin particular, while exemplifying the properties it possesses, 
does not, in itself, have any properties. On this account thin particulars and property 
instances are separate and distinct entities.111 
One implication of Armstrong’s theory of substance is that it requires an additional category 
– states of affairs. This is because there must be something in the world in virtue of which 
the thin particular and its properties are ‘welded’ together. For Armstrong this can’t be either 
the thin particular, the property instance, or the two together, because there is nothing 
intrinsic about these categories that would guarantee the relationship of instantiation of that 
property by that particular at that time. The instantiation of the property by the substance is 
the state of affairs, which is a form of non-mereological composition, and a new category of 
being. 
The idea of states of affairs as ontologically additional entities is problematic.  Some have 
criticised the idea of thin particulars.112 The worry is whether the idea of an entity lacking any 
properties is incoherent, and to what extent it is an issue that such an entity is beyond 
experience. To elucidate the idea, Armstrong refers to the Fregean notion of the 
unsaturatedness of concepts: he says that a state of affairs has ‘blanks as part of its nature’ 
that are filled by thin particulars and property instances.113 Furthermore, a thin particular can 
only exist within a state of affairs, a thin particular seems strange when considered by itself 
only because it cannot exist independently. This explains why the notion is strange, since 
the thin particular cannot be experienced, the only way we can know of it is through the 
particularity of the properties that it instantiates as part of a state of affairs. 
Problems remain for this account however, for instance, how can one thin particular be 
distinguished from another thin particular – something that would seem to be necessary for 
them to function as particularisers - without there being any properties by which to do so? 
Armstrong argues that the numerical distinctness of thin particulars is sufficient for this task.   
                                               
111 In a formal sense rather than capable of independent existence. 
112 e.g. Campbell 1990 
113 1997, p. 29 
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2.5.3 Aristotelian Substance Ontology 
Another theory of substance114 is that properties are ways that substances are, and, as 
such, properties and substances are so intimately connected that they do not need any 
additional entity like a state of affairs to ‘weld’ them together. This is because, when 
properties are taken seriously as ways that substances are, the two aren’t separate and 
distinct in the way that they are in Armstrong’s account. Substances are property bearers; 
properties are ways substances are.115 The two categories of being are complementary. 
Every substance is itself some way or another - often many ways - and there is no need for 
there to be anything that binds a substance to its properties. For a substance to possess a 
property is just for that substance to be a certain way; properties do not make up a 
substance – they are not parts of a substance. When we consider the substance absent its 
properties, or we consider any of the properties absent its substance, we are abstracting – 
this is what Locke called ‘partial consideration’. According to this view the categories of 
substance and property are fundamental and inseparable. A substance must have some 
properties – it cannot be no way at all. And a property must be a property of a substance. 
On the Aristotelian view there is no more fundamental category than substance and property 
– like states of affairs or bundles of tropes - from which either of the categories can be 
derived. There is no relation equivalent to the instantiation relation between Armstrong’s 
universals and substances on this view. But the two categories are inseparable and cannot 
exist without each other. In section 2.2.1 we gave a minimal definition of ontological 
dependence (OD) as follows: 
(OD) An entity x is dependent iff for all possible worlds w and times t at which a 
duplicate of x exists, that duplicate is accompanied by other concrete, contingent 
objects in w at t116 
It should be clear from this that while substances cannot exist independently of any 
properties, this is not a form of ontological dependence. Whether properties are entities or 
not, they are certainly not objects on the Aristotelian account.117 This leads us back to the 
characterisation of a substance as an ontologically independent entity.118 Since substances 
                                               
114 As put forward in, for instance, Martin 1980. 
115 For more on properties as ways, see Levinson 1978, 1980; Seargent 1985; Armstrong 1997a, pp. 
30-1; Heil 2003, 2012 Ch 2. 
116 This is from Barnes 2012, p. 880 
117 It is noted here that this also implies that, if properties are entities, then their inseparability from 
substances makes them ontologically dependent on them. It might be argued that they are 
fundamental and ontologically dependent entities. This will form part of our discussion about the 
relationship between ontological dependence and fundamentality in sections 4.5-6. 
118 See, for example, Campbell 1976, 1990; Robb 2009. 
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are objects on the Aristotelian account, they’re inseparability from properties does not make 
them ontologically dependent; it is they that can have the ontological independence 
necessary to guarantee the existence of all other entities. They could be the existential 
foundation we committed to in section 2.2.2. The world would be a world of objects.119 In 
order to perform this role, if complex objects depend on their parts, substances seem to 
have to be simple. We will return to this in section 3.1. 
2.6 Causal Powers 
In the next few sections we’ll set out some options on what the relationship between causal 
powers and properties might be. There are a range of different theories, but in the 
background here is Plato’s Eleatic Stranger: 
I suggest that anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of 
power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a degree, by 
the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to 
distinguish real things that they are nothing but power.120 
Here the idea is that there is nothing to a concrete entity but its power to affect and be 
affected. Properties confer powers to the objects possessing them – they are ‘pure powers’. 
This means that properties make a difference to the way the world unfolds and the truth of 
any counterfactuals in which they feature is due to the powers that properties confer. 
Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea that properties are powers.121 There is 
the Eleatic Principle122 and Alexander’s Dictum123, both of which express roughly the same 
principle that to be real is to possess causal powers. The Eleatic Principle posits that all 
properties make a difference to the causal powers of something. Alexander’s dictum is 
stronger, it posits that all properties must contribute causal powers to objects.124  
Similar ideas are also at work in the distinction between genuine properties and ‘mere 
Cambridge properties’, which are arbitrary and not real. An example of the latter is Fodor’s 
H-particle.125 A particle has the property, being an H-particle, just in case it is a particle and a 
                                               
119 Rather than ‘a world of states of affairs’ as per Armstrong 1997 
120 Plato, Sophist 247d-e 
121 I’m going to us the terms ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ interchangeably. Philosophers who have held 
that properties are powers include the following: Boscovich 1763; Priestley 1777; Harrè 1970; Harrè 
and Madden 1975; Mellor 1974, 2000; Shoemaker 1980; and Swoyer 1982.  
122 Oddie 1982 
123 Kim 1993, p. 202 
124 Strictly speaking, it is to this dictum, not the Eleatic Principle, to which we must appeal to rule out 
non-power properties. See Molnar’s positional properties for an example of properties that make a 
causal difference but are not properties: Molnar 2003, pp. 158-60. 
125 Fodor 1988, p.33 
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coin tossed by Fodor lands heads. We do not consider these properties to be genuine 
because they are obviously gerrymandered and possession of them is dependent on distal 
objects, but another reason that we think these properties are not genuine is that an object’s 
having of them makes no difference to the way that object behaves. One reason to favour 
such a view of properties is the worry that, if properties were causally impotent, then they 
would be undetectable and therefore unknowable (insofar as detectability requires some 
kind of causal interaction with something). There is a problem of epistemic access to non-
dispositional properties. Another, stronger, reason to favour the view that properties are 
powers is that, if a property did indeed make no difference to the powers of its possessor, 
then it would seem to make no difference at all.126 
2.6.1 Pure Powers 
The theory of properties as pure powers goes further than the dictum that all properties must 
bestow powers. To give a more precise definition of the thesis: proponents of the pure 
powers theory believe that intrinsic properties of concrete objects are distinguished by 
distinctive contributions they make to powers or dispositionalities of their possessors.127 Here 
is Shoemaker, a prominent advocate of the view that properties are powers, providing 
reasons to suppose that not only do all properties make a causal difference, they are also 
distinguished by causes: 
Suppose that the identity of properties consisted of something logically independent 
of their causal potentialities. Then it ought to be possible for there to be properties 
that have no potential whatever for contributing to causal powers, i.e., are such that 
under no conceivable circumstances will their possession by a thing make any 
difference to the way the presence of that thing affects other things or to the way 
other things affect it. Further, it ought to be possible for there to be two or more 
different properties that make, under all possible circumstances, exactly the same 
contribution to the causal powers of things that have them. Further, it ought to be 
possible that the potential of a property for contributing to the production of causal 
powers might change over time, so that, for example, the potential possessed by 
property A at one time is the same as that possessed by property B at a later time, 
and that possessed by property B at the earlier time is the same as that possessed 
by property A at the later time. Thus a thing might undergo radical change with 
respect to its properties without undergoing any change in its causal powers, and a 
                                               
126 These arguments are examined more closely in chapter 8. 
127 This definition is from Heil 2003, p. 76. Note that Heil and Martin, while being powers theorists, are 
not pure powers theorists. 
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thing might undergo radical change in its causal powers without undergoing any 
change in the properties that underlie these powers.128 
From considerations like these we might draw the following theory of property identity: 
(PI)  Necessarily, if A and B are properties, A = B just in case A and B make the 
same contribution to the causal powers of their possessors.129  
A possible objection arises. The basic thought is that if a property did indeed make no 
difference to the powers of its possessor, then it would seem to make no difference at all, the 
above principles are embellishments of that. But perhaps properties that are causally 
irrelevant are still relevant—they make a difference—in some other, non-causal, way. What 
sort of property might make a non-causal difference?  
2.6.2 Categorical Properties 
One reason to think that not all properties are powers is the plausibility of categorical or 
qualitative properties. These include the qualities of conscious experience and also the 
qualities of ordinary physical objects. Here is an example of a line of argument against a 
theory of properties as pure powers: 
On the face of it, a qualitatively empty world is indistinguishable from the void. The 
worry here is not just that a world barren of qualities would be dull and listless. A 
weighty tradition, going back at least to Berkeley, has it that the notion of a world 
without qualities is incoherent: a wholly non-qualitative world is literally 
unthinkable.130 
The real difficulty lies not in the threat of a regress, but in the fact that qualities play a 
central role in the identity and individuation of powers. Strip away the qualities, and it 
is no longer clear what, if anything, you are talking about.131 
The existence of categorical properties is a counterexample to a theory of properties as pure 
powers in so far as these properties are not identified by their contribution to the causal 
powers of their possessor. This would be true if such properties were purely categorical, or if 
a property were both categorical and dispositional, but it was possible for its qualitative 
                                               
128 Shoemaker 1980, pp. 214-5 
129 We will look a lot more closely at considerations of property identification in chapter 8 and 9. For 
now the purpose is just to outline our basic assumptions about properties.  
130 Heil 2003, p. 76 
131 Heil 2012, p. 71  
43 
 
features to vary independently of its dispositional ones. What can we say about the 
distinction between categorical and dispositional properties? 
Drawing the distinction is difficult. Some have argued that properties are both dispositional 
and categorical.132 But there is also a tendency in usage for ‘categorical’ to refer to any non-
dispositional property, making the two mutually exclusive and exhaustive.133  
I will use the terms ‘categorical’ and ‘qualitative’ interchangeably to refer to intrinsic 
qualitative properties and the term ‘dispositional’ to refer to properties that bestow powers, 
where certain powers are bestowed on an object solely by that object having a certain 
property. “Dispositional properties, if there are any, have their powers ‘built in’.”134 This last 
sentence is to be contrasted with properties that bestow powers only indirectly. For instance, 
Armstrong argues that properties bestow causal powers on their possessors only in virtue of 
laws of nature.135 On this picture, properties are intrinsic and qualitative and it is the relations 
that hold between those properties that determine the powers that are conferred. 
2.6.3 Intrinsic vs Relational 
This leads us to one of the ways in which the distinction between dispositional and 
categorical properties can be drawn: the notion of intrinsicality. Let’s define an intrinsic 
property as “nonrelation[al] in the sense that its possession by an object does not (logically 
or conceptually) require the existence of any separate object or the existence of that same 
object, or a part of that same object, at some other time. An object, o1, is separate from an 
object, o2, just in case o1 is not identical with o2 or with any part of o2.”136 We can distinguish 
categorical properties from ‘mere Cambridge properties’ on this basis. Categorical properties 
are intrinsic, they are possessed by objects independently of other objects; but the 
possession of mere Cambridge properties is dependent on other, separate objects, like the 
flipping of Fodor’s coin. 
Here there is an analogy with Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary (and 
tertiary) qualities.137 Secondary and tertiary qualities on Locke’s account are powers to 
produce certain sorts of effects in conscious observers and the qualities of other objects 
respectively. An example of a tertiary quality would be the sun’s power to melt wax. An 
example of a secondary quality would be a tomato’s power to produce the experience of 
                                               
132 See the limit view of Martin, e.g. 2008 
133 See Mumford 1998 
134 Heil 2003, p. 79 
135 See e.g., Armstrong 1997 
136 Heil 1992, p. 24 
137 Locke 1690: II. viii 
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seeing red. Primary qualities, which include ‘solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and 
number’138 as well as bulk and texture,139 are intrinsic qualities.140 They could be possessed 
by a lone object in virtue of that object alone. In contrast, the tomato, which while ripe always 
possesses the necessary primary qualities in its surface - the necessary topography or 
texture, let’s say - to produce in an observer the experience of seeing red, can only possess 
the secondary quality of ‘looking red’ in virtue of the relation between its primary qualities 
and the observer. The secondary and tertiary qualities of the tomato are characterised by 
their possible effects on an observer or on other objects, while the primary qualities are ways 
the object is independently of observers or other objects. 
Locke thus employs the notion of intrinsicality to distinguish different sorts of property; 
however, his distinction does not match up with the distinction between categorical and 
dispositional properties. Primary qualities on Locke’s account, like the round shape of the 
tomato, also bestow powers, like the power to produce the experience of ‘roundness’ in an 
observer, or the power to produce a round indentation in a soft surface. Because Locke’s 
intrinsic primary qualities also bestow powers, they are also dispositional properties, so 
using Locke’s notions of primary qualities and secondary qualities to distinguish between 
categorical properties and dispositional properties is a non-starter—relational secondary 
qualities are dispositional, but intrinsic primary qualities are both qualitative and 
dispositional. 
There are at least two ways that we can alter Locke’s distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities for it to illuminate the categorical/dispositional distinction. We can push 
the relational nature of dispositions and maintain that categorical properties and only 
categorical properties are intrinsic. Or we can push the thought that dispositional properties 
depend and are determined by underlying categorical properties, just as the dispositional 
property to ‘look red’ is possessed in virtue of intrinsic properties of the tomato. We’ll take 
the first of these options first, and say more about the second option in the section below 
about grounding dispositions. 
Conceiving of dispositions as relations naturally follows from how we commonly identify 
dispositions, which is in terms of their manifestations. For instance, the dispositional property 
to ‘look red’ bestows the tomato with the power to produce the experience of redness when 
an observer is present. The manifestation in this case is the experience of redness (which 
may, of course, never occur if the tomato is never placed in front of an observer). Likewise, a 
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vase has the dispositional property of fragility, which bestows the vase with the power to 
shatter if forcibly struck. The manifestation in this case is the vase shattering, and the 
conditional nature of these definitions is critical. We shall look in a later section at whether an 
account of dispositions as conditional statements or in terms of conditional statements is 
workable; what is clear here is that the conditionality of the dispositional property with 
respect to its manifestations does not constitute a relation.  
Going back to the red tomato, on the present account its being red is a matter of it having 
the power to produce a red experience if confronted by an observer. But this conditional 
does not mean that the tomato possesses this power because it stands in some relation to 
the experiences of potential observers. Indeed, it would be an unintuitive result if it were the 
case. As an example, imagine a universe in which only the tomato existed, and the having of 
a dispositional property meant standing in some relation to other objects; in that universe the 
tomato would not be red. It seems reasonable to assume that objects can have dispositions 
that never manifest. If not, then we must admit that an object’s actual properties are changed 
by the occurrence or removal of distal objects just whenever the latter are necessary for the 
manifestation of the former. Imagine the fragile vase and consider whether or not it would 
stop being fragile just because it were floating in a region of deep space where no other 
object could reach it. If one admits that a vase is fragile even if it never happens to be 
shattered, and if one admits that such a vase is still fragile even if it could not in practice be 
shattered, then it seems intuitive to admit that such a vase is still fragile even if it is in a world 
where, all else being equal, it could not possibly be shattered.141 
In contrast, one might think that the powers of an object are contingent with respect to its 
properties. For instance, a vase is fragile because it possesses a certain molecular structure, 
an amorphous arrangement of silica, which makes it susceptible to breakage at very little 
force of impact. However, one might suppose, if things were different, (if, say, we think that 
there are independent laws of nature), then it could be possible for the vase to have the 
exact same properties—being an amorphous solid, etc—and yet not be fragile: not have the 
power to break at very little force of impact. By this I do not mean that the glass vase would 
not break if it were in different circumstances, like being a different temperature, or 
undergoing tempering or lamination, but rather that the exact same vase could survive being 
hit with the exact same force, with nothing about it having changed except for the ability to 
break. If properties are powers then this would not be possible. Glass—an amorphous solid 
of the relevant kind—necessarily breaks easily in the right circumstances; if we were in a 
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world where the vase no longer did this, then some of its properties must be different; the 
properties and powers of the vase could not vary independently. 
2.6.4 Grounding Dispositions 
Pushing the relational conception of dispositional properties was our first option for drawing 
the distinction between categorical and dispositional properties. Our second option was to 
push the thought that dispositional properties depend and are determined by underlying 
categorical properties. In that vein, we might instead postulate that all powers are ‘higher-
level properties’ that are possessed by objects in virtue of that object’s primary, categorical 
properties. Categorical properties ‘ground’ the dispositional properties, they are the ‘bases’ 
of the dispositions, or their ‘realizers’. 
The idea that dispositions are ‘higher-level’ properties ‘grounded’ in ‘lower-level’ qualitative 
properties is separate from the idea that categorical properties are intrinsic and dispositional 
properties are relational: these grounding and realization relations do not rely on distal 
objects; they are not external relations. 
Functional properties might be a sort of dispositional property on this account. Certainly 
‘higher-level’ dispositional properties would be ‘multiply realizable’. Household glass, 
ordinary ceramics and eggshells are all fragile, but each of them is fragile in virtue of a 
different micro-structure. For example, these objects might possess the following: an 
amorphous silica structure for glass, a semi-crystalline clay structure for ceramics, and a 
crystalline calcium carbonate structure for eggshells. In virtue of possessing each of these 
different material properties, the vase, the dinner plate and the chicken egg respectively, all 
have the power to break easily when struck—they are all fragile.142 The differences in the 
micro-structures of these fragile objects prevents identification of the shared dispositional 
property ‘being fragile’ with any single micro-structural property.  
One option is to say that the higher-level dispositional property is realized by, or grounded in, 
each of these distinct lower-level properties. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson143 give an 
argument in support of this thesis, which is based on the following characterisation of the 
nature of dispositions: 
For each disposition we can specify a pair of antecedent circumstances and 
manifestation which together determine the disposition under discussion. In the case 
of fragility, the pair is (roughly) {knocking, breaking}, in the case of water solubility the 
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properties, i.e. they are not, in fact, real properties. The examples are purely for illustration. 
143 1982; contingent laws of nature will also have a role in explaining dispositions on this account. 
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pair is {putting in water, dissolving} and so on for the other familiar cases. By ‘a 
causal basis’ we mean the property or property-complex of the object that, together 
with the first member of the pair – the antecedent circumstances – is the causally 
operative sufficient condition – for the manifestation in the case of ‘surefire’ 
dispositions, and in the case of probabilistic dispositions is causally sufficient for the 
relevant chance of the manifestation.144 
The properties that ground dispositions – the ‘causal basis’ – are then argued to be distinct 
from dispositions themselves.145  
What is clear from the above definition is that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson assume that 
dispositions are analysable as conditional statements; however, we shall see in chapter 8 
that this is not always possible.146 Even when such conditional statements are complicated 
beyond the simple characterisation given above, dispositions cannot be analysed this 
way.147  
The conclusion itself is also problematic: dispositions on the grounding thesis are causally 
impotent.148 Now, it should be clear that proponents of this view are not making the same 
ontological assumptions with regard to fundamentalism, since dispositions are regarded as 
‘higher-level properties’, which, if they were not causally impotent would imply ‘a curiously 
and extravagant kind of overdetermination’.149 Nonetheless, according to our assumptions, 
dispositions should properly be held, according to this argument, as a derivative entity. 
References to such properties might figure in explanations and counterfactuals, but we are 
committed to realism and it seems that the only explanation for causation required in the 
grounding thesis is the presence of the underlying categorical properties and the conditions 
for manifestation. Postulating additional epiphenomenal dispositional properties to 
accompany the categorical ones seems otiose. But if we were to do away with these 
epiphenomenal powers and explain the fragility of the vase simply by the ‘causal basis’ for 
its breaking, it seems that such a causal base would itself amount to properties as powers.150  
We will proceed with the assumption that powers are either identical to, or figure into the 
identity conditions of, the properties of objects. We assume this broadly on the grounds of 
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145 Ibid pp. 253-4. 
146 Because of e.g. finks. 
147 Again, see chapters 8 and 9. These reformed conditional statements in any case assume that 
which is to be proven – that dispositions are distinct from their causal bases.  
148 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982, p.255. 
149 Jackson 1997, p. 202 
150 This argument is from Heil 2002, pp. 87-9. For more on the idea of powers being grounded in 
categorical properties, see Mellor 1974 and Molnar 2003, Ch. 8. 
48 
 
epistemic access and because, if it were not the case, then it would seem that intrinsic 
properties could not make a causal difference.151 Looking into the finer detail about the 
nature of properties will be reserved for later when it will become more important to the 
argument. 
This concludes the background picture. We have assumed a realist and naturalistic 
metaphysics. We have argued that there exists an ontologically independent and atomist 
foundation to reality. Reality also comprises a single, fundamental level, though we have so 
far resisted the temptation to say that the fundamental level is the foundation of reality, and 
we have said that all derivative entities do not really exist, once that term is understood in 
the relevant way.152 Properties on the other hand are real, at least the fundamental ones, 
and all properties are either powers or bestow them. Whether or not properties qualify as 
entities, we have assumed that properties inhere in substances – our atomistic foundation is 
one of objects. These assumptions and the considerations that have gone along with them 
will be critical in the next stage of the thesis. We are going to take the motivating 
observations discussed in chapter 1 and develop a problem for this background picture. That 
will be the topic of the next chapter.  
3. The Explananda of the Problem of Reduction 
This chapter looks at macro-phenomena that supposedly motivate emergent explanations. In 
each case we shall analyse whether these phenomena really do require an emergent 
explanation, as per chapter 1, because they contradict one of our background assumptions. 
The discussion begins with a look at the notion of reduction, the failure of which is often 
taken as an explanandum of emergence. After looking at what kind of reductive failure would 
motivate emergence, we go on to look at other potential explananda and settle on a general 
problem that should be solved by a theory of emergence. 
                                               
151 Of course there are other ways of abiding by the Eleatic principle without going as far as to say 
that properties are metaphysically individuated by their causal profile. Armstrong for instance has 
categorical universals that through laws of nature will always make a causal difference without the 
properties being essentially causal. 
152 Prima facie, if Barnes’s emergence exists, then there are fundamental entities at different levels, 
which conflicts with this assumption. But there is no reason to assume that ontological dependence 
will generate levels, or that the fundamental emergent properties on Barnes’s view are any less 
fundamental than other fundamental properties. Once again to emphasise that these assumptions are 
consistent with emergentism. 
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3.1 The Reduction of Natural Kinds 
3.1.1 Boyd on Reduction 
In this section we’re going to raise supposed problems for the view above. These are 
candidate problems that a theory of emergence might be supposed to solve. Let’s begin with 
another look at the problem of the conceptual reduction of special science terms. Richard 
Boyd,153 like Fodor,154 starts with the insight that the special sciences employ categories that 
are not recognised by fundamental physics. Like Fodor, Boyd has reasonable doubts that 
there can be a type-type correspondence between natural kind predicates in a completed 
fundamental physics and natural kind predicates in the completed special sciences.  
Boyd, however, is not dealing only with predicates. For Boyd, these ‘natural kinds’ are 
clusters or families of real properties: “definitions of natural kinds are reflections of the 
properties of their members that contribute to that aptness” in explanation.155 It is in virtue of 
natural kinds that the special sciences have a certain degree of explanatory autonomy with 
regard to more ‘basic’ sciences.156 The autonomy of the ‘natural kinds’ – their aptness in 
explanation – is indicative of their naturalness.157 “The naturalness of natural kinds consists 
in their aptness for induction and explanation.”158 An important part of the explanatory 
aptness for Boyd is the use of natural kind terms in induction – they are projectable to predict 
behaviour in new circumstances. 
It’s clear that Boyd does regard natural kinds as clusters of real, powerful properties, and he 
makes a distinction between these ‘homeostatic property clusters’ and mere ‘nominal 
kinds’.159 Natural kinds make contributions to the powers of their objects and do causal work. 
His natural kinds nonetheless exhibit only family resemblances and they cannot be precisely 
characterised in terms of the members of these property clusters.  
Is this something that needs to be explained by the fundamentalist, deflationist view 
espoused above? The question depends on whether natural kinds are supposed to be new 
fundamental properties themselves. If this is the explanation for the failure to reduce natural 
kinds to their members, then that is a problem for our fundamental ontology and demands 
explanation. It should be clear from Boyd’s definition that this is not the case. Natural kinds 
are not themselves properties, but merely homeostatic clusters of properties exhibiting family 
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155 Boyd 1999: 410 
156 As an aside, we aren’t necessarily talking about a neatly nested hierarchy of sciences, but perhaps 
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157 Compare Sider 2009  
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resemblance. Boyd’s idea amounts to the claim that there is no finite cluster of properties 
definitive of (at least some) natural kinds. Natural kinds instead comprise a vaguely defined 
sufficiency of necessary properties. This of course may imply a failure of one sort of 
reduction, but it does not imply the existence of a new property. 
Natural kinds as indefinite groupings of properties is no more a problem for our background 
picture than irreducible predicates. Without something to substantiate these groupings, we 
can accept that the aptness of natural kind terms is indicative of their naturalness by pointing 
to the same observations we did with Fodor: there is more natural structure in the world than 
that given by the fundamental joints in nature. Not all science is involved in carving ‘the’ 
joints. Reality has endless joints and different sciences circumscribe different joints that are 
significant for reasons other than their fundamentality. It is an interesting and important 
insight that different scientific domains commemorate different and incommensurable 
taxonomies, but this insight alone is not sufficient for an explanandum in fundamental 
metaphysics. 
3.1.2 Van Gulick on Varieties of Reduction 
If not the failure of conceptual reduction, what other problems of reduction might be a 
problem for us? What would be sufficient for an explanandum given our background picture? 
Let’s have a look at some varieties of reduction. The basic idea of reduction is that, if Xs 
reduce to Ys, then Xs are, in some way, nothing more than Ys. The notion of reduction is 
used in a variety of ways. In order to differentiate these notions of reduction we need to be 
specific about two things: 
1. The relata: What sorts of things are Xs and Ys. 
2. The relation: How must the Xs and Ys be related in order to count as reduction.160 
Now, clearly one of the problems with Fodor’s anti-reductionism as far as we’re concerned 
was that the relata were theoretical or conceptual, so that a failure for reduction to hold was 
not a problem for the fundamentalist ontological picture. Van Gulick calls this 
Representational Reduction, or REP-Reduction.161 This is as opposed to Ontological 
Reduction, ONT-Reduction, which is a relation between real-world items such as objects or 
properties. 
Our contention in the preceding section on Boyd was that, since natural kinds are mere 
collections, there is no failure of reduction. The Xs are a collection of objects and the Ys are 
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objects; therefore, since the relata are real world items, Boyd’s is a claim about the failure of 
ONT-Reduction. It is not, however, a successful claim. This is because when we move to the 
question of the relation between these items, we have a ready answer to the question of how 
the Xs are related to the Ys. The answer is composition. 
There are other possible relations that could satisfy ONT-Reduction. Van Gulick identifies 
five possible candidates: elimination, identity, composition, supervenience, and 
realization.162 The candidate that will be most interesting to us is composition.163 If the Xs are 
composed entirely by Ys, does this mean that Xs are ‘nothing more than’ Ys? One of the 
advantages of composition over a straightforward claim of identity is that composition can 
perhaps more readily accommodate the family resemblance and vaguely defined sufficiency 
conditions of natural kinds. A composite X can outlive the component Ys which compose it at 
any given time. This also seems an apt characterisation of what is happening with Boyd’s 
natural kinds as mere clusters of properties.  
A problem arises, however, when we want to move to sufficiency conditions for reduction 
more generally. Van Gulick introduces a complication for a simple compositional analysis of 
ONT-Reduction.164 The problem is that the composition relation – defined as the Xs’ being 
composed entirely of Ys – is insufficient for the reduction of the Xs to the Ys - defined as the 
thesis that all of the Xs’ parts are entirely Ys. This does not apply to Boyd’s natural kinds 
because they are merely the collection of properties meeting some vague sufficiency 
conditions, and nothing more. But we note here that it might be a problem for claims of 
reduction in the absence of the italicised clause. 
Boyd’s (and Fodor’s) argument proceeds from the insight that reduction has failed for 
theoretical concepts and imputes ontological significance to this insight. Part of their 
arguments is to show that there is a failure of a certain form of REP-Reduction, a form that 
Van Gulick calls Theoretical-Derivational reduction.165 Theoretical-Derivational reduction is 
one of five candidates Van Gulick identifies for satisfying REP-Reduction; the other four 
being, A priori Conceptual Necessitation, Expressive Equivalence, and Teleo-Pragmatic 
Equivalence. If we are correct in our characterisations of Boyd and Fodor, then the failure of 
Theoretical-Derivational reduction is clearly compatible with the success of ONT-Reduction. 
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or to be straightforwardly identified with certain objects. It is not necessary for us to defend either sort 
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The view of Boyd (at least) can thus be properly interpreted as the belief that, while there is 
just one domain of reality, as best understood by fundamental physics, adequately 
representing all the complex features of that reality is beyond the theoretical resources of the 
physical sciences. Similarly, just as the fact of composition fails in itself to entail the ONT-
Reduction of one set of real entities to another, the lack of a sufficiently close derivation of 
one set of theories to another does not in itself entail the failure of ONT-Reduction between 
any corresponding entities.  
Are there any varieties of REP-Reduction that, if they failed to hold, would be a problem for 
the background picture? The last two types of REP-Reduction mentioned above, Expressive 
Equivalence and Teleo-Pragmatic Equivalence, can be used to highlight a relevant 
consideration. The two sorts of equivalence are forms of reduction where the relata are not 
just theories or concepts, but whole ‘representational systems’. If the expressive range of the 
two representational systems isn’t equivalent, then reduction has failed. While this seems 
like a broader and therefore weaker requirement, its relevance to ONT-Reduction begins 
with one notable failure of reduction in this area – the alleged special nature of first-person 
phenomenal concepts and the sorts of experiential facts that we can supposedly access only 
through their use.  
A person’s experiences seem to be radically different to the features exhibited by the 
behaviour of objects as observed from the third-person. And the first-person perspective 
seems to have a maximally direct nature, which would make us aware of those experiences 
in a way that makes it difficult to conceive that we could be mistaken about the intrinsic 
character of the experiences themselves. The familiar Cartesian intuition suggests that these 
experiences have fundamentally distinctive features and that there are no intrinsic features 
of them that we cannot directly access through subjective experience. One such feature that 
would seem to preclude ONT-Reduction is the supposed ‘substantial unity’ of our 
experiences, which, if we take it as veridical - as the Cartesian intuition requires - seems to 
preclude the possibility of our experiences being a composite product of parts or some other 
complex relata of reduction. Rather, it is argued by some to be indubitable evidence of a 
fundamental particularity in our experience.166 If true, the implication seems to be that these 
representations themselves carry an ontological implication. This would be a form of REP-
Reduction failure that could imply the failure of ONT-Reduction. 
Many philosophers have resisted this implication and ones like it. And some have argued 
further that there are no facts about consciousness that cannot be adequately known from a 
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third-person perspective, so there is no gap in the expressive range of the two 
representational systems – the first-person experiential system and the third-person 
scientific one.167 Regardless of the merit of these arguments, the claim is usefully illustrated 
by the move to a relation of Teleo-Pragmatic Equivalence. This theory of reduction involves 
bringing in other parameters of representation beyond the terms in which expressive 
equivalence is analysed. Here representation involves other parameters such as the 
representation user, the context of use, and the goals of the representation. The problem 
then becomes to find a way to “use the contextually embedded resources of the reducing 
theory to do the equally contextual representational work done by the items in the theory we 
are trying to reduce.”168 This contextual and pragmatic relation of reduction is very likely to 
fail when it comes to the disparity in representational resources between third-person 
scientific theories and first-person experiences.  
Such failure can occur and this is not considered a problem for the physicalist. It is to be 
expected given the differences in context and resources. It is open to them to point to 
independent reasons why they hold certain accounts of representation. And given that these 
accounts change the relata for reduction, the success or failure of the equivalence of 
representational systems also turns on these commitments.  
Why is this relevant to our problem? The route to an implied problem for ONT-Reduction is 
not through the failure of expressive equivalence anyway, but rather it is caused by the 
apparently veridical nature of experience to represent experience itself. Since this different 
account of representation is contextual and pragmatic, and our first-person concepts are so 
directly embedded within our intra-mental processes of self-regulation, self-monitoring and 
self-modulation,169 it is to be expected that the representations regarding something like the 
substantial unity of experience would be irreducibly different in that context than 
representations about the same apparent feature in an objective third-person scientific 
context. These representations would be inherently context and use dependent, which 
seems to block the strong ontological implications from conscious representation. 
To someone wishing to maintain that the character of experience bears implications for 
ONT-Reduction, there are of course ways to defend the claim that experience is veridical 
about the nature of experience (such that it precludes the possibility of mistakes about its 
intrinsic character). One such route proceeds by pointing to supposed difficulties for a theory 
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of empirical knowledge that maintains that we are subject to an illusion of this kind at the 
source of all our empirical evidence.170 All of this serves only to sketch out some of the 
terrain and to justify our consideration of conscious experience as an example of a problem 
for reduction, so we will proceed no further. 
That is the last of our coverage of representational reduction. In summary, there are several 
forms of representational reduction that are compatible with ontological reduction. But there 
is evidence here of a problem for our background picture: the possibility that 
phenomenological claims about experience are indubitable and transparent and represent to 
us real properties. Regardless of how plausible this is we will assume that it is possible and 
that this possibility demands an explanation involving fundamental ontology. Next we will 
move on to another potential problem for ontological reduction – mental causation – before 
settling on a common form of the problem to be explained. 
3.2 The Causal Closure Argument 
Emergence, like several other theories in philosophy of mind, is invoked to resolve one or 
more of the various problems of mental causation. 171 One such problem is set out in the 
causal closure argument, a popular presentation of which follows. This form of the argument 
uses two or three intuitively appealing, but (apparently) mutually contradictory premises. The 
first is the existence of psychophysical causation – that is, mental events such as my beliefs 
or desires are causally relevant to some events that seem straightforwardly physical, such 
as the movement of my body. This premise seems immediately plausible; indeed, our 
pretheoretical notion of human agency is seemingly reliant on this premise. 
The second premise is the causal closure of the physical domain. The thought here is that 
physics is somehow complete, that there are no so-called ‘special forces’, or any other non-
physical causes for physical events.172 This premise is thought to be supported by inductive 
evidence from physics and physiology. For instance David Papineau173 traces the history of 
purported ‘special forces’ – forces popular in the 19th century - that would, if they existed, 
appear to violate the closure of physics. These forces all proved to be apparent, and would 
standardly turn out to be composed of the same small set of fundamental physical forces. 
This track record of finding sufficient physical causes to compose apparent non-physical 
causes is here taken as inductive evidence that physical causes are always sufficient. 
Furthermore, Papineau argues, the detailed study of physical events in physiology has - in 
                                               
170 O'Connor and Jacobs 2003 
171 For example, O’Connor and Wong 2005, O’Connor and Churchill 2010. 
172 See Lowe 2000a for more precise definitions of causal closure. 
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the end - never required non-physical causes to provide a sufficient cause for a physical 
event – if this is true then there is no direct empirical evidence for a physical event like the 
movement of my body that has not had a sufficient physical cause.  
We’ll see that the causal closure premise is very relevant to theories of emergence, so we 
will explore it more later.174 For now it is worth noting a few things to which we will return. 
Firstly, as Papineau himself says, there cannot be a knock-down case for causal closure 
based on this kind of evidence, even if it were really as complete as he suggests. Secondly, 
the relevance of the evidence might depend on the account of causation assumed – it 
seems in his talk of ‘special forces’ Papineau is assuming a transference theory of 
causation, but there are others.175 Thirdly, there are several purported cases from physics 
and chemistry of causes that are not composed of the fundamental physical forces176, so 
perhaps the evidence doesn’t straightforwardly support Papineau’s first argument from 
induction. And fifthly, in order for the causal closure premise to engage with the whole causal 
closure argument in the way Kim and others intend, it would perhaps be necessary to give it 
a formulation so strong that it is not, in fact, supported by the empirical evidence Papineau 
presents.177 We will examine some of the formulations and the other issues mentioned later. 
These first two premises of the causal closure argument, psychophysical causation and the 
causal closure of the physical domain, are often presented along with a third premise, the 
denial of systematic causal overdetermination.178 The necessity of this denial depends on 
the strength of the second premise: if the causal closure premise merely stipulates that 
physical events always have sufficient physical causes, then ruling out co-present sufficient 
mental causes is a necessary third premise required for causal closure to engage with the 
premise of psychophysical causation. It is simple to see why: even if sufficient physical 
causes were always present for physical events, one would still need for these causes to 
somehow exclude other causes if there is to be a contradiction between causal closure and 
psychophysical causation.  
Note the emphasis here is on systematic overdetermination. There may be uncontroversial 
specific examples of events with multiple sufficient causes, a favourite example being the 
case of two independent gunshots reaching the heart of the victim at precisely the same time 
– each is a sufficient cause of the victim’s death, and therefore the victim’s death is 
overdetermined by the gunshots. Even given such cases, it is uncontroversially implausible 
                                               
174 See chapter 5 
175 See also Gibb 2010 on the relevance of the laws of conservation of energy and momentum. 
176 For instance, Silberstein 2006; Hendry 2006 
177 Lowe 2000a. 
178 Defined below. 
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that some events are overdetermined as a general rule because theories which commit to 
pervasive overdetermination lack the theoretical virtues of simplicity or elegance.179 
The causal closure argument can be formulated as follows180: 
[Psychophysical causation] – Some mental events are causally relevant in the physical 
domain. 
[Completeness of the physical] - Every physical event, at every time at which it has a cause, 
has a sufficient physical cause.181 
[Non-overdetermination] - Events are not systematically overdetermined.182 
The premises above seem to be mutually incompatible, unless mental events are identical 
with physical events. Indeed, the job of any decent theory of mental events that holds that 
mental and physical events are distinct is to deny or disambiguate one or more of these 
premises or otherwise resolve this incompatibility. 
Many approaches have been taken. The identity theory accepts the argument’s conclusions 
(though identifying mental events with physical ones might also be interpreted as a 
disambiguation of [Psychophysical causation]).183 Epiphenomenalism denies 
[Psychophysical causation]. Substance dualism denies [Completeness of the physical]. Non-
reductive physicalist theories usually attempt to find some compromise that reconciles all 
three premises with identification, often by disambiguating [Non-overdetermination]184. 
Whether non-reductive physicalist theories can do this satisfactorily is a matter of recent 
debate - it has been repeatedly argued that non-reductive physicalism fails to reconcile the 
premises, and must therefore accept identification, or else either imply overdetermination185, 
or deny [Completeness of the physical]186. Theories of emergence usually deny 
[Completeness of the physical].187 More on this in chapter 4. 
                                               
179 See Sider 2003 for counter arguments. 
180 This formulation is Lowe’s 2000b, 27, cf. Gibb 2013. 
181 For a discussion of the different strengths that the principle might take, see Lowe 2000a. This is 
not discussed here because my arguments won’t turn on the strength of the formulation. 
182 For more see: Sider 2003 
183 Since mental events are not causally relevant qua mental, or because their attribution as mental 
events is de dicto. 
184 E.g. Raymont 2003; Wilson 2011 
185 O’Connor and Churchill 2010 is an example of such an argument applied to several leading 
nonreductive physicalist theories; more options and positions within this debate are summarised in 
Gibb 2013, 2014  
186 E.g. Crane 2001, and see section 3.3 below. 
187 McLaughlin 1992; Horgan 1993 
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Introducing the causal closure argument here is useful because it provides a framework 
within which to discuss how theories of emergence do some of their explanatory work. 
However, the causal closure argument, as presented, is itself only valid given certain 
metaphysical assumptions188. Since we are developing this problem within a powers 
ontology and otherwise limiting the options by only focussing on some of the potential 
solutions to that problem, we will skip over some potential solutions and assume the 
argument is valid for didactic purposes.  
There are, however, some further assumptions that will be useful to make discussion easier. 
For instance, the theories discussed will usually be in terms of mental and physical 
properties rather than events. Given certain accounts of events the causal closure argument 
as presented above can be straightforwardly applied to properties. For the sake of 
convenience, we will assume a Kimian account of an event as a substance instantiating a 
property at a time. According to Kim’s account189, an event (s1, p1, t1) is a substance (s1) 
instantiating a property (p1) at a time (t1), and two events (s1, p1, t1) and (s2, p2, t2) are 
identical if and only if s1 = s2, p1 = p2, and t1 = t2.190 With this assumed, the conclusion of 
the causal closure argument - the identification of mental and physical events – entails the 
identification of mental and physical properties, allowing for theories of emergence to be 
discussed in those terms.191 
3.3 Kim’s Supervenience Argument 
Kim has published many papers with variations on the causal closure argument, mostly 
targeted against nonreductive physicalism and other attempts to resist the identification of 
mental and physical properties while maintaining that mental properties are ontologically 
dependent on physical properties.192 His arguments extend beyond the causal closure 
argument above, with its premise about the causal efficacy of mental properties in the 
physical domain, to a more general problem for purely mental causation as well.193  
The argument proceeds like so, let’s say that M and M* are mental properties and M causes 
M*. Let’s also say that nonreductive physicalism is the theory that M* is ontologically 
dependent on P*, its physical base. There are now two rival explanations of the existence of 
M* - its cause and its physical base, analogous to the two forms of dependency discussed in 
                                               
188 For example, on the nature and homogeneity of the causal relation, and the nature and 
homogeneity of the causal relata. See Gibb 2014 for an overview. 
189 Kim 1998 
190 Other alternatives are available, for instance ‘in virtue of’ events. 
191 Even if one adopted a different account of the causal relata where this entailment fails to hold, the 
problem of causal redundancy seems to reoccur. See, e.g. Heil and Mele 1993. 
192 Examples include Kim 1989, 1992, 1993b, 1999a, 2005. 
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section 2.2.1. Is the existence of M* due to M or P*? Again, because these are two different 
sorts of dependency, this is not strongly analogous to cases where one can identify multiple 
causes for an event. Kim argues that the non-reductive physicalist’s response must be that 
M causes M* by causing P*; but if this is the case, the causal closure argument kicks in. M is 
now a psychophysical cause. And since M will be ontologically dependent on its own 
physical base, P, we might plausible identify P as the cause of P* and retain our commitment 
to [Completeness of the physical]. The rest of the argument proceeds as normal to the 
conclusion that the occurrence of properties like M* is systematically overdetermined. 
Indeed, it seems that such an argument can generalise to all macro-properties wherever 
such properties are taken to be ontologically dependent on a physical base, with only a few 
tweaks to what is meant by ‘physical base’ or ‘physical domain’. This includes those 
properties posited by the special sciences.194 If it is possible that a distinct property is 
ontologically dependent on other properties, then the supervenience argument does seem to 
apply. Causation involving ontologically dependent properties seems to give way to 
causation involving their physical bases. This is the problem Ned Block calls ‘causal 
drainage’ in relation to a view of reality as ontologically dependent levels.195 All of the causal 
powers of dependent entities seem to drain away to the properties of fundamental physics. 
Whether this problem also arises for certain forms of ontological dependence in a 
fundamentalist ontology will be discussed in section 5.1. 
Kim does not explicitly acknowledge that his supervenience argument is reliant on a causal 
powers ontology,196 but does acknowledge the argument’s reliance on certain views about 
causation, for instance a commitment to abiding by Alexander’s dictum, that all properties 
must contribute causal powers to objects.197 The premise [Overdetermination] also seems to 
be more straightforwardly motivated in a causal powers ontology than if, say, we assume a 
reductive account of causation like counterfactual analysis.198 There is something obviously 
otiose about positing two distinct relations of causation for every event supposedly caused 
by a mental event. In a nonreductive account of causation we are thereby committing 
ourselves to the existence of something additional. On a reductive account we are not. An 
                                               
194 This has often been taken as a weakness of a position like Kim’s, e.g. in Baker 1993; Burge 1993; 
and more recently, Ross and Spurrett 2004. See also van Gulick 1993. The commitment to 
fundamentalism we have developed and the discussion of ‘higher levels’ will hopefully serve to 
illustrate that this is not necessarily a weakness. 
195 Block 2003; see also Kim 2005 and Walter 2008. 
196 Indeed, Kim is ambiguous on the point, see Kim 1998, p.43; 2005, p. 20, 41. And he has 
speculated that causality might variously be supervenience on laws, a Humean affair at the 
fundamental level, or something like a transference theory, see 2002, p. 677. 
197 For more evidence of Kim’s assumption of a view of properties similar to the causal powers theory, 
see Kim 1998, pp 45-56; 2002, pp.674-5; 2005, pp. 17-18. 
198 See chapter 8. 
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explicitly causal powers formulation of the supervenience argument has been put forward by 
O’Connor and Churchill.199 Their presentation contains a premise that nonreductive 
physicalists are committed to and which generates the problem of reduction: 
“Mental properties are realized by physical properties: a particular event M of a 
person S’s having mental property M is either ‘constituted by’ (a kind of ontological 
posteriority) or is identical to various physical particulars—possibly including portions 
of the person’s environment—having certain physical properties and standing in 
certain physical relations.” 
Since the argument generalizes to any properties that are ‘realized’, (where, in lieu of further 
analysis, realization is understood as a relation of ontological dependence that ensures 
distinctness,) we will offer the following amended premise: 
[Realization] Macro-properties are ontologically dependent on foundational properties: a 
particular event of an instance of a macro-property is ontologically dependent on some 
foundational objects having certain foundational properties and standing in certain relations. 
Then we can say, in parallel with the causal closure argument, Realization is not compatible 
with both the causal closure of fundamental physics and the causal relevance of macro-
properties unless some form of ontological dependence can be found which is capable of 
blocking causal drainage.200 This should suffice to illustrate the problem of mental causation 
as it pertains to both the identity and realization theories of mental properties. 
3.4 Downward Causation 
The problem emergence addresses has often been defined in terms of ‘downward 
causation’. How can ‘higher-level properties’ cause things when there are no higher level 
substances? How can ‘downward causation’ occur given fundamentalism?  
Emergence does not imply ‘downward causation’ because emergent entities are, in the 
important sense relevant to a causal powers ontology, fundamental. This might be because 
there are non-physical things that are fundamental, but if one were inclined to argue that the 
physical ontology exhausts all the fundamental things, then emergence still does not present 
a problem, since whatever definition of physicalism ties physics conceptually to the most 
general account of reality, would also seem to be able to admit that fundamental emergent 
properties are physical.  
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Given our background picture, explaining downward causation is not an explanandum for a 
theory of emergence except insofar as we need an explanation of emergence’s relation to 
the thesis of physicalism – the only properties are physical ones – and the notion of 
fundamentalism, which is investigated throughout this thesis. 
3.5 Some Explananda and the Nozick Formulation of the Problem 
We might give the problem for our background picture a few more general formulations. 
Here are a few that are not so tightly defined. We might ask to give an account of natural 
kinds or explain multiple realization. We might ask how apparent ‘higher-level’ or ‘downward’ 
causation is possible given fundamentalism. Or we might ask why dependent entities can 
have causal relevance seemingly beyond the causal powers of those entities on which they 
depend. In general these questions all ask for an account of macro-properties and this 
account must be consistent with our background picture. Since the background picture is 
fundamentalist and deflationary about derivative properties, an apparent failure of ONT-
Reduction represents a problem that demands an explanation.201 That explanation might 
take the form of showing how the failure of reduction is merely apparent or of how such a 
failure can be incorporated into our background with some new theory. We will give these 
general formulations an umbrella term, the Problem of Reduction, which we will use for the 
rest of the thesis. 
Note that the Problem of Reduction does not arise for inflationary or nonfundamentalist 
ontologies.202 This is because inflationary ontologies have no problem accepting the reality 
of macro-properties and nonfundamentalist ontologies do not entail ontological reduction. On 
the picture of reality as a hierarchy of levels, one level does not reduce to another. On a 
fundamentalist picture, in general, it must. Likewise for other aspects of the background 
picture. Atomistic foundationalism is necessary to generate the problem. Monism does not 
encounter a Problem of Reduction because reduction is also expected to fail. Without atomic 
simples there is no ontologically privileged set of objects that might in turn privilege certain 
properties. Not only does this seem necessary to motivate the causal closure argument, it 
provides a principled reason to limit the reification of putative macro-properties in general. 
Whatever the theory of properties developed under the alternative positions on 
foundationalism, it is unlikely to motivate a metaphysically deep distinction between macro-
properties and any other kind of property. 
                                               
201 There might a danger of interpreting this background picture in a way that rules out emergentism 
from the start (one might think emergent properties are derivative in the sense that they are 
dependent entities.) To be clear, emergentism is not ruled out automatically because emergent 
properties would count as being among the fundamental properties. 
202 See sections 2.2.2 and 2.4 for descriptions of these alternative ontologies. 
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So what does accounting for macro-properties consist in? Alex Oliver points out that the sort 
of explanation required for a successful general theory of properties is rarely clarified, and 
this, combined with a conflation of substantially different explananda, changes our evaluation 
of the solutions.203 By closely examining the Problem of Reduction, we will be able to readily 
judge the efficacies of different theories of causal powers to account for apparent macro-
causation. In this part we will resolve three issues: what it is that is supposed to be explained 
or accounted for (the explananda), what it is about the explananda that requires explanation 
(the explanatory goal), and what would constitute such an explanation. 
There have been different statements of the problem, only some of which have been 
mentioned above, which in turn have led to different solutions. Of all the various suggested 
explananda, it is safe to say that at least some of the problems have parallel solutions, but 
until we have a clear idea about what sort of explanation is required, we should not feel free 
to vacillate between them all.   
Several of the most prominent presentations of the problem fit into a general form described 
by Nozick: how a certain thing, say ‘X’, is possible supposing certain other things.204 We will 
focus on two broadly different problems in this form. The first way of putting the problem was 
to do with the properties of conscious experience. For example: how, if our experiences are 
veridical, can the ‘substantial unity’ of our experiences be possible given that we are 
complex objects, i.e. the explanandum is “how can a macro-property be simple” and the 
problem is to explain how a qualitatively simple property can be qualitatively simple given 
that it inheres in a complex object. In Nozick’s form the ‘X’ here is the simplicity of the macro-
property, which seems incoherent supposing the substantial complexity of composed 
entities. 
A different problem is explaining how macro-properties can have causal relevance, i.e. the 
explanandum is “how can macro-properties make a causal difference” and the problem is to 
explain how a complex object can possess a fundamental property. In Nozick’s form the ‘X’ 
here is the causal efficacy of macro-properties, which seems incoherent supposing the 
derivative nature of composed entities. 
Nozick calls the “other things”, the ones that are supposed to make ‘X’ incoherent, “apparent 
excluders”.205 We can remove the incoherence by showing that the apparent excluders do 
not exist or by explaining why the apparent excluders are merely apparent. The apparent 
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excluder for the first Problem of Reduction is the complexity of composed entities: how can 
we have qualitative simplicity given this? The apparent excluder for the second Problem of 
Reduction is the derivative nature of composed entities: how can we have fundamentality 
given this?  
The Nozick form of the general problem is one of eliminating an incoherent scenario. 
However, there are of course presentations of the problem that do not take this form, and 
motivate a different sort of explanation. The explananda/explanation presentation of a 
problem states some facts—the explananda—and then provides an explanation of those 
facts. The explananda in this case are something like “a complex entity is simple” and “a 
dependent entity is fundamental”. When we characterise a philosophical problem as a 
motivating explanandum and an account that explains it, a lot turns on what we decide we 
require of the explanation. A sufficient explanation can be characterised in several ways. For 
instance, what is it about the explanandum that the explanation must explain? What must 
this explanation consist in? In Sections 3.6-9 we will discuss three lines of thought as to what 
a sufficient metaphysical explanation might consist in. These three types of explanation are 
analyses of concepts, ontological commitments and truthmakers.  
In addition, there are different conditions for a sufficient explanation,206 each of which 
requires the elimination of an existing, undesirable scenario.  With the Nozick-form problems 
the undesirability of the scenario comes from the apparent incoherency of the explanandum. 
Another type of undesirability is a general lack of specificity in our understanding of the 
explanandum; this is a subtly different sort of problem. Eliminating the later scenario does 
not require the elimination of apparent incoherency, but rather the elimination of 
unspecificity. This is a non-Nozick form of the Problem of Reduction, with a different 
explanatory goal. We will develop and compare the two scenarios in the next section and 
see how this affects our analysis. 
3.6 Conceptual Analysis, Specificity and Sufficient Explanations 
So what does Nozick say is required to eliminate the incoherencies? We can either show 
that the things which appear to exclude ‘X’ do not exist or that they are merely apparent 
excluders. Those who employ Nozick-form presentations of a problem—how a certain thing, 
say ‘X’, is possible supposing certain other things—are seeking an explanation that does 
one of these two things. But unless we have a clear idea of what it means to “show that they 
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are merely apparent excluders”, this criterion alone can give rise to explanations of very 
different kinds. 
Macbride, for example, argues that, not only are there many problems that do not take the 
Nozick formulation, but the incoherencies in the above Nozick-form problems can simply be 
resolved by conceptual analysis.207 We might show the excluders to be merely apparent by 
drawing a distinction between qualitative simplicity and substantial complexity such that they 
are compatible (e.g. by thinking of qualitative simplicity and substantial complexity as two 
unrelated aspects of the complex object). Different things can be the same because the 
respect in which they are the same is different from the respect in which they are different.208 
However, we are not just concerned with eliminating an apparent inconsistency in our 
concepts; we are concerned with eliminating an apparent inconsistency in our understanding 
of reality. Just because something is conceptually coherent doesn’t make it metaphysically 
coherent.  
To show that qualitative simplicity and substantial complexity - or derivativeness and 
fundamentality - are compatible we need to show why their apparent mutual exclusion is 
only apparent, rather than just saying that it is. The ‘showing why’ requires an account of 
what qualitative simplicity and fundamentality consist in, i.e. we require a metaphysical 
explanation of why the inconsistency is merely apparent. The Problem of Reduction is more 
difficult than mere conceptual analysis allows, but this is not because of incoherency per se. 
We can see that it is not the incoherence of the explananda that is doing the work, but our 
requirements for a sufficient explanation of those explananda. 
The Nozick-form problem - eliminating the inconsistency – is actually motivated by the 
situation’s vagueness. 209 In this case we would like to relieve vagueness in our knowledge 
of the underlying nature of reality. Again, the incoherence may be an appropriate motivation, 
but it is not the incoherency per se that requires a full account of apparent macro-properties. 
Once we see that it is really a lack of knowledge about macro-properties that is doing the 
work here, we can identify perfectly good alternative presentations of the Problem of 
Reduction. The facts to be explained remain the same, but we are asking different questions 
about those facts. Regarding qualitative simplicity, we ask: in virtue of what is the putative 
macro-property simple? Regarding fundamentality we ask: in virtue of what is the putative 
macro-property fundamental? There is no apparently incoherent scenario in these questions, 
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as there is with the Nozick form; instead the explanatory goal is to eliminate an unspecified 
scenario. Because of this the questions more transparently represent what is usually desired 
of the explanation for both presentations of the Problem of Reduction, i.e. specification of 
these features in reality.210211 
3.7 Quinian ontological commitments 
Oliver identifies three sorts of solution to problems in the ontology of properties.212 These are 
conceptual analysis, analysis of the ontological commitments, and analysis of the 
truthmakers of the explananda. We have already ruled out conceptual analysis in section 
3.1. on the grounds that conceptual reducibility does not enable us to distinguish between 
reducible and irreducible entities. We can now add that it does not constitute a sufficient 
explanation. Conceptual analysis alone does not tell us anything about what exists.213 
The other two types of explanation, analyses of ontological commitments or analyses of 
truthmakers, do tell us something about the world. Going back to the argument about the 
reduction of natural kinds in the special sciences. It might be objected that an analysis of the 
ontological commitments of our best scientific theories should be the primary mode of 
investigating the potential existence of macro-properties. Analyses of ontological 
commitments tell us about what exists by identifying the entities that must exist for a given 
sentence to be true. The commitment relation is a kind of cross-categorical entailment: just 
as a sentence S entails a sentence T if and only if it is not possible for S to be true and T to 
be false, sentence S is ontologically committed to entity a if and only if S implies ‘a exists’.214 
In practise, we apply semantic theories to sentences, and we must evaluate these theories 
in the light of a host of considerations, some of them metaphysical. We refine the apparent 
semantic theories using philosophical argument and they tell us what a given sentence is 
committed to. We can also paraphrase sentences to test to see if our apparent commitments 
are merely apparent. The outcome depends not just on how the semantic analysis goes, but 
also on the sentences we choose to analyse. The collections of sentences we take to be true 
are our ‘best theories’. If we find the true commitments to our best theories, then we truly say 
that those entities exist, but this is dependent on analysis revealing which commitments are 
merely apparent and which are real. 
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In our case we might be looking to see if the apparent qualitative simplicity and 
fundamentality of macro-properties is ontologically committed to any entities, over and above 
the composing entities of the complex object, to account for these apparent facts.215 If an 
entity is among the ontological commitments of our best theories, we have the best possible 
reason to think that they exist. Where is commitment to these entities going to be located 
within the sentences of our chosen theories? Oliver finds several problems with 
characterising problems in the metaphysics of properties as a demand for analyses of 
ontological commitment. The first problem is finding appropriate constructions that harbour 
real ontological commitment to properties.216 
Oliver identifies three sorts of subsentential constructions that have been taken to harbour 
ontological commitments to properties: predicates, abstract singular terms and property-
quantifiers. He then examines each. First is Armstrong’s resistance to reductive analysis, 
which seems to imply that predicates can harbour ontological commitments.217 This seems 
to be based on a necessary equivalence between sentences like ‘a is F’ and sentences like 
‘a has the property of being F’.218 In this case the latter sentence contains an abstract 
singular term apparently harbouring an ontological commitment to a property-entity.  
However, if we suppose that ‘a is F’ is equivalent to ‘a has the property of being F’, we run 
into a problem. If the equivalence holds and there doesn’t seem to be a principled reason 
why we couldn’t replace the predicate F in ‘a is F’ with the predicate ‘red’, then ‘a is red’ is 
equivalent to ‘a has the property of being red’, and we seem to be ontologically committed to 
the existence of the property-entity red, or any other predicate we chose to substitute. Now, 
Armstrong himself does not believe that there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
predicates and properties.219 And as we said in Section 2.3, we are looking for an account of 
the real similarity between things; the sharing of sparse, not abundant properties. So, if all 
abstract singular terms harbour ontological commitments, there cannot be equivalence 
between ‘a is F’ and ‘a has the property of being F’. Armstrong requires a semantic theory 
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that doesn’t refuse “to take predicates with any ontological seriousness”,220 but also doesn’t 
slip into reifying every property predicate.  
Next Oliver examines the apparent ontological commitments for abstract singular terms and 
property-quantifiers.221 Maybe we can solve Armstrong’s problem by finding a semantic 
theory that can distinguish between real and apparent ontological commitments for abstract 
singular terms. Quine has two strategies in this regard: offer a paraphrase of the sentence 
that does not feature the abstract singular term, or argue that the referent of the abstract 
singular term is not a property, but some other entity, like a set.222 However, Frank Jackson 
has demonstrated that neither of these strategies work.223 For example, Quine, attempting to 
argue that ‘humility’ is not a property, translates ‘Humility is a virtue’ into ‘Humble persons 
are virtuous’. The problem is, if it just so happens that every tall person is virtuous, then ‘Tall 
persons are virtuous’ is true, but it plainly does not follow that ‘Tallness is a virtue’. 
Paraphrases like this are not necessarily equivalent. The same problem occurs if we take 
‘humility’ to refer to the set of humble persons; just because every member of that set is 
virtuous does not entail that humility is a virtue. This argument neatly extends to apparent 
property-quantifiers, because if abstract singular terms like ‘red’ in ‘red is a colour’ are not 
sets or anything else, then ‘something is a colour’, which follows from the first sentence, 
cannot be a quantifier ranging over sets or anything else.224 Armstrong appeals to the same 
point in one of his early arguments for properties as universals; he is impressed by the lack 
of available paraphrases for sentences containing abstract singular terms and property-
quantifiers and uses this argument to challenge those who might use analyses of ontological 
commitment to support a nominalist solution to the Problem of Universals.225 However, the 
failure of these paraphrases does not show that no such paraphrases exist. Furthermore, 
even if such paraphrases cannot be found, Armstrong still needs some other way of 
distinguishing between real and merely apparent ontological commitments that avoids 
reifying abundant properties.  
The examination of ontological commitments here is by no means exhaustive, and it might 
well be possible to solve the objections discussed. But even if we could identify the real 
ontological commitments for sentences about properties, there is another worry about using 
this kind of explanation to answer our questions. The worry arises because there are some 
important metaphysical differences that are not decided by the semantic analyses of our 
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best theories. Oliver uses the example of particulars: Quine argues that we are committed to 
particulars because we require values for the bound variables of our best scientific 
theories.226 However, while this gives us an excellent reason to believe particulars exist, our 
best scientific theories do not decide many of the important issues about the nature of these 
particulars. For instance, the application of a semantic theory does not commit us one way 
or the other on the question of whether particulars are sui generis entities or mereological 
sums of tropes. We require additional metaphysical analyses involving other considerations 
if we want a full account.  
Analyses of ontological commitment are limited by the sentences that are available. Simply 
analysing these sentences might not be sufficient to obtain the requisite level of specificity to 
answer our questions. Of course, we might be able to discern some aspects of the nature of 
properties by finding theory sentences that are committed to those aspects, but again, this is 
by no means guaranteed. It seems to be harder to find ontological commitments when it 
comes to questions like whether an entity is abstract or concrete (for example, the 
ontological status of numbers).227 That there are questions that are not decided by 
sentences of our best theories does not entail that such important metaphysical differences 
do not exist in reality. Since our questions require specificity about the nature of qualitative 
simplicity and fundamentality, it is not obvious that ontological commitment will be able to 
constitute a sufficient explanation. This is an arena where, Oliver argues, little metaphysical 
information is likely to be forthcoming from our best scientific theories.228  
3.8 Truthmakers 
The discussion so far has given us a good clarification of what we require to explain the 
Problem of Reduction. Accounting for apparent macro-properties by finding truthmakers for 
our explananda seems to be the best bet,229 so let’s make a few notes about the 
methodology of truthmaking analysis.  
There is a somewhat systematic approach to analysing ontological commitment: we 
transcribe sentences from our best scientific theories into canonical notation and apply a 
semantic theory. In practise of course, identifying which semantic theories are real and 
which are merely apparent is a mixed theoretical enterprise, but otherwise the methodology 
quite strictly informs and bounds the ensuing enunciation of an explanation—which is partly 
what gives rise to the doubts about it producing an adequate one. Looking for truthmakers is 
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an illuminating and useful way of regimenting the metaphysical enterprise. However, to 
paraphrase Armstrong, truthmakers are no royal road to metaphysical explanation.230 Firstly, 
the distinction between one’s general theory of truthmaking and particular answers to 
truthmaking questions is not sharp. They have to be brought into reflexive equilibrium.  
But also, while viewing things from a truthmaker point of view gives one a tendency to favour 
some metaphysical positions over others, there are limits; choosing between competing 
theories of ontology requires more fine-spun argumentation. In general, finding a robust, 
coherent account of the truthmakers of our selected explananda is not the sum total of 
metaphysical theory choice. Contemporary metaphysicians generally employ a multi-
faceted, quasi-scientific approach. The first stage is to construct robust and coherent 
accounts, which they then test and compare. We then proceed as discussed in section 2.1.  
As an aside, to argue that an explanation consisting of conceptual analysis is insufficient 
does not mean that conceptual analysis will not be necessary for a sufficient explanation. 
Identifying truthmakers will not resolve our problems in the absence of a conceptual 
distinction. Our explanation obviously requires a conceptual distinction between qualitative 
simplicity and substantial simplicity. And between fundamentality and ontological 
independence. However, an explanation consisting of truthmakers will entail this distinction. 
The truth of our explananda entails the conceptual distinction—because without the 
distinction they would not be true. And the truthmakers for our explananda entail the 
explananda, thereby entailing the conceptual distinction. 
Truthmaking and truthmakers are another way of explicating the division between 
fundamental and derivative entities.231 Entities that make true their own existence are 
fundamental, the other entities for which they can also act as truthmakers are the derivative 
entities.232 The substances and properties of the last few sections are fundamental. Let’s 
suppose that object, x, comprises a substance inhering a property. So asserting the truth of 
statements like “object, x, exists”, requires appealing to nothing else in our ontology than x 
itself. If x, along with other fundamental objects and relations between them, composes a 
complex object, y, then y exists, but in contrast to the truthmakers for x, the truthmaker for 
the existence of y is not y itself, but the objects and relations composing y.  
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So there is and should be an explanation for the explananda of emergence. Chapters 4-6 
explore these explanations. But since we are also interested in evaluating these theories not 
just to see if they are coherent, but also to see how well they work, we will require emergent 
theories that serve as explanations both for how the main features of emergence, below, are 
possible, but also how the preceding problem is solved. Naturally this will involve throwing 
out some theories. 
3.9 Concluding Remarks on the Nature of the Problem 
The aim of this chapter was to explore some of the interpretations of the problems that 
theories of emergence are invoked to solve, and to gain a fairly comprehensive 
understanding of the Problem of Reduction. In this regard, there is not one, but several 
explananda for which we might give an explanation. We refined our definition of the 
explananda and will continue to do so in relation to emergence concurrently with our 
definition of emergence in the next chapter. Wieland233 demonstrates that there are different 
questions we can ask of metaphysical explanations, including problems requiring the 
elimination of incoherent or unspecified scenarios. We also argued that a sufficiently 
specified theory about the entities involved can resolve these apparent contradictions – this 
should be the aim of a theory of emergence.  
4. Theories of Emergence 
Macro-properties are properties of complex objects. Since our background picture assumes 
that objects are simple and fundamental and properties inhere in their objects, we should 
ask how it is possible for a macro-property, which inheres in a complex object, to likewise be 
simple and fundamental. If not from the usual simple substances, whence does the property 
derive its simplicity and fundamentality? Regarding qualitative simplicity, we ask: in virtue of 
what is the putative macro-property simple? Regarding fundamentality we ask: what is it 
about the putative macro-property that makes it fundamental?  
The Problem of Reduction arises because of a lack of specificity about the nature of macro-
properties. These properties need to be elucidated to show how this new kind of property is 
capable of being simple and fundamental when it is so different to all of the micro-properties 
that we have defined as such. A theory of metaphysical emergence provides an answer to 
the Problem of Reduction. This section explores the question, what is emergence and how 
does it help us to answer these two questions?  
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4.1 The Inexplicability of Emergence 
The idea of ‘strong emergence’ has been used to characterise the way that some properties 
of a complex system are dependent on, distinct from, and novel with regards to, the 
properties from which they emerge. The set or system of properties from which an emergent 
property emerges is called the emergent base; in its novelty the emergent is said to be 
‘something new’234, something ‘irreducible’, or something ‘over and above’235 these basal 
properties. Emergent properties are not something you ‘get for free’; they are one of the 
things God would have to create in order to make the world how it is236. Emergent properties 
have also been described as ‘going beyond’ the features of their parts, of being ‘different in 
kind’237, of being ‘non-physical’ and ‘sui generis’ in their causal powers238. Facts about 
emergent properties have been said to not be deducible, even in principle, from facts about 
the base239. The relation between an emergent and its base has also been described as 
‘mysterious’240. And emergence has been described as simply ‘unexplainable’, for example 
in Alexander:241 
The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, as 
some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact or, as I should prefer to 
say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the "natural piety" of the investigator. It 
admits no explanation. 
On this last point, I will argue that when the notion is fleshed out, bounded by the 
requirement for metaphysical rigour and especially when guided by recent work in ontology, 
there is plenty that can be said about emergence in the central case. It is the novelty of 
emergence that is critical, not its mysteriousness. When Alexander, one of the original British 
Emergentists, says that “The existence of emergent qualities… [is] to be accepted with the 
‘natural piety’ of the investigator. It admits no explanation.”242 it is not clear what exactly it is 
about emergence that is supposed to be unexplainable. I contend that it is not the case that 
emergence is unexplainable in some general, problematic manner. We should be able to 
specify their metaphysical features as we do with micro-properties. 
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First of all, it is likely that Alexander has a weaker sense of emergence in mind, one stated in 
terms of explanations rather than in terms of ontology243. In many earlier theories of 
emergence (and some more recent ones) the arguments are ambiguous as to their 
ontological implications, but there are parts of Alexander that suggest that the mystery is not 
the lack of an ontological explanation, and that, if one’s knowledge were perfect, there would 
be no mystery.244  
We have already explored some of the ways in which the epistemic situation has been 
argued to carry ontological implications.245 An entity’s existence is explained in terms of what 
entities/causes/relations/laws, etc, account for that existence. In this vein, the worry about 
mysteriousness can be interpreted as a proposition about ontological inexplicability. It might 
then be seen as an argument that the existence of an emergent is utterly mysterious, i.e. 
that there is nothing in the ontology that can explain it. But there are other possible 
ontological interpretations: for instance, it could mean merely that the existence of an 
emergent admits no explanation in terms of some pre-determined set of acceptable entities. 
This pre-determined set constitutes an ontology, and since no explanation is possible within 
this ontology, an emergent is something additional to it. It is this kind of inexplicability that we 
can call ‘something new’; it is an ‘addition of being’.  
If we allow this interpretation, other parts of Alexander might be used to flesh out what this 
addition involves. Earlier on in the same paragraph Alexander says that an emergent quality 
“emerges from the lower level of existence… and it does not belong to that lower level, but 
constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour.”246 Here 
the ‘something new’ is a new set of special laws of behaviour, a set that is additional to the 
set of laws of behaviour governing the base. The emergent is inexplicable in the sense that 
its behaviour cannot be explained by means of the laws governing its base. We admit 
instead a new explanation or new set of explanations for that behaviour, in the form of new 
laws. It might be objected that these new laws of behaviour are ‘nomological danglers’. But 
to be explicable in terms of danglers is not to be inexplicable; appealing to nomological 
danglers does not make emergence ‘magic’, as some worry247. What would be required is 
some additional reason why the set of acceptable explanations should be restricted to 
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exclude these danglers. One such argument is the causal closure argument, which was 
introduced in section 3.2.  
4.2 The Key Features of Emergence 
Inexplicability is a notion used to characterise emergence. If emergence is neither magic nor 
autonomous, we might ask what is it that is unexplainable? If we are talking about just the 
existence of emergent properties, then one explanation of an entity’s existence is in terms of 
what entities account for that existence. The truthmaker gloss would be to ask what entities 
are truth-determining for propositions about an emergent property’s existence. 
In this sense the existence of emergence might be mysterious in two ways. Either we think 
that the existence of an emergent property is profoundly, utterly mysterious, i.e. that there 
are no entities in the ontology that can account for it and it really is magic. Or, the more 
reasonable interpretation, the proposition that an emergent property exists admits 
explanation in terms of some entity or entities, but it does not admit explanation in terms of 
some specified, pre-determined set of entities.  
In this case the best candidate for the pre-determined set constitutes the known properties of 
the emergent base, and indeed no explanation is possible within the ontology of the base, 
just because an emergent is something additional to it. It is this kind of inexplicability that we 
can call ‘something new’. An emergent property is an ‘addition of being’. And if so, then 
ontological emergence is certainly guilty of this kind of inexplicability, just because it involves 
a new entity.248 
Emergence is a realist theory of macro-properties. This does not necessarily contradict a 
commitment to deflationism about derivative entities, as described in section 2.4.249 
Emergentism claims that at least some macro-properties are not derivative properties, that 
they are fundamental and do in fact exist. This is compatible with the inflationist belief that 
derivative entities exist, but the way in which they exist is different to the way in which 
                                               
248 While I’ve used a quote from Alexander on the mysteriousness of emergence, he almost certainly 
disagrees that emergent properties are additions of being, and certainly that they are novel causal 
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fundamental entities exist. It is also compatible with the deflationist belief that derivative 
entities do not in fact exist. There are more properties that exist on an emergence theory of 
macro-properties than on one that accounts for their putative existence without invoking new 
properties, but this does not involve changing the status of derivative entities because 
emergent properties are not derivative entities. 
Regarding the inexplicability of emergence, most theories of emergence do not involve 
magic or complete autonomy,250 and, while there are many differences among the 
formulations that ontological emergence has taken over the years, there are certain features 
that are, for the most part, held in common. The idea of emergence involving something 
ontologically new and additional in relation to its base is one of these ideas. The idea that 
emergents are dependent on their base is another.  
Some of the other details here mean that the discussion won’t apply to all accounts of 
emergence - not least, for example, because emergence is often formulated in terms of laws 
rather than powers - it is nonetheless likely that these considerations could be parsed in 
those ontologies. Inevitably however, there are also some theories with incommensurable 
views on the nature of an emergent’s dependence and novelty. The ‘emergent’ theories 
supported by Silberstein and McGeever251, Spencer-Smith252, Searle253, and Sperry254, for 
instance, contain features that are divergent with most of the following discussion. 
Silberstein and McGeever’s view of ‘emergence’ is ‘relational holism’, which is ambiguous in 
its metaphysical commitments vis-à-vis dependence and novelty, but also entails the denial 
of atomistic fundamentalism and the intrinsicality of properties that is assumed in the 
background picture here.255 Spencer-Smith, Searle, and Sperry’s views diverge because of 
their variously different ideas about the kind of novelty that suffices for emergence. 
Other differences notwithstanding, the rest of this section proceeds to develop the notions of 
‘dependence’ and ‘novelty’ as they pertain to emergence. Consider these to be starting 
points to be developed: 
[Dependence] – Emergent properties are dependent on the emergent base256 
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[Novelty] – Emergent properties are ontologically additional to the emergent base. 
Emergent entities are dependent on their bases and yet are ontologically distinct. This is the 
form that the emergent answer to the Problem of Reduction takes. [Dependence] must also 
allow a distinction between micro-properties and macro-properties. [Novelty] guarantees that 
the macro-property is, in fact, a really existing property. The emergence relation to be 
defined must satisfy these premises. In addition, in order to solve the Problem of Reduction, 
the emergence relation must explain how a macro-property is the property of an apparently 
complex object and yet be simple and fundamental. Let’s examine some theories with these 
explananda in mind. 
4.3 The Unpredictability of Emergence 
In some discussions of emergence a lot rides on the extent to which phenomena are 
‘unpredictable’, though there are formulations of emergence that are compatible with both 
causal determinism and its denial.257 There is the possibility of a new form of unpredictability 
that is implied as a direct consequence of the core metaphysical features of emergence; 
however, given what has been said about the inexplicability of emergence, the extent of that 
unpredictability is questionable. Here is Broad on the question of unpredictability: 
There is nothing, so far as I can see, mysterious or unscientific about a trans-ordinal 
law or about the notion of ultimate characteristics of a given order. A trans-ordinal law 
is as good a law as any other; and, once it has been discovered, it can be used like 
any other to suggest experiments, to make predictions, and to give us practical 
control over external objects. The only peculiarity of it is that we must wait till we 
meet with an actual instance of an object of the higher order before we can discover 
such a law; and that we cannot possibly deduce it beforehand from any combination 
of laws which we have discovered by observing aggregates of a lower order.258 
In the world before an emergent property occurs for the first time, it would be possible to 
accurately observe all of the behaviour of the base entities and yet fail to predict the 
emergence of the new, emergent property when it occurs. A theorist whose understanding of 
the world was derived from theories developed entirely from observations of physical 
systems before emergence might not be able to anticipate the emergent property: the 
threshold will appear to be arbitrary. This possibility seems to follow from the inexplicability 
of emergence in terms of the properties of the emergent base.  
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Here is Alexander characterising this implication of emergence: “A being who knew only 
mechanical and chemical action could not predict life; he must wait till life emerged with the 
course of Time.”259 And: “How much of the future he will be able to predict depends on the 
time at which his calculation begins, that is, on the state which the universe has then 
attained in the unfolding of its characters.”260 
Compare this with the Laplacean demon: 
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that 
set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this 
intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in 
a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of 
the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just 
like the past would be present before its eyes.261 
Employing the notion of the Laplacean demon, one might say that, ceteris paribus, if 
emergence were true it would mean the difference between a world where the Laplacean 
demon is successful in its predictions and one where it is not. We should be clear that the 
stipulation that the demon has knowledge of “all forces that set nature in motion”, is limited to 
only that set of entities constituting the emergent base, before the first occurrence of 
emergence. It is this restriction in the epistemic viewpoint of the demon and not its limitations 
as a calculator that is pertinent to emergence. What Alexander has in mind is that if a 
Laplacean demon has complete knowledge of the universe before emergence occurs, that 
demon could not possibly predict that occurrence. 
That the unpredictability of emergence is entailed by this restriction of one’s epistemic 
viewpoint (to the emergent base) even for a postulated perfect predictor like the Laplacean 
calculator is significant. Let’s assume the Laplacean demon is omniscient in two ways: apart 
from the epistemic restriction to the emergent base, it has perfect knowledge of fundamental 
ontology;262 and, apart from whatever unpredictability is entailed by that epistemic restriction, 
it is a perfect predictor of all that that ontology entails. We’re assuming that the only kind of 
unpredictability that affects the Laplacean demon is one resulting from this division in 
fundamental ontology between the entities to which the demon has access and those that it 
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does not. In this sense – and only in this sense - we are admitting that a restricted epistemic 
standpoint is the mark of emergence. With that in mind, let’s look at some other formulations 
of emergence in terms of unpredictability.  
Newman263 argues that sensitivity to initial conditions in strange attractors and other chaotic 
nonlinear systems poses insurmountable measurement limitations that makes the 
occurrence of these macro-properties unpredictable using only the theories describing the 
emergent base. Newman’s argument is based on similar reasoning to that which we saw in 
sections 3.1 and 2.4, i.e. the impossibility of creating derivational relations between theories 
concerning macro-properties and the emergent base. And as we’ve seen this does not entail 
the addition of being that defines ontological emergence: it is a form of weak emergence. 
Indeed, Newman explicitly claims that such macro-properties are identical to the properties 
of the emergent base and relations among them.264 These macro-properties are structural 
properties and therefore do not, in fact, exist.265 Furthermore, if it is the sensitivity to initial 
conditions and measurement issues that generate the unpredictability, then this does not 
seem to be the kind of unpredictability that a Laplacean demon would face. 
Bedau266 characterises a form of unpredictable emergence that is also based on a restricted 
epistemic standpoint. His argument is based on the observation that for nonlinear systems it 
is typically impossible to provide an analytic or ‘closed’ solution; the solutions must typically 
include boundary conditions. This is not the right kind of restricted epistemic standpoint and 
it does not entail ontological emergence. Our Laplacean demon is restricted only to the 
emergent base – which includes all entities that are not emergent macro-properties. Since 
both system states and boundary conditions are included in the emergent base, our 
Laplacean demon would have all the resources to provide solutions to these systems.267 
Bedau also stipulates that the macro-properties of these systems can only be derived by 
simulation; this likewise poses no problem for our perfect calculator. 
Both the inexplicability and the in-principle unpredictability of emergence are implied by the 
ontology of emergence and the novelty of emergence has its basis in that ontology. This 
connects with our discussion of fundamentality in section 2.2. There fundamentality was 
characterised as the set of entities that God would have to create in order for the world to be 
the way that it is. Here we can characterise emergence as positing a difference, ceteris 
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paribus,268 between the possible epistemic standpoint of God and the possible epistemic 
standpoint of the Laplacean demon in relation to their knowledge of fundamental ontology. In 
other words, God, having created the universe’s ontology, has full knowledge of it and 
therefore, for God, emergence is neither inexplicable nor unpredictable in this sense. 
Furthermore, according to this definition of fundamentality and the preceding description of 
the relevant difference between the Laplacean demon and God, the novelty of emergence – 
that the emergent entity is an addition to our ontology – would be fundamental. 
The examples above, and others that are based on a scientistic approach to emergence, 
examine scientific case studies that exhibit unpredictability in nonlinear systems.269 The 
unpredictability found in these nonlinear systems goes beyond the merely conceptual 
irreducibility explored in sections 3.1. and 2.4; over and above the general failure to 
explanatorily reduce special science and natural kind terms. Otherwise the examples are 
similar: the putative macro-properties seem, in their indispensability, to indicate some kind of 
a correspondence with the way the world is structured. This is another kind of 
epistemological emergence. These epistemological features often tell us interesting things 
about the world, how it unfolds, the nature of the entities in it, and so on. They do not, 
however, entail that those putative macro-properties really exist.270 The naturalness of these 
macro-properties could indicate only correspondence to structure and not real entities. 
Philosophers like Jessica Wilson and Carl Gillett, just for example, describe varieties of 
emergence that I take to be less than ontological emergence, but that are still mind- and 
explanation-independent features of the world.271 This is Wilson’s ‘weak metaphysical’ 
emergence and Gillett’s definition of ‘Strong’ emergence. Ontological emergence is 
something more: it is an addition of being. The only epistemic criterion we have identified for 
ontological emergence is the one that would apply to the Laplacean demon. 
For any given set of observations, the difference between the two (ontological emergence 
and epistemological emergence) is usually a matter of metaphysical theory. Whether we 
think that an observed phenomenon implies the existence of a new entity is often going to 
turn on the most general theories we have about the entities that exist and what they can do. 
In this case the category of ‘property’ entities, and our theory about what their identity 
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conditions are and how to identify new entities in that category. The theory of property 
identification that we hold is the difference between saying that there are a small set of 
properties, a sparse ontology, perhaps only to be identified by fundamental physics,272 and 
saying that there are abundant properties, maybe even to the extent that there is a really-
existing new property-entity for every meaningful predicate we have. Likewise, the theory of 
property identification that we hold is also the difference between saying that a phenomenon 
is epistemologically emergent and saying that it is ontologically emergent. We’ve done some 
of the necessary work in chapter 2. and we’ll return to the question in chapters 8-10. 
4.4 Novelty 
We’ve so far characterised emergence by reference to Alexander’s criterion vis-a-vis the 
unpredictability of emergence. The Laplacean demon is limited in his predictions until after 
emergence has unfolded in the course of time. “How much of the future he will be able to 
predict depends on the time at which his calculation begins, that is, on the state which the 
universe has then attained in the unfolding of its characters.”273  
We’ve also argued that one implication of thinking about emergence in terms of the 
Laplacean demon and the concept of fundamentality in terms of God’s necessities,274 is that 
the emergent property would be fundamental. This also seems to follow from our 
background commitments to deflationism in fundamental ontology and the adoption of a 
realist stance about emergent properties.  
With this in mind, let’s return to our premise with regard to novelty, which is:  
[Novelty] – Emergent properties are ontologically additional to the emergent base. 
This should not be understood as meaning that any new property that is an addition to the 
fundamental ontology is an emergent property. What is meant by the novelty of an emergent 
property is not merely the novelty of the first occurrence of a previously unseen property. It is 
not that a property has never been seen before that entails the inability to predict that 
occurrence; ex hypothesi, for the Laplacean demon the occurrence of never seen before 
(but non-emergent properties) is completely predictable. The ‘emergent base’ in this 
definition includes all possible properties of the emergent base.  
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What follows is a brief survey of some of the methods of identifying the novelty of 
emergence and of making the distinction between an emergent property and the emergent 
base. There are some who regard the lack of logical entailment to be sufficient for 
emergence: i.e. that emergent properties are not logically implied by the properties of the 
emergent base.275 We will look at some examples of this and some problems with a modal 
conception of the emergent relation in the next section, but it suffices to say here that the 
failure of a logical or some version of metaphysical ‘entailment’ to hold fails to rule out both 
mere correlations and non-emergent nomological relations of the kind that could be 
predicted by the Laplacean calculator. 
There are also conceptions of the novelty of emergence based on the distinction between 
dispositional and categorical properties.276 Chalmers, for instance, distinguishes emergent 
qualities in the case of consciousness from causal novelty in quantum systems.277 Van 
Gulick presents emergence as being split into emergent properties and emergent powers, 
with different kinds of novelty.278 And Searle’s account of emergence relies on mental 
properties being emergent qualities but not emergent causes.279  
It would be problematic for us to use the categorical/dispositional distinction to demarcate 
emergent and non-emergent novelty. This is true even if we accept the arguments that 
conscious experience entails a failure of reduction.280 One problem with this is that it 
assumes a position on the distinction between categorical and dispositional properties that 
we struggled to justify in section 2.6. And we have, on the basis of those arguments, made 
the assumption that powers are either identical to, or figure into the identity conditions of, the 
properties of objects. It is not available to us to say that the difference between the novelty of 
an emergent property and the novelty of a non-emergent property is that one is categorical 
and one is dispositional. 
Other conceptions of the novelty in emergence are clearer in demarcating the ‘ontologically 
additional’ emergent properties from the ontologically additional micro-properties. Even 
something like Horgan’s ‘superdupervenience’ seems to fit the bill, where the macro-
properties are metaphysically and scientifically basic, in much the same way that 
fundamental laws of physics are basic; they are unexplained explainers.281 Non-reductive 
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276 See section 2.6. 
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278 Van Gulick 1993 
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280 See, for instance, section 3.1. 
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physicalism is supposed to be “nothing over and above” whereas emergence is “something 
over and above”. Since superdupervenience is supposed to be incompatible with 
nonreductive physicalism, might this not suffice? Assuming that the nonreductive thesis is a 
substantive ontological one, one way of characterising the difference between emergence 
and non-reductive physicalism is that NRP attempts to make sense of distinctness (non-
identity) between macro-properties and the ‘emergent’ base, without doing so through the 
use of an addition to the ontology.  
While fundamentality and ‘basicness’ are necessary conditions for the novelty of an 
emergent property, it is not sufficient to distinguish it from the novelty of the kind of 
ontologically additional micro-property the occurrence of which the Laplacean demon could 
predict. Both types of property are additions to fundamental ontology. The only relevant 
distinction seems to be that an emergent property is a macro-property.282 If this is the case 
then not only is emergence a theory of macro-properties, it is also necessarily a theory of 
macro-properties. Emergent properties are macro-properties and, as we shall see in the next 
section, macro-properties are also emergent properties. It is therefore something about the 
novelty of a macro-property that explains the inability of the Laplacean demon to predict its 
occurrence. 
4.5 Primitive Dependence  
So emergent properties are macro-properties and they are fundamental. We also started 
with the following premise: 
[Dependence] – Emergent properties are dependent on the emergent base  
But in what ways does an emergent depend on its base? What features does this 
dependence have? Let’s survey the options. 
First of all, there are some conceptions of emergence that rely on the failure of a primitive 
notion of dependence. Due to its primitiveness we have to talk about this stipulation in the 
abstract. One way we can do this is by employing the very general notion of dependence in 
the same way that Schaffer does.283 Let’s assume that a theory of emergence on this 
account would simply mean a failure of dependence to hold between the emergent property 
and the emergent base. 
                                               
282 Note that the micro-macro boundary is at the point of the atomistic foundation: physical and 
molecular emergence is not ruled out by this. 
283 See, for example, Schaffer 2009 and some of the discussion about dependence in section 2.2.  
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A second problem is that one of the core features of emergence is that emergent properties 
do, to some extent, depend on the emergent base. Would a primitivist approach deny 
[Dependence]? Or is there some other primitive way in which an emergent does depend on 
its base? If so, would this involve the stipulation of a further abstract notion to preserve 
[Dependence]? 
This will not do. One problem with employing an unspecified notion like this is that it will not 
help us solve the Problem of Reduction. The Problem of Reduction arises because of a lack 
of specificity about the nature of macro-properties. Adopting a general approach where 
dependence fails to hold as a matter of abstract principle does not give us any advance on 
this lack of specificity. This is a purely negative definition of emergence. Since a theory of 
metaphysical emergence should provide an answer to the Problem of Reduction, this is not 
an adequate theory of emergence. Why does this dependence fail to hold? We will shortly 
argue that there is a kind of dependence that does fail to hold – ontological dependence - 
and that this is what explains what it is that makes emergent properties fundamental. We will 
then need to rely on a different kind of dependence to explicate the [Dependence] premise. 
By using an unspecified abstract notion we would struggle to make this distinction and could 
not explain what makes a macro-property either macro or a property. 
4.5.1 Ontological Dependence 
We have a minimal working definition of ontological dependence from section 2.2: 
(OD) An entity x is dependent iff for all possible worlds w and times t at which a 
duplicate of x exists, that duplicate is accompanied by other concrete, contingent 
objects in w at t284 
And we have also mentioned how ontological dependence is an important notion in defining 
deflationism and substance, sections 2.4 and 2.5. If we are to think of the dependence of an 
emergent property on its base in terms of ontological dependence, we need to be clear 
about what the notion means and the different ways in which one entity can ontologically 
depend on another. We must go beyond (OD) as a definition. 
The crux of the idea is that one entity depends for its existence on another entity, and this is 
not in a causal sense, as already explained in section 2.2. We can also distinguish 
ontological dependence from the notion of logical dependence, which is a kind of 
dependence that can only obtain between propositions.  
                                               
284 This is from Barnes 2012 p.880. Most of the analysis in this section looks at the account of 
emergence in this paper. 
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We suggested in 2.5. that substances were ontologically independent and as such could be 
the foundation of reality we committed to in 2.2.2. It is common for substance to be 
conceived as an object that does not depend for its existence on anything else.285 To begin 
exploring the different relations that might be able to do the work in the case of substance 
and emergent properties, let’s define a simple relation of ontological dependence that would 
satisfy (OD): 
(D1) x depends for its existence upon y =df Necessarily, x exists only if y exists.286 
Here ontological dependence means that the existence of x strictly implies the existence of 
y. And it’s worth noting that this also implies that on this definition everything ontologically 
depends on itself. We can then form the definition of substance in terms of ontological 
independence: 
(Substance) x is a substance iff there is nothing y such that y is not identical with x 
and, necessarily, x exists only if y exists. 
Now, for our purposes in providing a solution to the Problem of Reduction, and in particular 
the questions of how a macro-property could be simple and fundamental, it is relevant to 
seek the implications of these conceptions of substance for the status of the properties of 
composite objects.287 We’ve already argued in sections 2.4. and 3.1. that a composite object 
does not in fact exist because it is nothing over and above the simples that constitute its 
proper parts and on which it existentially depends. It may however be possible to deny that a 
composite substance depends for its existence on its proper parts because it is possible for 
that substance to undergo a change of those parts without ceasing to exist. In this way we 
draw the distinction with a composite object that is not a true substance, but merely rather 
the collection of objects that composes it. The relation of ontological dependence as defined 
by (D1) does not hold between a composite substance and its parts.288 
In sections 2.3. and 2.5. we defended a view of properties where they are ontologically 
dependent on the objects in which they inhere. Using our definition of ontological 
dependence we can now form the following premise about properties: 
                                               
285 For instance in Descartes 1644/1983 
286 Lowe 1998 p. 137. Most of the ensuing discussion and the definitions used here are from Lowe 
1998 ch. 6. 
287 We continue this discussion in relation to simplicity in section 3.1. 
288 Though it does in a more generic sense of ontological dependence. 
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(Inherence) If x is a property and y is an object in which x inheres, then necessarily, x 
exists only if y exists. 
The premise (Inherence) only seems to apply to property particulars, since x seemingly 
cannot ‘migrate’ to some object other than y when y no longer exists.  
Returning to (Substance), there appears to be a problem with using (D1) to form a definition 
of substance. That is, if one role for substance is forming the foundation of reality as required 
by foundationalism, then, contrary to the background picture,289 (D1) seems to allow the 
possibility of a relation of mutual existential dependency holding between non-identical 
things, i.e. x may bear the relation (D1) to y, and y may bear the elation (D1) to x. Rather 
than a chain of ontological dependency that terminates in an ontologically independent 
substance, it would be possible to have a chain of (D1) dependency that terminates in a 
mutually dependent pair x and y that do not satisfy (Substance). 
The notion of ontological dependency must be asymmetrical if it is to satisfy foundationalism. 
One important reason why an asymmetrical relation of ontological dependence is desirable 
is because of its explanatory role. Our main motivation for committing to foundationalism 
was that it explained how existence is possible – in virtue of the ontological independence of 
the foundational objects. No such explanation is provided by the mutually dependent pair x 
and y. The explanation for the existence of x is the existence of y, but the explanation for the 
existence of y is the existence of x - it is circular. Whereas, if x is a substance as defined by 
(Substance), the explanation for the existence of x is that it is a substance and therefore 
capable of independent existence, and it is in virtue of this that anything that ontologically 
depends on x exists. 
If the existence of x is supposed to be explained by the existence of y, then this gives us a 
possible way to define ontological dependence in an asymmetrical way. This is because the 
explanatory relationship and the conjunction ‘because’, are themselves asymmetrical. We 
might then replace (D1) with the following: 
(D1*) x depends for its existence upon y =df Necessarily, x only exists because y 
exists. 
The explanatory role of ontological dependence is also relevant if it is supposed to be 
appealed to in order to explain the dependence of an emergent property on its emergent 
base. For our purposes, the emergent relation must explicate emergence in such a way so 
                                               
289 i.e. that there exists a foundational ‘level’ at the bottom of reality that is ontologically independent. 
See section 2.2.2. 
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as to explain the possibility of macro-properties and solve the Problem of Reduction. This 
will create a conflict between the two explanatory roles of the relation of ontological 
emergence. In foundationalism, ontological dependence explains the existence of an entity 
in virtue of the objects on which it existentially depends. But [Novelty] ensures that an 
emergent property is ontologically additional to the emergent base. And we have argued that 
this novelty entails the inexplicability of emergence from the epistemic standpoint of the 
emergent base. How then is it possible for an emergent property to be ontologically 
dependent on its base, i.e. for its existence to be explained by the existence of its base, and 
yet for a Laplacean demon with perfect and complete knowledge of that base to be 
incapable of explaining its existence? 
Perhaps we can resolve the contradiction by appealing to (Inherence), which, since we are 
talking about emergent properties rather than substances, might seem to be the more 
appropriate kind of premise regarding the ontological dependence of emergence. This only 
pushes the problem back a stage. Properties must inhere in a substance. We have made the 
distinction between composite objects – which are derivative entities and do not in fact exist 
– and composite substances. Emergent properties are macro-properties. Macro-properties 
must inhere in composite substances. However we have already argued that composite 
substances do not ontologically depend on their parts.290  
If the dependence of an emergent property on its base is supposed to be a relation of 
ontological dependence, then it cannot be the relation described by (Inherence) because 
that is a relation between a property and its substance. If the composite substance is 
fundamental rather than derivative, then it is something additional to the base. The 
substance in which an emergent inheres is a distinct relata to the base composing it. The 
relation between a composite substance and its parts is not ontological dependence. 
But neither can the dependence of an emergent property on its base, via a composite 
substance, involve the relation described by (D1*). This is because a notion of ontological 
dependence that could fit the bill required by foundationalism would entail the kind of 
explanatory reduction available to the Laplacean demon and therefore the failure to comply 
with [Novelty]. Furthermore, since we’ve explicated the notion of fundamentality in terms of 
the difference between the epistemic standpoint of God and the Laplacean demon, the 
emergent property on such an account would also fail to be fundamental. Such an entity 
would not count as emergent and could not solve the Problem of Reduction. 
                                               
290 Except in a generic sense. More on this in section 6.5. 
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We can now see that, given our background assumptions about foundationalism in terms of 
ontologically independent objects, and our assumptions about fundamentality in terms of the 
ontological necessities of God, ontological independence is the mark both of the ontological 
foundation of reality and also its fundamental objects.  
We can describe this in reference to God and demon again The shift in epistemic standpoint 
from God to the Laplacean demon effectively involves the removal of the knowledge of 
certain possible fundamental objects. Any objects that are thus removed, but which are 
ontologically dependent, will, insofar as ontological dependence explains the existence of an 
object in virtue of the existence of another object to which it stands in the relation of 
ontological dependence, be epistemically available to the demon because the demon has 
perfect knowledge of all of the entities within the purview of its standpoint and therefore 
access to the explanation.291 Thus fundamental objects must be ontologically independent. 
The notion of an ontologically dependent entity that is fundamental is contradictory according 
to our current definition of ontological dependence. 
Let’s return to Barnes’s conception of emergence as involving fundamentality and 
ontological dependence.292 She assumes that fundamentality is brute, and that ontological 
dependence does not bottom out in what is fundamental. 293 However, this relies on taking 
ontological dependence to also be brute. If, as Barnes seems to suggest, ontological 
dependence were some catch-all metaphysical concept like Schaffer’s ‘grounding’294 
capable of covering the requirements of both foundationalism and the relation holding 
between natural numbers and the world, then for our purposes, as we have seen, this does 
not sufficiently explicate emergence. It seems unlikely that whatever relation is able to do the 
explanatory work for mathematics (assuming that she is right about that possibility) would be 
able to do the same for emergence. A catch-all umbrella concept is not a brute relation. The 
only candidates for being brute are the specific relations covered by that umbrella.  
The move to umbrella terms only obscures the real relations. What relations are there that 
have the force of metaphysical necessity? The relation of identity is the paradigm. But that 
means there is no new entity required to be created by God. If the ontological dependence of 
emergence is mereological, then, as we argued in section 2.4., the emergent property would 
not really exist. If the ontological dependence of emergence is defined by (D1*), then it also 
seems that fundamental entities cannot be ontologically dependent. It seems that once the 
                                               
291 This assumes that perfect knowledge of an entity includes knowledge of the propositions made 
true by that entity’s existence, including those propositions about the existence of other entities. 
292 Barnes 2012 
293 Ibid p.876 
294 See preceding section. 
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existence of an object is dependent in this sense, then God would not have to create it 
independently of the entities on which it depends. It is in this sense that derivative entities 
should be understood – their ‘existence’ is explained by the entities from which they are 
derived. God would only have to create the independently existing entities.  
Using the general terms of meta-ontology make the possibility of ontologically dependent 
emergence seem more plausible: Barnes argues that how the two concepts come apart in 
the opposite direction for mathematical objects is evidence of the possibility of 
emergence.295 But the sense in which mathematical objects are ‘ontologically dependent’ 
and the sense in which an object or a property are ‘ontologically dependent’ is different, and 
what is true of the dependency of mathematical objects is not necessarily true of the 
relations above. We have plausibly argued that it is not true. The move to the generalities of 
meta-ontology has facilitated an equivocation on the notion of dependence.  
A theory of emergence must give an account of how the emergent entity is novel and how it 
depends on its base. It is not necessary for emergence to be a relation that is this strong in 
order to do that.296 Barnes glosses over the main problem of emergence, which is explicating 
the relation that makes emergence possible. Instead, by lumping emergence in with what 
(she argues) are two independently supported metaphysical brutes, it seems to imply that 
emergence comes without cost. However, the theory that both foundationalism and 
fundamentalism are defined by ontological dependence employs only one of those brute 
terms – ontological dependence. Barnes argues for two, and one of those – ontological 
dependence – isn’t even brute.  
Barnes herself admits that there were problems with coherence in the past when ontological 
emergence was defined in terms of a metaphysically necessary relation.297 The appeal to 
meta-ontology does not help in overcoming the problems. In this regard, she appeals to the 
example of a gunky universe to suggest the possibility of dependent entities whose 
existence is not threatened by their dependence (they are dependent but fundamental). But 
if the emergentist wants to assume a gunky universe, they will find emergence hard to 
motivate. In a gunky universe there is no foundation, so there is no basis for privileging some 
entities over others. Every object is both fundamental and dependent. This means that every 
object would satisfy Barnes’s requirements for emergence. Raising meta-ontological 
possibilities like those we considered in section 2.2 doesn’t help with the Problem of 
Reduction because it is only in this universe with the meta-ontological background that we 
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have assumed that such a problem occurs. If the thought is that the existence of the 
Problem of Reduction in an atomistic fundamentalist universe gives us reason to believe that 
the universe is gunky, then that case should be made.   
In any case, better than saying that everything in a gunky universe is emergent is saying that 
nothing is. What you have here is a different theory of objects and properties in general, not 
a theory of emergence in particular. The unique characteristics of a theory of emergence are 
a response to the Problem of Reduction and other similar problems that only arise in 
ontologies where the existence of macro-properties would require additional metaphysical 
commitments. The fact of ‘emergence’ in other ontologies is trivial. 
The dependence of an emergent entity is not necessarily ontological dependence. It is not 
dependence in the sense defined by Barnes. We should assume that in our metaphysical 
framework there is no such thing as an ontologically dependent fundamental.298 
4.5.2 Constitution 
Let’s first rule out some ways in which the emergent property does not depend on its base. 
An emergent is not constituted by its base. While the emergent depends for its existence on 
a composite of simples, it is not a mere aggregate of the simple properties.  
An emergent property is a property of a composite object, and the emergent base comprises 
properties of parts of that composite. But compare this to a relation that is a mere 
aggregation, like the relation between the weight of a whole and the weight of its parts. The 
weights of the parts straightforwardly determine the weight of the whole. The weight of the 
whole and the weight of the parts are different, but, if the weight of the whole is a property at 
all, it is the same kind of property as the weight of its parts: they are both determinates of the 
determinable weight. Van Gulick calls cashing out the emergent relation as a 
determinable/determinate relation ‘specific value emergence’ but it will not suffice to give us 
the novelty an emergent requires.299 In an emergent theory of macro-properties a macro-
property is more than the sum of the properties of its parts – it is a genuine ‘addition of 
being’.  They cannot be constituted by the ‘additive point of view’, as Ernest Nagel puts it,300 
because they are not similar in kind in the respect of a determinable and a determinate. The 
determinable/determinate is the wrong kind of relation.301  
                                               
298 In this we are following the arguments in, for instance, Heil 2012, Ch. 3 
299 Van Gulick 2001 
300 E. Nagel 1963 
301 Searle calls the relation between the weight of a whole and its parts a ‘system feature’, which also 
includes other features of a whole that are straightforwardly determined by the aggregation of its parts 
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The next candidate for the emergent relation raised by Van Gulick is ‘modest kind 
emergence’. When cashed out in terms of causation this matches up with what Searle calls 
‘causally emergent system features’302. The relation holds when a whole has features that 
are different in kind to those of its parts. Examples of this type of relation might include 
wholes characterised by solidity, transparency, and redness: none of the molecules making 
up a red tomato are themselves red, for example.303 For Searle, this relation - ‘emergent1’ he 
calls it - is the relation that holds between mental and physical properties. However it would 
not count as an emergent theory of macro-properties according to the proscriptions of this 
thesis. 
In terms of causal powers, as Searle puts it, a property that emerges via an ‘emergent1’ 
relation, has causal powers that are entirely explained in terms of the causal interactions of 
the basal properties. Furthermore, when the tomato’s constituents are arranged, you thereby 
have a red tomato. In the ontology there are the properties of the base and its arrangement, 
and nothing more.304 There is no addition of being necessary. Since there is nothing new in 
the ontology, this must be a relation where the whole is ‘nothing over and above’ its parts. 
Even an identity theorist can accept that mental properties are ‘emergent1’. For example, 
J.J.C. Smart emphasises that ‘in saying that a complex thing is nothing but an arrangement 
of its parts, I do not deny that it can do things that a mere heap or jumble of its parts could 
not do.”305 If the relata of ‘emergent1’ are basal properties and their arrangement on the one 
hand, and nothing ontologically additional to the basal properties and their arrangement on 
the other, then it seems hard to argue that they are not identical, which would violate 
[Novelty]. 
O’Connor and Wong would describe specific value emergence and modest kind emergence 
as ‘structural properties’, where a structural property has the following definition: 
                                               
and their arrangement, such as shape or velocity, that are features of a kind held by the parts 
themselves. Searle 1992 p.111-2 
302 Van Gulick 2001 p. 17; Searle 1992 p. 111 
303 Spencer-Smith 1995 ‘Reductionism and emergent properties’ p.117 also gives a definition of this 
conception of emergence in contrast to the determinable/determinate relation (though ‘constituent’ 
has to be interpreted in a certain way for it to match the definitions here). 
304 Searle’s account relies on a conception of mental properties as a new kind of quality in a way that 
doesn’t require anything additional in the fundamental ontology. His argument is directed at certain 
other problems in philosophy of mind. He already accepts that there is no causal emergence, thus, in 
terms of the causal closure argument, he does not offer an emergent solution. See Searle 1992. 
305 J.J.C. Smart 1987 p248 
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A property, S, is structural if and only if proper parts of particulars having S have 
properties not identical with S and jointly standing in relation R, and this state of 
affairs is the particular’s having S.306 
They characterise these structural properties as properties-by-courtesy. In contrast, 
genuinely emergent traits are ‘wholly nonstructural’. This does not violate [Dependence]: 
emergents are caused by certain arrangements, and would cease to exist without those 
arrangements, whereas structural properties are those arrangements, they are identical. 
Among the options presented by Van Gulick, the only relation that fits our basic account of 
emergence is Van Gulick’s third, ‘radical kind emergence’. As with modest kind emergence, 
here there is also a difference in kind between the whole and its parts. Unlike modest kind 
emergence, the whole’s nature and existence is not necessitated by the properties of its 
parts, their arrangement, or “the law-like regularities governing the features of its parts.”307 
The point is that, though the emergent depends on its base, the base, whatever powers it 
has and whatever laws might apply to it, is insufficient to cause the emergent. They are a 
cause but not a sufficient one. 
4.5.3 Supervenience 
Not too long ago it was common for philosophers to suggest that the connection between an 
emergent and its base should be thought of in terms of a synchronic strong supervenience. 
Strong supervenience would mean that an object having an emergent property at a time t 
would imply, of causal necessity, that it also has a certain basal property or family of physical 
properties. The slogan is: 'No mental difference without a physical difference.'308 
Putting aside for the moment the question of what sort of relation explains this kind of 
covariance, we might legitimately ask if this is an issue. Why is it that these philosophers 
postulated that the relation between the emergent and its base is a supervenient relation? 
Part of the reason might be that these discussions of emergence were typically given 
contiguous with discussions of non-reductive physicalism, where supervenience was a key 
idea; the project in these circumstances was often to disambiguate non-reductive 
physicalism. 
As Hong Yu Wong points out, looking through this literature, one can find only a few 
examples of arguments for why emergent properties must supervene on their bases.309 Here 
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is Crane when considering ‘the notion of a property of a whole whose powers are unrelated 
to whatever the powers of its parts are’:  
If they do not thus supervene, then it seems somewhat perverse to describe the 
properties as ‘emergent’. Presumably part of the point of this label is to pick out the 
sense in which putting a thing’s parts together gives you something new – but not 
because you have added something ‘from the outside’. If emergentism is to be 
distinguished from dualism and vitalism (which do add something ‘from the outside’) 
then it must reject this strong notion of emergence 310 
So the argument here seems to be that supervenience is necessary to distinguish 
emergentism from more radical views. However, this seems inadequate, because there is no 
reason why the properties of substance dualisms cannot also co-vary – indeed, on a 
Cartesian system the best way to save appearances is for properties of the “mind” and the 
“body” to co-vary. The point is that, insofar as the supervenience of emergents and basal 
properties is for them to exhibit modal dependent variation, it is trivial in a sense. It doesn’t 
seem to be able to separate a property emergentism from a substance dualism in a 
principled way.  
Crane characterises substance-monist emergence as being the claim that mental properties 
are properties of physical objects – which he calls ‘Dependence’ – if the thought here is that 
substance monism makes supervenience more plausible, it is hard to see why this is the 
case. That the same object might exemplify mental and physical properties doesn’t imply 
that those properties would co-vary. Crane’s argument for a supervenient emergent relation 
is based on the need to reconcile the ‘something additional’ of the [Novelty] premise with the 
substance monism of his ‘Dependence’ premise. However, there is nothing there that needs 
to be reconciled. 
Turning to a different example, in Being Realistic about Emergence, Kim argues that 
supervenience must be considered a component of emergence, because it is the only 
guarantee of a systematic connection between basal conditions and emergent phenomena: 
he says that emergent properties must supervene because otherwise the connection 
between a mental property, say pain, and a neural condition, would be “irregular, haphazard, 
or coincidental, and not to be relied upon”, and he asks “what reason could there be for 
saying that pain ‘emerges’ from that neural condition than another”.311 
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What Kim is arguing against in this case is what Van Gulick calls radical kind emergence, 
where emergent properties are: “of a kind whose nature and existence is not necessitated by 
the features of its parts, their mode of combination and the law-like regularities governing the 
features of its parts”.312 Admittedly, this doesn’t seem to leave a lot of room for the 
production of emergents, at least in terms of the theory of causation we are currently using. 
If we are to put this in terms of laws, it seems like the confusion here is that, as opposed to 
the law-like regularities governing the features of its parts, an emergent property would have 
a separate law-like regularity that is additional to the law-like regularities of the parts.  
This is the difference between C.D. Broad’s intra-ordinal laws, which govern the features of 
the parts, and his trans-ordinal laws, which govern the production of the emergent 
properties.313 To continue with the analogy we’ve been employing: what we have here is the 
difference between the fundamental properties of the parts that are known to the Laplacean 
demon, and the properties of those parts that only God would know about, but which are 
necessary for the production of an emergent property. 
Crane’s argument for a supervenient emergent relation is based on the need to reconcile the 
‘something additional’ of the [Novelty] premise with the substance monism of his 
‘Dependence’ premise. However, he does not specify what actual relation it is that would 
ensure supervenience would hold; substance monism does not entail supervenience of 
emergent properties on basal properties. It is clear though that Crane would, like Kim, reject 
Van Gulick’s radical kind emergence. This is implied by his statements about how 
emergence does not involve anything outside of the composite object. 
Kim’s argument for a supervenient emergent relation is based on the need to ensure that the 
relation between an emergent and its base is not “irregular, haphazard, or coincidental, and 
not to be relied upon”, which he fears would be the case with radical kind emergence. I think 
this is an expression of the worry we encountered earlier about the inexplicability of 
emergence, and I agree that it is a problem for radical kind emergence, since it seems to 
preclude the possibility of there being any explanation to be found among the parts of the 
composite. In this case the answer to the problem is the same as we discussed in section 
4.1., emergence is only mysterious from the epistemic standpoint of the Laplacean demon, 
not from the perspective of an ontologically omniscient being. There is always an 
explanation for the existence of an emergent property to be found among the entities of the 
universe; just not for the given set known to the Laplacean demon.  
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Stipulating supervenience, on the other hand, does not entail that this is the case. Nor will 
whatever relation explains [Dependence] necessarily ensure that supervenience will hold. 
Kim requires some sort of systematic connection in order to avoid inexplicability. The fact of 
supervenience will depend on the nature of the real relation that ensures that there is the 
systematic connection for which Kim is looking.  
Wong raises a further worry: “In particular, it is unclear how supervenience emergentism 
allows for novel, downward causal powers for emergent properties whilst still guaranteeing 
the covariation of emergent properties with basal properties in a way consistent with the 
fundamental emergent laws which ensure the supervenience of emergent properties on 
basal properties.”314 We have already seen how stipulating supervenience in a general way, 
that is, without specifying the relation that ensures it, is insufficient for emergence – because 
it is possible that supervenience between properties holds as a matter of mere covariance. 
We’ve also seen that, if it is possible for a systematic relation to hold that would allay Crane 
and Kim’s concerns about the danger of a “haphazard” connection between emergent and 
base, then stipulating supervenience is unnecessary for emergence. It is also possible, if 
Wong is correct, or if causal drainage is an insurmountable problem,315 that stipulating 
supervenience might contradict emergence. 
4.5.4 Multiple Realisability 
The notion of supervenience has been used in various theories of mental properties, many 
of which can be characterised as non-reductive physicalist theories. While the preceding 
section argued that the concept of supervenience does not in itself enable us to gain 
adequate specificity about the emergence relation, it is still possible that the strength of the 
emergence relation can usefully be contrasted with both supervenience and reduction in 
order to demonstrate what is unique about emergence. As we have seen, emergence has 
often been taken as a form of supervenience, while Crane, Wong and others have variously 
construed supervenience as implying either reduction or emergence.316 
In order to bracket this discussion, let’s run down some other ways in which one purported 
property can be dependent on another and talk about their general strength. Identity is the 
strongest kind of dependence between emergent properties and their bases. More than that, 
the emergent properties just are their base - there is no distinctness at all here. It then 
obviously follows that there is a biconditional determination: if the emergent property is 
present then so is that particular base, and vice-versa. This rules out the multiple realization 
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of emergent properties and also guarantees supervenience. Most importantly, identity entails 
reduction. 
The next strongest kind of dependence is still a kind of logical determination, but here there 
is a one-way realization relation rather than a biconditional identity relation. This is Kim’s 
original notion of logical supervenience.317  The contrast between logical supervenience and 
identity is the denial of type physicalism, which is implied by a one-way - rather than 
biconditional - realization relation. Supervenience then means that, instead of being identical 
with its base, an emergent property is somehow ‘realized’ by its base. In logical 
supervenience the existence of a realization base entails, by logical necessity, that there is a 
particular supervenient property, but the existence of a supervenient property does not 
necessitate a particular realisation base – there may be several that could do the job. This 
would allow for the multiple realisability of supervenient properties.  
The possibility of multiple realisability precludes identity and this might suggest that 
supervenient properties are distinct from their realisers. It is a strategy along these lines by 
which logical supervenience attempts to satisfy [Novelty], because, while a particular 
realisation base implies a particular supervenient property, a particular supervenient property 
does not imply a particular realisation base, so it seems possible to draw a distinction. 
Logical determination makes this dependence very strong – there are no possible worlds 
where the base could exist without realising the supervening property, regardless of 
differences in the natural laws. This, however, raises a familiar problem with specificity: is 
this a real relation, or merely a conceptual one?318 What real relations are there that hold 
between real entities with the strength of logical determination? Kim argues that logical 
supervenience is in fact token identity, which entails logical determination but does not entail 
[Novelty], since two identical entities are not really distinct.319 
A different kind of supervenience would be one with a realisation relation that was weaker 
than logical determination. Let’s say that this kind of relation is nomological since 
nomological supervenience has been appealed to in the past to explicate emergence.320 In 
this kind of supervenience the realisation is still one-way, but this time the existence of a 
realisation base only entails the existence of the emergent property in possible worlds that 
have the relevant realisation law. This would be a contingent physical law that relates the 
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base to the emergent property it realises. The law is usually posited as a physical law so that 
this kind of supervenience is a non-reductive physicalist theory. 
Let’s pause now to compare the above primitive notions with the emergence relation as 
we’ve characterised it. Firstly, as argued in sections 4.5.1-2, there do not seem to be any 
viable candidate relations where emergence takes the strength of ontological dependence, 
the emergence relation can be biconditional or one-way – i.e. it doesn’t rule out multiple 
realisation. Broad, for example, allowed for emergent relations to be biconditional,321 but 
nothing in what we’ve set out so far implies this. This is borne out in Kim’s arguments about 
the implications of logical supervenience. Some kind of contingent nomological relation does 
seem to fit the bill; however, as argued in section 4.5.3, there do not seem to be good 
reasons why emergence must imply nomological supervenience. Barnes holds that it is the 
dependence of the emergent simpliciter. “Nothing about dependence encodes the 
essentiality of constitution”.322 But as argued in section 4.5.1, this approach lacks the 
specificity necessary for a theory of emergence to solve the Problem of Reduction. When it 
comes to multiple realisability of emergence, the important thing to note in our general 
account is that it is not on the grounds of the one-way-ness of a relation that an emergent 
property maintains distinctness from its base, as is the case with logical supervenience 
above.  
4.5.5 Modality 
Are there any other general things we can say about the strength of the dependence 
relation? Nagel, arguing against the possibility of emergence, says that explaining the 
properties of a complex system in terms of the properties of its parts requires some sort of 
necessary connection between an emergent property and its base.323 In this context – Nagel 
is arguing against the possibility of emergence - Van Cleve determines that the kind of 
necessity Nagel has in mind must be a strict logical necessity.324 Nagel needs for the 
emergence relation to be this strong in order for it to engage with a premise denying 
reductionism. Nagel’s argument goes: the link between the emergent and its base must be 
explicable, therefore there must be a logical dependence, and therefore an emergent would 
be reducible to its base. 
We can deny the second premise: that explicability requires logical necessitation. The 
explanatory role of [Dependence] does not require a logical connection – that requirement 
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would seem to imply some form of causal rationalism, a la Spinoza, which is not an 
assumption we have made.  Furthermore, we can also deny that the connection between the 
properties of a complex system and the properties of its parts can only be explained by a 
logical connection – this would imply mereological rationalism. Indeed, in the classical 
theories of emergence, explaining the emergence of one domain from another (e.g. 
chemistry from physics) has been a matter of using bridge principles between the truths of 
one domain and another.325 These bridge principles explain the connection in terms of 
nomological necessity only; furthermore - regarding the relation of dependence that could do 
the explanatory work we require - the relata of [Dependence] are not truths but real entities. 
And even if Nagel is correct that the explicability of one truth’s dependence on another 
requires a kind of logical necessitation, we have argued in section 3.1 that a failure of REP-
Reduction does not imply a failure of ONT-Reduction.326 In seeking a metaphysical 
explanation with adequate specificity to resolve the Problem of Reduction we are looking for 
truthmakers, which have different relata – the truthmaking relation is a cross categorical 
relation between truths and real entities.327 Nomological necessity seems sufficient to qualify 
as a metaphysically explicable account. This concludes our survey of primitive and general 
notions of dependence. 
4.6 Non-primitive Dependence 
4.6.1 Bridge Laws 
Abandoning the general and primitive approaches to emergence, we ask: What candidate 
relations are there that guarantee both [Novelty] and [Dependence]?  
With the identity relation above, there is insufficient distinctness. In logical supervenience, 
the distinctness is due to a one-way determination enabling multiple realisability, which is 
insufficient to guarantee [Novelty]. In nomological supervenience, the distinctness is granted 
by the nomological character of the determination – since the supervenient facts follow only 
contingently from the basal ones, there are possible worlds where this connection fails to 
hold. And so far nomological supervenience, while being neither a necessary nor sufficient 
account of emergence, has at least seemed compatible.  
We also hold, from the assumption of [Novelty] and the discussion in section 2.6, that for 
emergent properties to count as ontologically additional entities, they must have novel 
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causal efficacy; furthermore, the relation between emergent and base must be sui generis 
with respect to its base.328  
Now, as several theories have it, the causal efficacy of properties is related to the laws of 
nature into which they directly or indirectly enter. If this were true it would naturally lead to 
the supposition that what is required to satisfy [Novelty] and [Dependence] is a new law of 
nature. This assumption is there in Mill’s heteropathic laws329 and Broad’s trans-physical 
bridge laws.330 They are laws that connect the domain of the base with the domain of the 
emergent properties, laws that are new with respect to the laws and properties of the 
base.331 This is why emergence cannot be predicted from the epistemic standpoint of the 
Laplacean demon.332  
4.6.2 The Physical and the Mental 
Another common claim about emergence, and something picked out to distinguish it from 
non-reductive physicalism, is the claim that emergent entities are non-physical. A simple 
argument to this effect can be formed: since the emergent relation is something new that is 
not derived from any of the laws or properties of its base, and since the base comprises 
physical entities in the domain of physical laws, the emergent relations cannot be in the 
domain of physical laws.333 We might say that the Laplacean demon had only the epistemic 
standpoint of the physicist. 
The argument follows from the observation that emergent bridge laws would be inexplicable 
in terms of the laws applying to the emergent base. Horgan argues that the laws which 
determine the emergence of macro-properties must therefore be 
“metaphysically and scientifically basic, in much the same way that fundamental laws 
of physics are basic; they are unexplained explainers. … A materialist position should 
surely assert, contrary to emergentism, (i) that physics is causally complete (i.e. all 
fundamental causal forces are physical forces, and the laws of physics are never 
violated); and (ii) that any metaphysically basic facts or laws – any unexplained 
explainers, so to speak – are facts or laws within physics itself.”334  
                                               
328 As determined in sections 4.1-2 
329 Mill 1843/1973 
330 Broad 1925 
331 Except insofar as the properties of the base enter into those laws in relation to the emergent 
properties. 
332 Again, section 4.1-2 
333 Here I’m parsing arguments in, for instance, McLaughlin 1992 and Horgan 1993 
334 ibid, p. 560 
97 
 
See section 3.2 for a look at problems relating to a causal closure account of the Problem of 
Reduction and see section 3.4 for a brief discussion of physicalism. In formulating our 
problem for emergence we have drawn the distinction between macro-properties and micro-
properties rather than between the mental and the physical. In this regard it suffices to say 
that a relation satisfying a non-reductive physicalism must connect the supervenient property 
to its realizers with respect to only those laws and properties of the base.335  
This distinction between NRP and emergence also follows from Wilson’s argument that 
physicalists cannot “allow that mental properties have any causal powers that are different 
from those of their physicalistically acceptable base properties, for this violates the 
physicalist thesis that mental properties are ‘nothing over and above’ their base 
properties.”336 Which brings the distinction between NRP and emergence more in line with 
the pertinent features we have identified as the Problem of Reduction – the features of 
macro-properties – rather than the distinction between mental and physical. 
Either way, if NRP denies causal novelty, this would contradict [Novelty]. And our reasons 
for supposing causal novelty – see section 2.6 – combined with the rest of our background 
picture, would imply that NRP would in that case be a form of reductionism, since its macro-
properties would be derivative. In similar fashion Crane, among others, argues that both 
emergence and NRP have to accept causal novelty, or else face reduction.337  
Barnes argues that emergence is neutral with respect to the question of physicalism.338 She 
argues that the objection by appeal to [Completeness of the physical] requires the following 
ancillary premises about what sorts of things are fundamental: only physical causation is 
fundamental, and further, all physical causation is derived from the fundamental. But 
whether or not these assumptions are true, neither presents a problem for emergence per 
se, so long as the distinction between the domain of the emergent properties and the domain 
of the emergent base cuts across the distinction between physical and mental – this would 
be the case if, say, the bridge laws relating emergent and base, were not ‘psychophysical’, 
but rather trans-ordinal laws linking domains demarcated in some other way. And this is 
perhaps closer to what Broad originally had in mind for bridge laws, since they were 
intended to be a relation between the domains of the living and the non-living,339 but also 
between the domains of the special sciences: “The question: Is chemical behaviour 
                                               
335 This implies that there is some connection between the emergence/NRP distinction and the macro-
property/micro-property and we will say more about this in chapters 5 and 6. 
336 Wilson 1999 
337 Crane 2001 
338 Barnes 2012 
339 Vitalism being the problem of the day. 
98 
 
ultimately different from dynamical behaviour? seems just as reasonable as the question: Is 
vital behaviour ultimately different from non-vital behaviour? And we are much more likely to 
answer the latter question rightly if we see it in relation to similar questions which might be 
raised about other apparent differences of kind in the material realm.”340  
4.6.3 The Domain of the Dependents 
We have suggested elsewhere that it is not necessarily problematic if emergent properties 
are non-physical,341 but it might also be unnecessary to posit that they are. The distinction 
between physical and mental would be one way of fleshing out the distinction between the 
domain of the emergent base and the domain of the emergent properties, and thereby 
explain the inexplicability of emergence identified in section 4.2. If emergence is not 
necessarily a theory of non-physical properties, how can we make the distinction between 
the two domains in a way that is not arbitrary? If the relation between emergent and base is 
sui generis and fundamental, then in virtue of what is the emergence relation inexplicable, 
i.e. what principled restriction might we place on the purview of the Laplacean demon, other 
than the physical? We must have a principled reason for saying that emergents are in a 
different domain to their basal properties, in a way that would require a metaphysical ‘bridge’ 
law, or equivalent. 
In Barnes the distinction is explained by pulling apart the notions of derivativeness and 
ontological dependence.342 While we have concluded that this approach to characterising 
emergence was insufficiently specified, it might be supplemented by specifying a real 
relation like a bridge law, and instead be relied upon merely to demarcate the domains to 
which the relata of a trans-ordinal law belong. In this case, the emergent property would not 
bear the relation of ontological dependence to its base simpliciter, pace Barnes, but would 
enter into a bridge law that, unlike intra-ordinal laws - which hold between independent 
entities - would instead hold between entities that on the one relata are ontologically 
independent and on the other are ontologically dependent.  
Is this something to which we could appeal? It would not be if we were to make the 
assumption that all causation is derived from independent entities,343 but Barnes argues that 
this assumption “seems to be too strong. Surely we think that there could still be causation in 
a gunky world, or that a mass trope can have causal powers, etc.” She argues that the 
motivation for thinking that only the independent entities are fundamental, and thereby 
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causal, is the assumption of an atomistic ontology, where fundamentality and independence 
are conflated.  
Since we have assumed an atomistic ontology in our background picture, chapter 2, it would 
seem that we do have motivation for assuming that we cannot pull apart the notions of 
derivativeness and ontological dependence. Since we have assumed that a gunky universe 
is impossible for independent reasons,344 there is no theoretical cost to our assuming a 
theory of causation that would be impossible in a gunky universe. Likewise, since we have 
assumed that tropes cannot exist independently of their object345 - that properties are the 
way objects are – there is no theoretical cost to our assuming that causation would be 
impossible for an independently existing trope. We have sacrificed no possibilities by making 
such an assumption. We also have independent motivation for restricting causation to only 
ontologically independent entities: that way we do not have to introduce a brute term to 
define fundamentality.346 Fundamentality can now be defined in terms of ontological 
independence – a notion already introduced in relation to foundationalism and substance. 
It seems the only relevant distinction between the two domains left to us is the one we 
started with – the distinction between macro-properties and micro-properties. The relata of a 
bridge law are, on the one hand, the properties of complex objects, and on the other, the 
properties of simple objects. While a new real relation - like a bridge law – seems to be a 
necessary condition for the [Dependence] of an emergent property, it is not sufficient to 
distinguish it from the ordinary nomological relations holding between the micro-properties 
the occurrence of which the Laplacean demon could predict. Both types of property are 
fundamental and independent.347 The only relevant distinction seems to be that an emergent 
property is a macro-property.348 As noted in section 4.4. this means that not only is 
emergence a theory of macro-properties, it is also necessarily a theory of macro-properties. 
But not only this. Since the emergent relation is to be distinguished from ordinary 
nomological relations by the distinction between macro and micro – which is what makes a 
bridge law a bridge law - then macro-properties are also necessarily emergent properties. It 
is because it is a macro-property that explains the inability of the Laplacean demon to predict 
the occurrence of an emergent property; but since the inability of the Laplacean demon to 
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predict the occurrence of a property is also what makes a property an emergent property,349 
all macro-properties are emergent. If the Laplacean demon cannot see it, then it must be a 
macro-property. Since we have defined emergence in terms of the epistemic standpoint of 
the Laplacean demon, then all macro-properties must be emergent properties. 
4.6.4 Synchronicity and Causal Inheritance 
An emergent property is a distinct entity characterised by [Novelty], but it is also dependent 
for its existence, as characterised by [Dependence]. We noted in section 2.2.1 that the 
causal relation may also be characterised by the distinctness of its relata and a kind of 
dependence; but the dependence in [Dependence] seems to be different to the dependence 
of an effect on its cause. A cause determines the effect but thereafter the effect is not 
dependent on the cause. What is required for [Dependence] is the sustained dependence of 
the one on the other. For that reason we argued that the dependence of an emergent on its 
base seemed to be some kind of ontological dependence,350 and we invoked the analogy to 
the dependence that a complex object has on its parts. Rather than being dependent on the 
existence of something in the past – as with causal dependence - the existence of an 
emergent is dependent on the existence of its base at that very time. We have been working 
with a minimal, primitive notion of ontological dependence, as follows: 
(OD) An entity x is dependent iff for all possible worlds w and times t at which a 
duplicate of x exists, that duplicate is accompanied by other concrete, contingent 
objects in w at t351 
This is a synchronic relation: implying that an emergence base is present at time t just in 
case the emergent property is present at time t. We’ve since fleshed out the notion with the 
nomological dependence of a bridge law.352 It implies that, whether such a law holds, you 
cannot have x by itself. While duplicating an ontologically independent entity involves only 
duplicating that entity, duplicating an ontologically dependent entity involves duplicating 
something else as well. Ontological dependence is stronger than causal dependence, since 
for something to be causally dependent on an entity does not require that entity to still exist. 
This seems like the right approach for a theory of emergence that seeks to explain mental 
properties because it seems correct to say that my mental properties could not exist at any 
time without my brain.  
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This relation of synchronic dependence encounters the problem of causal drainage that we 
introduced in section 3.3. If synchronically dependent properties inherit their causal powers 
from the properties on which they are dependent, then it would seem that the causation into 
which emergent properties enter would be systematically overdetermined. 
As argued in section 4.6.1., given our background assumptions, [Novelty] implies that an 
emergent property, P, has some causal powers not possessed by its base, Q. Let’s assume 
that P synchronically depends on Q. We have assumed, in section 2.6., that causal powers 
figure in the identity conditions of properties, so if a property has a power, then all bearers of 
that property will have that power; therefore, if P has a power, C, then the bearer of P has 
the power C. And we also identify the powers of P as all those powers that by nomological 
necessity are had by all the bearers of P.    
The problem of causal inheritance arises because of the coextension of P and Q. Since they 
are properties of the same complex object as a matter of synchronic nomological necessity, 
all bearers of P are also bearers of Q and vice versa. Since all bearers of P have the power 
C, and we identify the powers of Q by the powers had by all of its bearers, then Q also has 
C. The powers of P are a subset of the powers of Q, which contradicts the assumption that 
[Novelty] entails causal novelty.353  
It would then seem, in parallel with the causal closure argument and Kim’s supervenience 
argument,354 that unless some other dependence relation can be found which is capable of 
blocking causal inheritance, synchronic dependence is not compatible with both the 
assumptions about causal powers set out in section 2.6. and the causal relevance of macro-
properties. 
4.6.5 Causal Maintenance 
Though the emergent entity is ‘something new’, the existence of the ‘new’ entity must 
be both caused and sustained by the collective activity of other entities. Otherwise, 
the entity in question would not be properly characterized as ‘emerging’ from 
anything355 
Accounts of emergence where the emergent and its base are not coextensive avoid the 
problem of causal inheritance.356 This is because the powers of P will not be a subset of the 
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powers of Q, if Q is not, at each time t, always accompanied by P. This would be the case if, 
for instance, emergence was a diachronic relation where the occurrence of P at time t+1 was 
caused by the occurrence of Q at time t, the occurrence of P at time t+2 was caused by the 
occurrence of Q at time t+1, and so on. In general, if the occurrence of an emergent 
property, P, at time tn, is dependent on the occurrence of its emergence base, Q, at time tn-1, 
then the powers of P are not identified with a subset of Q’s powers. This is because, the first 
time that Q occurs, say, at tn-1, the bearer of Q will have the powers of Q, but not the powers 
of P. And if Q is no longer occurrent at time tn, then the bearer of P will have the powers of 
P, but no longer have the powers of Q. 
The occurrence of an emergent property is a function of certain joint causal 
potentialities of underlying base properties. Consequently, the continuing 
instantiation of the emergent property is completely dependent on some set of 
properties or disjunctive range of properties in the object’s microstructure.357  
Effectively this is merely a kind of causal maintenance, and yet it seems sufficient to satisfy 
[Dependence], and also to satisfy the requirement that an emergent property is “caused and 
sustained by the collective activity of other entities”. By stipulating the continued causal 
maintenance of an emergent property by its base, we have turned the causal relation into 
one that sustains a property and provides for continued dependence.  
The emergent property is fundamental rather than derivative. But it is also, pace Barnes, 
ontologically independent. We have already argued that this is the case, since 
fundamentality is identified with ontological independence. Causal maintenance is also 
demonstrably independent, since it violates the minimal definition of ontological dependence, 
(OD).  
It should be noted that, once we have stipulated continued maintenance, nothing in the 
considerations of section 2.2.1 is incompatible with the theory that  the emergent property is 
merely causally dependent and not ontologically dependent. This does not seem to be a 
problem because, aside from the merest quantum of time when an emergent property exists 
without its base, this seems to satisfy the characterisation of macro-properties as being 
strongly dependent on complex objects, in the sense of being incapable of existence without 
them, but without encountering the problems we’ve seen with the assumption of strict 
ontological dependence. Most importantly, since the emergent property is not ontologically 
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dependent, there is no tension with the assumptions that it is fundamental, capable of 
satisfying [Novelty] and causally efficacious. 
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Causal Powers Emergence 
5. A Solution to the Problem of Reduction 
Chapter 4 examined some of the ways in which we might develop a theory of emergence 
that was capable of solving the Problem of Reduction. In this section we will elaborate on a 
theory that seemed to do the job. We will call it Causal Powers Emergence. 
To recapitulate: emergent properties are new fundamental properties, basic and 
ontologically independent like other properties. The thesis of emergence is that there are 
fundamental properties that are had by complex objects; there exist some macro-properties, 
and these are the emergent ones. The emergent properties are causally produced and 
continuously causally maintained by other properties in the emergence base. 
Speaking generally, the theory of properties assumed in our background picture means that 
emergent properties have the power to make the world unfold in ways that the world 
otherwise would not, and this is a fundamental feature about these properties upon which all 
else (counterfactuals true of them, regularities and patterns that encompass them, 
explanations that cite them) is derivative.  Properties are ontologically irreducible, and 
properties are individuated in terms of causal powers. 
According to a causal powers account of emergent properties – at least, one like that 
developed by O’Connor and others358 - the instancing of emergent properties is like the 
instancing of any other properties in a causal powers ontology: their production is in virtue of 
the manifestation of other powers. In this case, the emergent properties are produced in 
virtue of properties found among the constituents of the complex in which the emergent 
property inheres, acting together in certain complex arrangements. Furthermore, under the 
causal framework here, by calling the emergent property a causal consequence of the 
constituents, this means that, while not consisting in the micro-properties of the constituents 
of the complex object, the distinct emergent property is caused by the powers of those 
micro-properties to produce such an emergent property.  
Emergence is just a normal, unmysterious, causal relation – an object instancing a property 
causing the instancing of another property in an object. This means that among the micro-
constituents of the universe there are properties with latent powers to contribute to the 
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production of an emergent property, and these latent powers are manifested or triggered 
only in organized complexes of the requisite sort. “For the emergentist, the seeds of every 
emergent property and the behavior it manifests are found within the world’s fundamental 
elements, in the form of latent dispositions awaiting only the right context for 
manifestation.”359 These micro-powers are unobservable in states of lower complexity, so 
these latent dispositions will be powers of simple objects that are unobservable by 
investigating the micro-physics of the constituents. 
Emergent properties are no less ontologically fundamental than perhaps, negative charge is 
taken to be by current physics, or rather as fundamental as the basic properties of a 
completed fundamental physics; however, emergent properties are different to micro-
properties like negative charge because they appear in complex systems and persist if and 
only if the system maintains the requisite organized complexity. Importantly, going back to 
the idea of the property being non-structural,360 this means that the emergent property 
doesn’t even partly consist in the basic properties of the constituents of that complex.  
In some discussions of emergence a lot rides on the extent to which phenomena are 
‘unpredictable’,361 here that unpredictability is a consequence of the core metaphysical 
features. From the limited empirical standpoint below the requisite level of complexity these 
powers will remain unmanifested and therefore be invisible. A theorist whose understanding 
of the world was derived from theories developed entirely from observations of systems 
below the requisite complexity could not possibly anticipate the emergent property, and the 
threshold will appear to be arbitrary. 
Of course, this means that, not only will the emergent property itself not be included in the 
basic properties of fundamental physics, the power of all of the micro-properties to produce 
an emergent property are also not among the fundamental properties seen in physics. Both 
the emergent property and the emergent-producing micro-powers are hidden to experiments 
on systems that do not exhibit the requisite macro-complexity, the sort of systems that 
fundamental physics investigates when trying to ascertain the taxonomy of fundamental 
properties. Each such power remains unmanifested until the right threshold degree of 
complexity, and so each micro-constituent cannot be observed to possess such a power 
when examined alone. This is the deep reason why emergence is not predictable based on 
the features of low-complexity systems. 
                                               
359 O’Connor and Churchill 2010 
360 See section 2.2. 
361 See section 4.3. 
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If Causal Powers Emergence is correct, there are two kinds of properties in the world that 
are quite unlike the properties of fundamental physics. One kind is the emergent properties, 
which are different because they are the properties of complex objects, they are fundamental 
but also dependent on the causal maintenance of other properties. The other kind are the 
emergent-producing micro-properties, which are not only invisible in the lower complexity 
systems observed in fundamental physics, but also have the power to produce emergent 
properties, a radically different propensity to the propensities of basic physics, since it is a 
power of causation across categories between the domains of the micro-properties and the 
macro-properties.362  
Let’s compare this sketch of Causal Powers Emergence with the explananda of the Problem 
of Reduction. To succeed, Causal Powers Emergence must explain the possibility of macro-
properties. One of the explananda set out in section 3.8. was: “how can macro-properties 
make a causal difference?” Let’s start with that. 
5.1 The Problem of Causal Exclusion 
We have introduced a cluster of related problems including the Causal Closure Argument, 
Kim’s Supervenience Argument, and the problem of Causal Inheritance.363 We have argued 
that a theory of emergence that assumes [Novelty] and explains [Dependence] via causal 
maintenance, avoids all these problems. There is another analogous argument from Kim that 
is aimed at diachronic theories of downward causation that in one respect seem to be like 
that under consideration. He concedes that a diachronic relation escapes the problem of 
causal circularity discussed in section 3.3, but argues that it is still subject to the problem of 
causal exclusion, similar to that discussed in section 3.2.364 
Kim’s argument goes like this. Assume that an emergent property M at t1 supervenes on its 
emergence base P at t1 and is a partial cause of its emergence base P* - this is described as 
downward causation - and the occurrence of “same-level” emergent properties M* at the 
subsequent time t2. 
I earlier argued that any upward causation or same-level causation of effect M* by 
cause M presupposes M’s causation of M*’s lower level base, P* (it is supposed that 
M* is a higher-level property with a lower-level base; M* may or may not be an 
                                               
362 These special micro-properties might seem analogous to panpsychism, in that they are non-
physical – see below - but the micro-properties are not really the same here as they are in 
panpsychism, because in Causal Powers Emergence they are simply emergence-producing, not 
proto-conscious. 
363 Sections 3.2, 3.3., and 4.6.4. 
364 Kim 1999 pp. 26-32 
107 
 
emergent property). But if this is a case of downward emergent causation, M is a 
higher-level property and as such it must have an emergent base, P. Now we are 
faced with P’s threat to preempt M’s status as a cause of P* (and hence of M*). For if 
causation is understood as nomological (law-based) sufficiency, P, as M’s 
emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P*’s cause, is 
nomologically sufficient for P*. Hence P is nomologically sufficient for P* and hence 
qualifies as its cause... Moreover, it is not possible to view the situation as involving a 
causal chain from P to P* with M as an intermediate causal link. The reason is that 
the emergence relation from P to M cannot properly be viewed as causal. This 
appears to make the emergent property M otiose and dispensable as a cause of P*; 
it seems that we can explain the occurrence of P* simply in terms of P, without 
invoking M at all. If M is to be retained as a cause of P*, or of M*, a positive argument 
has to be provided, and we have yet to see one. In my opinion, this simple argument 
has not so far been overcome by an effective counter-argument.365 
The argument seems to be that the diachronic causal contribution of an emergent property 
will be redundant because its causal contribution is attributable to the emergence base 
producing it. The problem with this argument is not that Kim assumes that an emergent 
property doesn’t make novel causal contributions: he says that an emergent property “must 
be capable of making novel causal contributions that go beyond the causal powers of the 
lower-level basal conditions from which they emerge.”366 The problem is that he assumes 
that the emergence base will be causally sufficient for any effect supposedly caused by the 
emergent property, since it was itself sufficient to produce the emergent property. This is a 
more general problem of the type analysed as causal inheritance in section 4.6.4: there the 
problem had to do with the identification of properties with the powers had by the objects in 
which they inhere, whereas here the problem is one of causal sufficiency and so could apply 
to other accounts of causation too.367 
However, just like with the more specific causal inheritance argument, this problem is 
avoided by Causal Powers Emergence if the emergence relation is itself a diachronic causal 
relation, which not only entails the failure of supervenience, but also should indeed “properly 
be viewed as causal”.368 As such it enters into a chain of causal sufficiency as an 
intermediate link. The powers of an emergent property are indirectly attributable and 
                                               
365 Ibid p.32 
366 Ibid p.25 
367 Kim claims that “The same conclusion follows if causation is understood in terms of 
counterfactuals” – ibid p. 32 
368 ibid 
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dependent on its causal history, but they are so only in the manner of ordinary causal 
relations. The emergence relation is unlike other causal relations only in that the relata are in 
different domains as defined in section 4.6.3., but this is not relevant to a discussion of 
causal sufficiency. 
5.2 Rejecting the Causal Closure Principle 
O’Connor and Churchill develop a similar problem to the Causal Closure Argument 
presented in section 3.2, which they call the Causal Exclusion Argument.369 The argument 
includes a premise similar to [Completeness of the physical] - Every physical event, at every 
time at which it has a cause, has a sufficient physical cause.370 They assume that (at least 
some) emergent properties are non-physical and conclude that the premise [Completeness 
of the physical] should be rejected in order to maintain the causal efficacy of emergent 
properties. 
Our analysis of both emergent properties371 and the demarcation of the physical372 support 
that conclusion. Since emergent properties are macro-properties, and so are produced only 
in certain composite objects of the necessary complexity, they are not discoverable by 
analysing the simplest interactions in fundamental physics. Since we have taken ‘physical’ 
properties to mean those properties that will be identified by a completed fundamental 
physics, emergence necessarily denies [Completeness of the physical].  
We can also compare our characterisation of emergence in terms of the epistemic 
standpoint of the Laplacean demon in relation to an omniscient God. In effect, since the 
Laplacean demon’s epistemic standpoint excludes emergent properties, and since macro-
properties are emergent properties, the Laplacean demon’s epistemic standpoint maps onto 
that of a completed fundamental physics.373 
This neat picture now requires an amendment in light of the theory of Causal Powers 
Emergence. This is because, as stipulated in section 4.3., the Laplacean demon, being the 
perfect calculator, must, in order to not be able to predict emergence, also be limited in its 
epistemic standpoint to those entities that would not enable it to predict the occurrence of an 
emergent property. There was a potential tension here between the requirements of the 
explicability of the occurrence of the emergent property and its unpredictability even to the 
                                               
369 O’Connor and Churchill 2010 
370 For a discussion of the different strengths that the principle might take, see Lowe 2000a 
371 Chapter 4 
372 Briefly discussed in sections 3.4 and 4.6.2-3 
373 Which is not to say that a hypothetical completed fundamental physics would necessarily have the 
perfect calculating power of a Laplacean demon, just that it will have identified all the fundamental 
properties within its purview. 
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Laplacean demon. Since Causal Powers Emergence posits an emergence relation very 
much like the ordinary relation of causal production between any fundamental properties, 
this would seem to make emergent properties predictable to a Laplacean demon with 
knowledge of the powers necessary to produce an emergent property. It is therefore 
necessary to restrict the epistemic standpoint of the Laplacean demon further to exclude 
those emergent-producing properties. This should be a reasonable adjustment to impose. 
Given the background picture and some of the epistemological issues of properties as 
causal powers discussed in section 2.6, it seems reasonable to include the emergent-
producing powers in the restrictions on the epistemic standpoint of the demon. And indeed,  
they are also unobservable to the methodology of fundamental physics, just because their 
manifestations, through which they must be observed, are the emergent properties. 
Compare this conclusion to the general discussion about how to define emergence in 
chapter 4. In section 4.6.2., we looked at the idea of demarcating the domain of the 
emergent properties in terms of the physical/non-physical distinction. We can now conclude 
that CPE cannot avail itself of this distinction because, according to our working definitions of 
the physical, though emergent properties are non-physical, there are some non-emergent 
properties that are also non-physical. Likewise, though we note that unpredictability of a sort 
is still the mark of emergence,374 demarcation between emergent and non-emergent does 
not map on to the epistemic standpoint of the Laplacean demon. Nor, as we have been 
arguing throughout and as confirmed by the identification of the emergence relation with 
causal production, does this unpredictability necessarily outlast the first occurrence of the 
emergent property. We will have much more to say about these emergent-producing mico-
powers in chapters 7 and 10. 
5.3 Resolving Apparent Contradictions 
Macro-properties are properties of complex objects. A complex object is not fundamental or 
ontologically independent. Since micro-properties inhere in objects that are simple and 
fundamental, we should ask how it is possible for a macro-property, which inheres in a 
complex object, to likewise be simple and fundamental? Regarding qualitative simplicity, we 
ask: in virtue of what is the putative macro-property simple? Regarding fundamentality we 
ask: what is it about the putative macro-property that makes it fundamental?  
The Problem of Reduction arises because of a lack of specificity about the nature of macro-
properties. Causal Powers Emergence explains macro-properties by specifying two features: 
                                               
374 In the sense described in section 4.3. 
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[Novelty] – Emergent properties are ontologically additional to the emergent base. 
[Dependence] – Emergent properties are dependent on the emergent base. 
[Novelty] entails the emergent property’s fundamentality, i.e. its ontological independence, 
which implies causal efficacy. Since the emergent property is ontologically independent, it is 
not composed, so there is no apparent contradiction to its simplicity. The emergent property 
is fundamental rather than derivative. Since it is not derivative, there is no contradiction to its 
causal efficacy.  
Causal maintenance is also demonstrably independent, since it violates even the minimal 
definition of ontological dependence, (OD); the emergent property is merely causally 
dependent and not ontologically dependent. But this is still insufficiently specified to provide 
an explanation for all the explananda set out in chapter 3. There we argued that one of the 
apparent excluders to the possibility of a macro-property was the substantial complexity of 
the complex object in which it inheres. The rejection of ontological dependence as a 
candidate for the emergence relation explains how macro-properties can be fundamental. 
But how can Causal Powers Emergence resolve the apparent contradiction between 
substantial complexity and qualitative simplicity? 
Part of the answer is to specify what makes a macro-property a property of a complex 
object, if it is not because of substantial complexity. This is partly achieved by fleshing out 
[Dependence] and partly achieved by describing the inherence of macro-properties.375 
Effectively [Dependence], according to Causal Powers Emergence, is merely a kind of 
causal maintenance. This is sufficient to satisfy [Dependence], and also to satisfy the 
requirement that an emergent property is “caused and sustained by the collective activity of 
other entities”. This seems to satisfy the characterisation of macro-properties as being 
strongly dependent on complex objects without encountering the problems we’ve seen with 
the assumption of ontological dependence. Most importantly, since the emergent property is 
not ontologically dependent, there is no tension with the assumptions that it is fundamental, 
capable of satisfying [Novelty] and causally efficacious. 
One problem with this stipulation in specifying [Dependence] is that, while the fundamentality 
and causal efficacy of an emergent property are necessary corollaries of the same facts that 
make [Novelty] true, what makes [Dependence] true involves no independent assumptions 
that would imply that the property that is causally maintained is a macro-property. We have 
simply stipulated that that is what demarcates the domains of the relata. By stipulating the 
                                               
375 See section 6.5. 
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continued causal maintenance of an emergent property by its base, we have turned the 
causal relation into one that sustains a property and provide for continued dependence, but 
we have not sufficiently specified how a simple property inheres in a complex object.376  
6. The Advantages of Causal Powers Emergence 
6.1 The Failure of Supervenience 
In Kim’s Supervenience Argument,377 his Downward Causation Argument,378 the Causal 
Drainage Argument,379 and the problem of causal inheritance,380 there are problems for a 
theory of macro-properties because of synchronic supervenience on the emergent base.  
So far we have been assuming that CPE is not a supervenience theory of emergence – the 
emergent property does not supervene on the micro-dispositions that have produced it. This 
is because we have assumed that the emergence relation is diachronic, so there will be an 
instancing of the emergent base in the interval of time prior to the instancing of the emergent 
property and an instancing of the emergent property in the interval of time subsequent to the 
instancing of the emergent base. This suffices to solve, for example, the problem of causal 
inheritance.381  
If, however, simultaneous causation is possible, then it might be possible for the emergence 
relation in Causal Powers Emergence to be synchronic. How then could CPE avoid these 
problems raised in the context of primitive supervenient emergence? 
O’Connor argues that supervenience will fail in a causal account, not simply because the 
emergence relation is diachronic, but also because of indeterministic causation and the 
causal difference made by prior emergent properties.382 Once we consider the causal 
contribution that other emergent properties make to the instancing of any emergent 
properties at a time, it seems that there could be instances where the same physical 
properties at t cause the instancing of different emergent properties. And even with the 
broadest notions of supervenience, indeterministic causation cannot guarantee the 
covariance of a supervenience relation. 
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381 See section 4.6.4. 
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As we argued in section 4.5.3., a failure of covariance does not imply an absence of a 
systemic connection between an emergent property and its base, nor would mere 
covariance guarantee it. Kim’s argument is that in the absence of covariance, the connection 
would be “irregular, haphazard, or coincidental, and not to be relied upon”, this is no more 
true of a causal emergence relation as it is true of any causal relation. The causal relation 
answers his question “what reason could there be for saying that pain ‘emerges’ from that 
neural condition than another”.383 
Let’s demonstrate the ways in which Causal Powers Emergence implies a failure of 
supervenience, and thereby escapes the potential problems raised above.384 An emergent 
property, E, would supervene on the properties of an emergent base, P, just in case a 
complex object’s having of E at time t implies that the object has P, and, necessarily, if it has 
P at t, it has E at t. In these diagrams an arrow represents a causal relation. 
 
In this diagram there is a diachronic relation of causation. Synchronic supervenience is 
violated at times t0 and t2, since the object has P at t0 without E, and it has E at t2 without P. 
This is only a slight divergence from supervenience, restricted to the first instance of P and 
last instance of E. More interesting divergences occur when emergent properties are 
involved in the production of other emergent properties: 
                                               
383 Kim 2006 
384 In this we’re largely following O’Connor and Wong 2005 pp. 16-9; though the presentation is 
streamlined and the analysis of dynamism more developed here. 
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In this example the emergent property E1 has an emergence base P1 on which it causally 
depends. However, its emergence base is insufficient to produce it without the causal 
contribution of an emergent property, E. This is what O’Connor and Wong call a dynamic 
account of emergence. The emergent property E is not included in the emergent base of E1 
because it is a macro-property. The emergent relation between emergence base and 
emergent property is a cross-categorical relation between micro-properties in one domain 
and macro-properties in the other. Note that there is also nothing in the definition of 
emergence so far that rules out a dynamical account – emergent properties are dependent 
for causal maintenance on their emergence bases, but the instancing of an emergence base 
is not necessarily sufficient for the production of all emergent properties to which they 
causally contribute. This is the root of the dynamical account of emergence and the implied 
failure of supervenience. 
Here we have several divergences from covariance. The first instancing of P1 occurs at t0, 
and yet E1 is also absent in the next time interval t1; furthermore, after a few time intervals 
where P fails to occur, E1 will also not occur, like at t4, even though P, unlike P1, which is 
occurrent throughout this time, is not part of E1’s emergence base. 
Now let’s introduce the possibility of synchronic causation: 
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P P 
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E1 E1 
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This has the effect of removing the divergences from covariance between the emergent 
properties and their emergent bases that occur at the first instancing of the emergent base, 
e.g. at t0 in the first two diagrams, and in the proceeding time interval to their last instancing. 
There is, however, still a divergence between the occurrence of E1 and its emergence base 
P1 at t2 because in this dynamic account the occurrence of P1 is insufficient to produce its 
emergent property E1.  
O’Connor and Wong describe another form of supervenience which does seem to hold in 
this scenario – global supervenience.385 In this form of supervenience it is not only the micro-
properties on which the emergent property depends for causal maintenance that are 
considered as the subvening base, but rather the emergent properties supervene on all of 
the occurrent micro-properties in the entire universe. In this example, E1 globally supervenes 
on the conjunction of P and P1 and there are no longer any divergences from covariation. 
For global supervenience to fail, we must introduce the possibility of probabilistic causation. 
Now it is simple to generate scenarios where covariation fails even for global supervenience 
via synchronic causal relations, as is the case at t1, t2, and t3 below, each of them time 
intervals where one of causal relations at t0 has failed: 
 
Even if we assume that emergent properties make causal contributions to the production of 
micro-properties and then fix the micro-properties of the universe at all times, this will not 
suffice to fix the distribution of emergent properties. When the production of those micro-
properties is guaranteed, ex hypothesi, it would still be possible for covariance to fail 
wherever two different emergent properties share an emergence base (an inevitable 
scenario given global supervenience) and also share possible micro-properties among their 
effects. For instance: 
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There do not seem to be any relevant senses in which supervenience holds that would 
generate the problems referenced above. Causal Powers Emergence therefore seems to 
avoid whatever problems might occur for a theory of emergence that guarantees 
supervenience. 
6.2 Dependence 
So the novelty of the causal production of emergent properties is adequately specified to 
explain the fundamentality of emergent properties and it avoids the objections levelled at 
other forms of emergence. Another important feature of emergence is the maintenance of 
emergent properties by the base. But why bother with causal maintenance? 
John Searle characterises a naive conception of emergence as the idea “that consciousness 
gets squirted out by the behaviour of the neurons in the brain, but once it has been squirted 
out, it then has a life of its own.” 386 This goes beyond the notion of emergence being 
developed in this essay. Searle seems to suggest a notion that is not just an addition of 
being, but, once it is created, completely autonomous. The notion here is of an emergent 
whose powers are unrelated to the properties of its base. And he rightly argues that it is 
implausible387. For instance, mental properties and the physical properties of the brain are 
clearly causally linked. This reasoning is behind the inclusion of dependence as a key 
feature of emergence. Mental properties are absent when the brain is absent, for instance, 
and changes to the physical properties of the brain affect the mental properties. This is 
uncontroversial. Theories of emergence do not hold that mental properties are completely 
autonomous.388 
                                               
386 Searle 1992, p112; he calls such entities ‘emergent2’. 
387 Though in his argument he seems to rely on a theory of causation that is insufficient for the general 
claim to causal closure, see Gibb 2010. 
388 Though in order to explain mental causation they are assumed to make a distinctive causal 
contribution to the world. 
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But what should we make of the dependence of emergent properties on their micro-
constituents? What is the dependence relation? It seems to be the same as the emergence 
relation that produced the emergent property: which in causal powers emergence is simply 
the causal relation. Thus we have an ongoing causal maintenance like that which we 
defended in section 4.6.5: the continued occurrence of an emergent property requires a 
continuing cause. But of course, there isn’t anything entailed by the generic causal relation 
that would ensure the need for continuing causes to maintain the effect, so this must be an 
additional stipulation of the theory. 
In Persons and Causes O’Connor says: “The occurrence of an emergent property is a 
function of certain joint causal potentialities of underlying base properties. Consequently, the 
continuing instantiation of the emergent property is completely dependent on some set of 
properties or disjunctive range of properties in the object’s microstructure.”389 The continued 
maintenance is just a further stipulation about emergent properties rather than something 
implied. They are a property that can only exist in certain circumstances and that is the end 
of it. 
I don’t think we need to make even this modest insistence without availing ourselves of an 
explanation in terms of the brute facts we already have. It’s true that a causal powers 
emergentist cannot appeal to some kind of supervenience or realisation relation to ensure 
dependence. And at first it doesn’t seem that there is anything about the core concept of 
emergence that would entail the need for maintenance. But in fact I think we can do so by 
appealing to what is essential about an emergent property.  
So an emergent property is a macro-property. This makes emergent properties different to 
other basic properties inhering in simples because they persist if and only if the system 
maintains the requisite organized complexity and other structural conditions. It also seems 
reasonable that certain changes to that system will produce different emergent properties, 
and that other changes will make no difference. By its nature an emergent property is 
already dependent on other entities in a way that the properties of simples are not. This is in 
virtue not of a realiser relation, nor supervenience or causal inheritance or anything like that, 
but just because it belongs to a complex object and not a simple one. One might say that the 
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complex must endure for there to be the proprietary substance on which the emergent 
property’s continuing existence relies.390 
This is a minor point, but it enhances the believability of a theory to minimise the 
concomitants. It’s better that dependence is entailed by the brute facts already entered, than 
to have to add another. Imagine for instance that none of the basic properties in the universe 
carried a maintenance condition. There would perhaps only exist fundamental properties that 
once produced always exist until something causes them to go out of existence. Then the 
stipulation that emergence properties must be actively maintained looks to be an 
uneconomical further addition to the theory. 
6.3 Unpredictability and Causal Indeterminacy 
In section 4.3 we argued that the unpredictability by which emergence is characterised is a 
result of an epistemological situation that is specific to and entailed by the metaphysics of 
emergent properties. Emergent properties are, uniquely, macro-properties – properties of a 
complex whole as opposed to simples. But if the emergence relation is causal, and 
causation is indeterministic, would this imply that causal powers emergence is unpredictable 
in principle? 
You can find a worry like this in Popper and Eccles’ book, The Self and its Brain.391 There we 
find the common refrain that ontological emergence is inherently unpredictable. But again, 
there is only partial truth in this and it is unproblematic. I think that it is possible that 
epistemological emergence is unpredictable in principle. Based on some of the discussions 
from the scientistic theories of epistemological emergence discussed in section 4.3 and 
elsewhere. And that’s an incredibly interesting result. 
In comparison, perhaps surprisingly, ontological emergence is not unpredictable in principle. 
Ontological emergence is only unpredictable in terms of the powers manifested at lower 
levels of complexity. If one were able, in some sort of holistic manner, to identify the macro-
properties, the requisite circumstances for their production and the associated, otherwise-
latent micro-properties, then emergence would be completely predictable. Or, rather, the 
emergence of a new power would not itself put the predictability at issue (because it is 
possible that a situation be both ontologically and epistemologically emergent and also 
possible that all cases that are ontologically emergent are also epistemologically emergent).  
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Popper and Eccles argue that physical indeterminacy would make complex systems 
unpredictable in principle. But this is analogous to our discussion of chaos theory in chapter 
1 – it is only an epistemological consideration. In contrast it is possible that an emergent 
property is strictly determined by the micro-dispositions of its constituents – emergence is 
compatible with general causal determinism and its denial.392 And where the emergence 
relation is causally indeterminate, it is only unpredictable to the extent of any other ordinary 
causal property – there is no special problem. Perhaps this is an unintuitive result: that 
ontological emergence is, in principle, predictable, while epistemological emergence might 
well be unpredictable.  
In any case, it means that causal powers emergence per se is not mysterious in the sense 
that it is entirely unpredictable. Compare the discussion in section 4.3, particularly  
Alexander’s argument that timing matters for the epistemic agent. Emergence is unknowable 
until it happens. The time at which it happens will appear arbitrary to an observer from 
before that time. The causal powers theory offers its own explanation of these remarks: 
unmanifested powers are invisible until they are manifested for the first time. After that time, 
however, there is no reason why emergence is necessarily unpredictable. It will be as 
reliably produced given the right circumstances as any relationship of cause and effect. 
Of course, in practise, though epistemological emergence and ontological emergence are 
quite different, they can appear similar, and will frequently co-occur, if not always. 
Unfortunately, these situations may prohibit the decisive identification of a macro-power by 
empirical means. We will discuss this possibility in more detail in sections 7.2 and 7.6. 
6.4 Ideological Economy 
Causal Powers Emergence introduces a brute term into theory – i.e. emergent property. But 
it seems that, for the explananda we have in mind, all the emergent explanans will introduce 
a brute term – a really existing macro-property-entity (or at least the theories that aren’t 
deflationary or eliminativist.) And I don’t think it is immediately obvious that causal powers 
emergence has a significantly worse problem in this regard. 
Let’s compare causal powers emergence with other emergent theories in terms of their 
ideological economy. (Where a theory has greater ideological economy if there is a smaller 
number of primitive predicates in the theory.) It’s clear that causal emergence has an 
advantage over other strong emergent theories simply because synchronic theories employ 
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a metaphysical emergence relation. Whereas with causal powers emergence the emergence 
relation is causation, and not some new relation.  
So causal powers emergence seems to be better in this respect. There is the ‘is an 
emergent property’ predicate, but other propositions in the theory are either ordinary or 
entailed by that first one. The causal relation is ordinary, the micro-powers are 
unexceptional, except that they are only manifested in circumstances that are complex in the 
relevant way. Dependence is entailed – see below. 
Of course, metaphysical theory choice is going to involve a whole range of subtle 
considerations. See chapter 11 for the final comparison between emergence and inherence. 
But causal powers emergence at least has an advantage over other kinds of emergence 
when it comes to the number of primitive concepts in the theory. 
6.5 Substance 
Heil and Lowe offer arguments about the fundamental categories of being that substances 
are simple and the only category of entities in which properties inhere.393 Among other 
implications, Lowe argues, if we don’t stipulate that substances are particulars, then we 
cannot, for example, rule out the possibility that universals are substances. 
Where does this leave Causal Powers Emergence as a theory of macro-properties? The 
emergent property must presumably belong to either a derivative complex object, or some 
new emergent substance.394 
Here is the solution offered by O’Connor and Jacobs. In short, they propose that substances 
can form individuals, which are substantially simple. 
we wish to carefully scrutinize the view that an emergentist understanding of the 
mental allows for a straightforward substance monist view of human beings 
consistent with a property, or state, dualism. On such a view, I am a biological 
substance having sui generis mental states; I am at any moment simply the 
mereological sum of each of my fundamental parts, though these parts collectively 
instantiate 'simple' states that are no less fundamental, ontologically, than the energy 
state of a basic particle. We now try to show difficulties for such a minimalist 
emergentist view concerning personal identity through time. 
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The difficulties can be laid bare only in the context of a general ontology of particulars 
and their properties. Alas, general ontology is more controverted than the philosophy 
of mind. So we consider four broad ontological schemes to which we are willing to 
assign at least a modest degree of plausibility: transcendent ("Platonist") universals 
theory and one of its variants, kind-Aristotelianism; immanent universals theory (also 
sometimes laying claim to the ‘Aristotelian’ label); and trope theory, on which there 
are no universals, but only property instances. We argue on familiar grounds that the 
first two of these ontologies suffer from deep obscurities. Furthermore, the first 
cannot ground an emergentist picture, while the second hints at a way to do so, but 
only at the cost of even deeper obscurity. 
Accordingly, we focus on the last two ontologies for the purpose of exploring the 
question of personal identity, given a property emergentism. Reflection on each, we 
suggest, pushes the property dualist toward a stronger view, which we dub 
‘substance emergentism.’ 
Now let us turn to ourselves. Our holistic mental states (or perhaps certain enduring 
‘baseline’ states in particular) confer on us a substantial unity as thinking biological 
substances, requiring one to treat persons as wholes in any adequate 
characterization of the dynamics of the world. This functional unity does not itself 
constitute a particularity as an enduring thing, but it plausibly implies it. Surely our 
particularity is primitive, rather than deriving from the primitive particularity of our 
parts, as those are constantly changing. Furthermore, one who embraces this 
general ontology will probably want to put essentialist constraints on thisnesses—lest 
we permit the absurdity that the thisness of eddie the electron could have been the 
thisness of me—and my essential properties are not going to be any kind of function 
of those of my fundamental parts.395 
Their theory is that the bearers of emergent properties are the proprietary substances of 
persons, the particularity of which is suggested by the substantial unity of our mental states. 
Must we suppose that emergence implies new macro-substances in which to inhere? Refer 
back to 2.5. and 2.2.2 and 4.5.2. The foundations of reality are simple, atomistic objects. 
Substances are ontologically independent. Ontological independence is the mark of the 
foundation of reality. The emergent properties must inhere in a substance. We might say that 
the emergent property inheres in a complex substance. But complexes are ontologically 
dependent on the objects that compose them. If the nature of substances is that they are 
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ontologically independent, then an ontologically dependent substance is by definition 
impossible.  
The nature of substance is to be certain ways – to possess properties – they give existence 
to properties. The emergentist could hold that substances do this without themselves being 
ontologically independent. But this might face an objection: if this kind of ontological 
dependence is transitive, wouldn’t we render the emergent property dependent for its 
existence on the simple objects composing the complex substance? To which the 
emergentist can reply: the ontological dependence between property and substance is not 
the same dependence as that between a complex substance and its component objects. In 
this respect they might argue for the possibility of a fundamental property inhering in a 
derivative object. 
However, the emergentist would still need a new kind of ontological dependence: mere 
mereology wouldn’t do the job because mere mereology results in a substantially disunified 
object, which cannot explain the apparent simplicity of the emergent property. This would not 
suffice to explain the Problem of Reduction. The emergentist seems to have to hold that 
there is a variety of mereology that composes a unified substance, i.e. that the macro-
substance is a new kind of existence. However this is done – through a new composition 
relation or perhaps whatever O’Connor and Jacobs have in mind - there is a new kind of 
substance and a new kind of property, both representing radical additions to our 
fundamental ontology.  
7. The Epistemological Problem 
7.1 A Brief Summary of Causal Powers Emergence. 
According to a causal powers account of emergent properties – at least, one like that 
developed by O’Connor and co-authors396 - emergent powers are produced by emergent-
producing micro-properties in certain complex arrangements.  
The emergent property is a power not among the powers of fundamental physics. The 
emergent property is caused by the powers of the micro-constituents of the arrangement to 
produce the emergent property given the right circumstances. These micro-tendencies are 
unobservable in states of lower complexity, so they will also be properties that are 
unobservable by investigating the micro-physics of the situation, i.e. the powers of all of the 
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micro-constituents to produce an emergent property are also not among the powers of 
fundamental physics.  
Both the emergent property and the emergent-producing micro-powers are hidden to 
experiments on systems that do not exhibit the requisite macro-complexity. Each such power 
remains unmanifested until the right threshold degree of complexity, and so each micro-
constituent simple cannot be observed to possess such a power when examined alone. This 
is the deep reason why emergence is not predictable based on the features of low-
complexity systems. 
If causal powers emergence is correct, there are two kinds of properties in the world that are 
quite unlike the properties of fundamental physics. One kind is the emergent properties, 
which are different because they are the properties of complexes rather than simples. The 
other kind are the emergent-producing micro-powers, which are not only invisible in the 
lower complexity systems observed in fundamental physics, but also have the power to 
produce emergent properties, a radically different propensity to the propensities of basic 
physics. As O’Connor puts it: “fundamental particles or systems, [in addition to having a 
locally determinative influence in the manner characterized by physical science] also 
naturally tend (in any context) toward the generation of such an emergent state.”397 
7.2 Unpredictability and Epistemological Emergence 
As we’ve already suggested,398 contrary to what Popper and Eccles think399, ontological 
emergence is not necessarily unpredictable. But in practice, actually testing whether a 
system has an emergent property may prove impossible. The epistemological problem starts 
with an observation we’ve noted previously: that both the emergent property and emergent 
producing powers are hidden to experiments on systems that do not exhibit the requisite 
complexity. This is because the emergent-producing powers are not casually operative in 
systems of lower complexity, and the emergent properties simply don’t exist yet. Emergent 
producing micro-powers remain unmanifested until the right threshold degree of complexity, 
and so each micro-constituent cannot be observed to possess such a power when examined 
alone. This is the deep reason why emergence is not predictable based on the features of 
low-complexity systems. 
We’ve started with a brief account of causal emergence and epistemological emergence. It 
is argued that, given epistemological emergence, it is practically impossible in ambiguous 
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cases to provide decisive empirical evidence for or against causal emergence.400 What 
follows is an examination of arguments that are based on that epistemic situation and which 
argue against causal emergence as a desirable theory for reasons of congruence and 
simplicity. This chapter sets out the main problem for emergence and will also give us the 
template for an argument in favour of an alternative to emergence that will be tested in the 
final part of this thesis. It also sets out a preliminary defence by emergentists to which that 
alternative can be compared. 
For the emergentist, the seeds of every emergent property and the behavior it 
manifests are found within the world’s fundamental elements, in the form of latent 
dispositions awaiting only the right context for manifestation.401 
This chapter argues that invoking these latent dispositions prohibits the decisive 
identification of an emergent property by empirical means because even perfect knowledge 
of behaviour is insufficient to settle the question of the identification of a new property. If one 
is not sensitive to the theory of property identification involved, then one is open to the 
objection that no new properties are implicated by any given observed behaviour. The best 
way left by which to decide the truth or falsity of a theory of emergence is abstract 
metaphysical reasoning. We will reveal some of the emergentist’s implicit reasoning here 
and then throughout the final three chapters I will argue that this reasoning is faulty and does 
not protect emergence from the epistemological problem. 
7.3 The Empirical Problem: “Not a scintilla of evidence” 
The title of this section includes a quote from a paper by McLaughlin402 in which he argues 
that emergence is a coherent concept but implausible because of the lack scientific 
evidence. He goes so far as to say that emergence is incompatible with contemporary 
scientific knowledge. 
O’Connor labels this claim as “sheer bluff”.403 In lieu of an a priori deduction eliminating the 
possibility of emergence, he says, the establishment of the "scientific knowledge" claim 
would require an insurmountable weight of evidence drawn from all across the special 
sciences that study complex systems.404 While he accepts that there are no widely-accepted 
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scientific theories that are necessarily committed to ontological emergence, he deems 
contemporary scientific knowledge to be partial enough to not rule them out.405 
Since it is possible that decisive empirical evidence will never be available, it is not a simple 
matter to motivate the move from McLaughlin’s first claim – the lack of scientific evidence - 
to his second – incompatibility with contemporary scientific knowledge. It is true as 
McLaughlin says that the simplistic levels-based approach by which early emergentists 
sought to explain biological life is incompatible with scientific knowledge. O’Connor and 
Wong accept that this was essentially an argument from ignorance.406 The chemical basis of 
life had yet to be proven and the difficulties in reduction were overestimated and taken to be 
a contrapositive for emergence. Now, of course, the chemical basis for life is well 
documented and is generally preferred to emergence as an explanation for life. 
The current epistemic situation is different in an important way – rather than the simplistic 
view of natural hierarchies envisaged by early emergentists, which was capable of being 
proved wrong by continued advancement in our understanding of the chemical basis of life, 
we are now faced with enormously complicated overlapping hierarchies that might preclude 
the possibility of the kind of theoretical reduction that took place in biochemistry. Proving this 
kind of emergence wrong by empirical means is much more difficult. Here is O’Connor and 
Wong: 
Theorists of the early twenty-first century, by contrast, are confronted with a picture of 
enormous, nested complexity in the biological and psychological realms. Clearly 
there are no sharp dynamical boundaries between such levels of organization. But 
for all that, we should not be astonished to discover emergent phenomena within the 
interconnected whole of nature -- as a subtle interplay of microphysical and holistic 
factors, instead of dramatic supersession.407 
It is not the case that, if we cannot currently make a theoretic reduction, then emergence is 
true - this would still amount to an argument from ignorance. The new emergentists must 
employ other arguments to demonstrate that the analogy between current emergentism and 
early emergentism is weak enough in relevant ways to block McLaughlin’s inductive 
argument. 
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There are a few putative examples of emergence within the natural sciences that might be 
sufficiently different to the early Emergentists to undermine the analogy.408 In biology, 
Polanyi has argued that embryonic cells exhibit a macro-determinative influence on the basic 
physical properties of the system.409 Also, Zylstra, among others, has argued for a special 
control hierarchy in biology that could be accounted for by emergence.410 In statistical 
mechanics and chemistry, Prigogine has argued that the dissipative structures of 
thermodynamics involve principles that cannot be derived from fundamental physics and 
Hendry has argued that there is a molecular macro-deterministic influence.411 In physics, the 
insensitivity of macro-phenomena after renormalisation to the micro-constituents of the 
system and the seeming irrelevancy of fundamental physics to the fractional quantum Hall 
effect have led many to argue that these phenomena will never be explained in terms of 
fundamental physics.412  
Focusing on the last of these as an illustrative example, regarding the fractional quantum 
Hall effect and the Josephson quantum, Laughlin and Pines argue:  
Neither of these things can be deduced from microscopics, and both are 
transcendent, in that they would continue to be true and to lead to exact results even 
if the Theory of Everything were changed. Thus the existence of these effects is 
profoundly important, for it shows us that for at least some fundamental things in 
nature the Theory of Everything is irrelevant.413  
And regarding renormalisation they argue: 
The belief on the part of many that the renormalizability of the universe is a constraint 
on an underlying microscopic Theory of Everything rather than an emergent property 
is nothing but an unfalsifiable article of faith.414 
In both cases there are theoretically distinct features – what they call “higher-organising 
principles”415 that as a matter of practical necessity preclude the kind of reduction that 
occurred with features of living organisms and biochemistry. The differences between some 
of these arguments and those of the vitalists is that while the vitalists posited theories of 
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emergence as an explanation for life - partly because they overestimated how difficult a 
Theoretical-Derivational reduction416 would be – the new emergentists argue that a 
Theoretical-Derivational reduction is impossible because of the independence of the “higher-
organising principles” and the practical impossibility of deriving predictions from quantum 
mechanics for even very small systems of particles.  
If the new emergentists are correct, what does this imply? We’ve argued that a failure of 
REP-reduction does not imply ontological emergence, so in this sense what is being claimed 
by the new emergentists is limited.417 But here we are examining their arguments in the 
context of McLaughlin’s claim that there is “not a scintilla of evidence” in favour of ontological 
emergence; if the new emergentists are correct, does this amount to evidence for 
emergence? After considering some of these cases, O’Connor and Jacobs are doubtful:  
For all we know on present evidence, some perfectly respectable biological and 
chemical features are ontologically emergent in this way. By the same token, we do 
not think there is any clear positive reason to suppose so.418 
Later in this section I will argue that decisive evidence is impossible, so in that sense 
McLaughlin is correct. Rather it is the metaphysical underpinnings necessary to support a 
theory of emergence that are decisive.  
What we can say for now though is that even if there is a lack of scientific evidence, it does 
not follow, pace McLaughlin, that emergence is incompatible with contemporary scientific 
evidence. The arguments of the new emergentists are only weakly analogous with the 
arguments of the old emergentists. The new emergentists do not simply take the absence of 
a reductive proof to be evidence of the impossibility of one. They make new and positive 
arguments why theoretic reduction is not just impossible now, but always will be. If these 
arguments are correct, then future science will not be able to provide a reduction, and 
McLaughlin’s inductive argument against emergence fails. 
Perhaps the best of these arguments against the possibility of reduction pertains to one of 
the main candidates for emergent properties: the phenomenal properties of consciousness. 
There seem to be deep differences between the features of a person’s experiences and their 
physical properties. Whatever reductive account there might be of these features it is going 
to be of a different kind to the account of life that was given by the discovery of, for instance, 
the transmission of genetic traits via DNA. As we saw in section 3.1.2, there are good 
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reasons to suppose that the existence of phenomenal properties entails the failure of REP-
reduction not just in the case of Theoretical-Derivational reduction but also in the case of 
Teleo-Pragmatic Equivalence. We introduced this distinction to illustrate that the kind of 
argument made by an emergentist wishing to maintain that a failure of REP-Reduction 
implied a failure of ONT-Reduction differs depending on what form of REP-Reduction they 
are talking about. But it should also be clear that this implies that the analogy with the early 
emergentists is particularly weak in the case of phenomenal properties. If emergentists are 
questioning whether it is possible to achieve even Expressive Equivalence between 
representational systems invoking phenomenal properties and those invoking only physical 
properties, then this is an argument involving theoretic reduction of not just a different order 
of complexity but also of a different kind to that employed by early emergentists.419 
Some new emergentists believe that the problem of reducing conscious mental states goes 
beyond finding Expressive Equivalence too. As we mentioned in sections 3.1.2. and 3.8., 
one of the things that a theory of macro-properties seeks to explain is the qualitative 
simplicity of a macro-property given that it is the property of a complex. In sections 3.1. and 
6.2. we said that the emergence relation itself was unable to account for that, and the 
necessary explanation involved dealing with the apparent substantial complexity of the 
complex object and showing how this did not exclude the possibility of an emergent 
property’s being simple.420 
This explanation is relevant to the ability of emergence to explain phenomenal properties, 
since new emergentists often assume that such properties exhibit substantial unity. Here is 
O’Connor and Jacobs, for example: 
And the maximally direct nature of our first-person awareness of these conscious 
states precludes the a posteriori ascription to them of underlying physical micro-
structure hidden to introspection. (By contrast, the causally-mediated awareness of a 
computer screen gives only coarse-grained information about its surface properties. 
Precisely because such information is causally transmitted, it is conceivable to each 
of us that we are and have been radically deceived by our sensory experiences, so 
that the world is quite unlike how we take it to be. But it is not conceivable, given the 
immediacy of our conscious awareness, that we be deceived about the intrinsic 
character of our experience itself.) The upshot of this familiar reflection, if it stands, is 
that our experiences and other conscious mental states have fundamentally 
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distinctive characteristics and, furthermore, lack intrinsic features that are not directly 
accessible to their subjects.421 
Here, the indubitable nature of conscious experience – guaranteed because it is maximally 
direct and not causally mediated - is presented as an apparent excluder to any theory of 
phenomenal properties as merely composed complex object with substantial complexity.422 If 
this is the case, then the appeal to emergence is not epistemically on a par with the 
contemporary science cases presented above, never mind those of C19 vitalists. In the 
special science cases we are motivated by empirical evidence tied to an understanding of 
the conditions of theoretic reduction, to argue that 1) There is always room for emergence 
within the dynamic nested structures of complex systems in the special sciences; and 2)  
there will always remain explanatory gaps between micro-theoretical accounts and macro-
theoretical accounts. If these arguments are correct then emergence is one possible 
explanation, but there are others, see sections 7.7-9. below. As O’Connor and Wong say: 
“There, the question of whether other types of hypothesis might inevitably fill such 
explanatory gaps equally well at less ontological cost is crucial.”423 But O’Connor and Wong 
take the unique epistemic situation vis-à-vis phenomenal properties to uniquely provide 
apparent excluders to substantial complexity:  
So even if the differential behavior resulting from emergent mental features could, 
from a third-person standpoint, be adequately captured in formal dynamical terms by 
non-emergentist models of the sort described below, we have independent reasons 
for rejecting such models.424 
Contemporary science cases are very different to the naïve theories of the early 
emergentists. As discussed, none of this is clear evidence for emergence, but these 
differences mean there is at least no prime facie reason why the failure of the early 
emergentists should be extended to theories of emergence as a whole. Nor does it seem 
that emergence is incompatible with contemporary scientific knowledge – emergence is 
possible without contravention of any scientific theories, and it seems unlikely that science 
will progress in ways that would conclusively contradict emergence. 
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7.4 The Scientific Incongruence Problem: Inductive Scepticism 
So there may be another way that emergence is incongruent with science. Kim has pointed 
out that theoretic reduction has been an “enormously success research strategy” in 
science.425  
Should this concern the emergentist? On the one hand it is true that this does not give us 
conclusive grounds for asserting the general negative thesis that there is no emergence.426 
The appearance of an emergent property at a given level of complexity will always be 
unexpected given only knowledge of the powers manifested at a lower level of complexity. 
But the success of science depends upon the induction that what holds true at lower levels 
of complexity will continue to do so at higher levels.427 A potential problem for the 
emergentist is that emergence seems to undermine this kind of induction – since new 
powers will emerge at seemingly arbitrary points as we increase the complexity of the 
system, why should we presume that whatever powers we observe now will continue to 
constitute any system above the observed complexity? We should now at least be agnostic 
about any generalisations we make about the powers we will find in any complex system 
that has not previously been observed. 
O’Connor and Wong answer this objection by arguing that the emergentist can still allow an 
epistemological presumption in favour of induction for previously untested systems.428 Only if 
there is special reason to suppose that they are different from the run-of-the-mill cases, will 
anything apart from the slightest change to our inductive expectations be appropriate for 
modest extensions of our theories. Scepticism about modest induction is forestalled by 
admitting only a small epistemic probability that such inductions will fail. They also point out 
that simple interpolations of linear complexity increases will presumably have an even 
smaller probability of failure:  
Furthermore: theories are necessarily put to the test for a finite number of case 
variations. Suppose we verify a theory for systems with complexity levels i  and i + k, 
but not for systems whose complexity falls between these magnitudes. We may 
confidently discard emergentist hypotheses concerning systems within the interval as 
well, since any emergent effects for such systems is apt to be manifested at the 
higher i + k level.429 
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O’Connor and Wong go on to argue that, if anything, the emergentist will exhibit the kind of 
measured scepticism about extrapolation that is complimentary to scientific practice, that, if 
anything, it is the sweeping judgements of McLaughlin, based only on very partial 
contemporary scientific knowledge, that fall foul of scientific practice.430 While allowing that it 
is reasonable to suppose theories have a broader application than the specific scenarios 
actually tested. They suggest that we should be less confident that a scientific theory will 
hold “the further removed a scenario is from the well-confirmed range along a scale of 
increased structured complexity.”431 
7.5 Congruence: The Problem of Natural Unity 
There’s one more explanatory criticism of emergence that I’d like to mention, and that’s the 
notion that emergence is disunifying in a way that threatens natural unity. This is a distinct 
concern from causal closure. The unity of nature is not necessarily a theoretical virtue432 but 
in any case, as we’ll see, emergence is compatible with a pervasive and uniform causal 
continuity anyway – a unity of dispositional structure, not behaviour: 
But unity does not require the reductionist vision of the world as merely a vast 
network binding together local microphysical facts, with a pervasive and uniform 
causal continuity underlying all complex systems. It is enough that at every juncture 
introducing some new kind of causally discontinuous behavior, there is a causal 
source for that discontinuity in the network of dispositions that underlie it.  In short: 
unity in the order of the unfolding natural world need not involve causal continuity of 
behavior, only continuity of dispositional structure.433 
Causal emergence retains a unity of dispositional structure because the emergent properties 
it postulates make a difference to, but fit in with, the normal unfolding of the universe. Macro-
level phenomena arise through entirely natural microphysical processes and their existence 
continues to causally depend on processes of this kind. In order to claim that emergence 
violates natural unity it would be necessary to argue for some sort of Constitution Thesis.434 
That is, a rule that all macro-level phenomena are not only causally dependent on, but also 
constituted by microphysical processes. And while that rule would preclude emergence, it’s a 
thesis that would require independent argumentation, because it does not follow from the 
understandable desire for casual unity. 
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To sum up, the current empirical situation regarding emergence is that there is a lack of 
decisive evidence either way, and it has been argued that decisive evidence will never be 
available; furthermore, theories of emergence in their current form do not seem to be 
threatened by an inductive argument based on past scientific progression, nor do they pose 
a threat to the appropriate application of scientific induction. The existence of emergence is 
empirically open. Next we will look at some other ‘epistemological’ objections to emergence. 
These are arguments based on the existence of alternative explanations for macro-
phenomena, specifically inherent explanations. 
7.6 The Epistemological Problem is Not an Empirical Problem 
O’Connor and Wong: 
Even so, absent a fully worked out picture of microbiology and a reasonably good set 
of mappings from complex physical structures to basic microbiological features, 
emergence cannot be entirely ruled out, either.435 
I will argue that this is not true. Both emergence and its denial face a deeper problem. This is 
an epistemological difficulty that is specific to and entailed by the metaphysics of emergent 
properties.  
For a start, emergent properties are, uniquely, macro-properties – properties of a complex as 
opposed to properties of simples. Experimental methodology seeks to understand a situation 
by breaking it down and examining the constituent objects in isolation. This presents a 
problem when conducting experiments on emergent properties because, once the whole is 
broken down, the emergent property is no longer produced. For the same reason 
experimental analysis of the constituent simples will fail to discover the basic powers that will 
produce the emergent property. Unfortunately, this prohibits the decisive identification of an 
emergent power by experimental means. 
Imagine employing a brute-force method to analyse an emergent system. Let’s assume we 
can achieve precise knowledge of the state of the system and the ability to precisely predict 
how the behaviour of each of the constituents will evolve in combination with the behaviour 
of the other constituents. For some complex systems this might be currently impossible: the 
compounding errors of approximation techniques used to measure fundamental physical 
features may always leave room for ambiguity in identifying a potential emergent power’s 
distinctive causal contribution.436 In general, with increasing system size comes the 
                                               
435 O’Connor and Wong 2005 
436 See Laughlin, et al 1999 
132 
 
increased potential for epistemologically emergent features that are empirically 
indistinguishable from ontological ones.  
With less certainty we might settle on giving a theoretical-deductive account of system 
behaviour in terms of the powers of the constituents, and should anything else be required to 
explain behaviour we could take this to be good evidence that there are additional entities 
present; however, we saw in sections 2.4.4 and 3.1 that not only are such reductions 
vexingly difficult, they are also not good evidence of the existence of additional entities. 
Furthermore, following the discussion in sections 3.6-8, the methodology employed here 
does not rely on semantic analyses of these theories to determine what exists and in general 
does not assume that theoretical necessity reifies properties. 
In addition, even if it were not practically impossible to employ the brute-force method to 
empirically test for emergence, the discussions in sections 2.4., 3.1.2. and 4.2-3 illustrate 
that, even if one had perfect knowledge and perfect deductive powers like the Laplacean 
demon, determining when it is necessary to invoke an emergent property is impossible in 
principle. This is because the epistemic standpoint of the demon is either restricted to only 
micro-properties, in which case the production of an emergent properties is utterly 
predictable, or the epistemic standpoint of the demon is restricted to exclude the emergent-
producing powers too. In the first case the reasoning becomes circular: we have to assume 
knowledge about which powers are micro- and which are macro- in order for an agent to be 
able to discover which properties are micro- and which are macro-. In the second case, even 
though it has perfect empirical knowledge of all micro-powers apart from those that produce 
emergent properties, the Laplacean demon is in no better position than we are to decide 
which of the remaining observed powers are micro- and macro-. Even a perfect calculator 
with perfect knowledge could not, in principle, use a brute-force empirical method to 
decisively identify which powers are which. This illustrates that the epistemological problem 
is a metaphysical one: it is entailed by the metaphysics of emergence and can only be 
solved by a (metaphysical) theory of property identification. 
This contradicts O’Connor and Churchill: 
Suffice it to say that if, for example, a particular protein molecule were to have 
emergent properties, then the unfolding dynamics of that molecule at a microscopic 
level would diverge in specifiable ways from what an ideal particle physicist (lacking 
computational and precision limitations) would expect by extrapolating from a 
complete understanding of the dynamics of small-scale particle systems. The nature 
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and degree of divergence would provide a basis for capturing the distinctive 
contribution of the emergent features of the molecule.437 
The ideal particle physicist would not have a basis for capturing the distinctive contributions 
of emergent features. This is entailed by the presence of emergent-producing micro-powers, 
which would not be observed by the ideal particle physicist in the dynamics of small-scale 
particle systems. 
The significance of this is that, even with precise knowledge, one is still open to the objection 
that any observed behaviour does not in fact implicate the emergent entities. It could, for 
instance, merely imply that the properties we already know about produce very different 
behaviour in different circumstances.438 When Shoemaker made this objection he said that 
this behaviour merely implies a complication of the micro-powers.439 Or there might be 
micro-properties we have not observed before, or some other better alternative. The crux of 
the argument is O’Connor and Wong’s claim that: “given the right sort of evidence, better 
alternatives [to emergence] would not in principle be available.”440 Which relies on 
arguments beyond the empirical evidence. 
Timothy O’Connor441 and O’Connor and Wong442 argue that in the face of uncertainty, it is 
preferable, on the basis of abstract metaphysical grounds, (i.e. the principles by which 
powers are individuated and a preference for ontological simplicity), to posit emergent 
properties wherever there is discontinuous systemic behaviour (discontinuous in the sense 
that the behaviour changes radically and suddenly as the complexity of the system 
increases)443. When a macro-power has been “precisely specified” in such circumstances, it 
is preferable to posit the existence of an emergent power than to posit that the behaviour is 
produced by the interactions of micro-powers alone. 
Their arguments variously involve the following premises: 
1. “Properties are posited… to explain differences among various general patterns of 
events”444. Precisely specifiable causal features are the mark of a new power.445   
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2. When the causal behaviour of a system meets the same individuation conditions as 
the behaviour of a simple, it is appropriate to posit a new power.446 
3. The behaviour of a non-emergent complex system cannot be somehow additional to 
the powers of its components.447 
4. Accounting for discontinuous system behaviour of a complex system using micro-
powers would require complicated disjunct micro-powers.448 
5. Accounting for a complex system that shows responsiveness to macro-
circumstances using basic powers would require basic powers that are responsive to 
macro-circumstances.449 
Premise 1 is a general principle about how powers are individuated by behaviour. Premise 2 
assumes that this principle generalises to the macro. Premises 3, 4, and 5 are proposals 
about how the powers of the components of a non-emergent complex system can combine 
to produce the behaviour of the system. They also have implications for how we might 
impute the essence of powers from their combined effects. They propose the following: the 
combination of basic powers cannot produce powers additional to the basic powers (premise 
3); the combination of non-disjunct basic powers cannot produce system-wide discontinuous 
behaviour (premise 4); and the combination of locally-acting basic powers cannot produce 
system-wide responsive behaviour (premise 5). 
Let’s assume that a complex system exists that has a precisely specifiable causal profile 
featuring discontinuous macro-behaviour and responsiveness to macro-circumstances – 
there seem to be plenty of examples. We should note that these premises do not alone imply 
the existence of an emergent property; however, when combined with the entirely 
reasonable premise that it is undesirable for powers to be complicated and disjunct, or to 
produce effects at a distance, it is possible to construct an argument that positing an 
emergent property is the preferable option.  
In the next section I will argue that premises 3-5 are false. It is the case that powers in 
combination can produce effects that are discontinuous, responsive to macro-circumstances, 
and somehow additional to the powers of the components. I will show how this is possible 
and in what senses powers in combination can be additional to the same powers in isolation. 
In order to do this we will have to discuss how powers produce effects. Once we have 
illuminated the way that powers produce effects we will also be better placed to refine the 
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principle by which we individuate basic powers (premise 1). We will than see that this 
principle does not generalise to macro-behaviour (premise 2). 
First let’s have a look at some of the previous arguments that rely on the epistemological 
problem and see where the above premises come from. 
7.7 Pepper’s Objection: Complicating our Micro-Powers 
O’Connor: 
If an emergent property is a necessary consequence of certain base-level properties, 
then its instantiation is one of the potentialities of that set of properties. Thus, are not 
the additional potentialities of this emergent property also a subset of the total set of 
potentialities of the base properties, in virtue of the necessary connection between 
the base properties and it? They are simply potentialities of the base properties at 
one remove. One is now led to wonder why we might ever think to postulate an 
emergent property at all, as it provides no explanatory gain over an account that 
excises the mediating link by taking the “additional” potentialities as directly tied to 
the base properties. 
Before addressing this objection, I want to remark briefly on the importance of its 
challenge to the whole gambit of appealing to emergent properties. I have 
emphasized the importance of a causal grounding condition to render emergent 
phenomena naturalistically explainable. Yet this must be consistent with the core 
emergentist intuition that certain higher level properties are radically new features… 
The objection just noted in effect claims that one cannot have both of these features; 
they are in conflict.450 
The first such argument comes originally from Pepper.451 He argued that novel macroscopic 
phenomena can be represented by complicating the laws that quantify over the constituents 
- but not the macro-properties - such that there is a dynamical evolution in response to the 
apparently emergent situation. These comprehensive physical laws would have nonlinear 
functionality above and below the threshold level of complexity and could thereby quantify 
over the macroscopic phenomena and the microscopic. The emergent laws quantifying over 
just the macroscopic phenomena are therefore assumed to be epiphenomenal. 
Taken as is, this argument doesn’t make sense in a causal powers ontology. First of all, if an 
emergent property exists, and therefore makes a causal contribution, it makes no difference 
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whether or not it is possible to give a different representation of macroscopic phenomena by 
complicating the causal profile of the constituents’ properties: the mere ability to give an 
alternative theory does not change reality. Pepper’s objection rests on the error, familiar to 
us by now, of assuming that possibilities of description imply metaphysical facts. 
The causal powers theorist can instead interpret the suggestion as this: when faced with 
potentially emergent phenomena we should always choose the theory that complicates the 
micro-powers before we choose the theory that posits new ones. That is, we invoke a 
principle whereby we should prefer to change our theory of the micro-properties and make 
those powers more complicated. The thought here might be that we should only posit a new 
property when it is necessary. The more complicated powers theory sacrifices one kind of 
simplicity, but it has the same explanatory power as a theory of emergence and it compares 
favourably in terms of ontological economy, i.e. there are fewer entities – the same small 
number of properties as before, but made complex and disjunct. 
However, finding a motivation for this principle is difficult for a causal powers theorist. A 
property’s causal role is essential and powers are individuated by their causal profiles. This 
is the presumption behind premise 1, above. When there are precisely specifiable causal 
features among the micro-constituents one should posit new properties to account for them 
rather than complicating existing ones. If this is the case for the micro-powers, why is it not 
the case for the macro-powers?452 
The discontinuous behaviour at the macroscopic level would require complicated disjunct 
micro-powers. It is usual to identify new properties with these disjunctions – for instance, we 
wouldn’t, for the sake of ontological economy, consider the mass and charge of a 
fundamental particle to be a single complex property. The objector would require some 
principled reason why the same is not true in the case of macro-phenomena. O’Connor and 
Wong argue that such cases ‘demand explanation’ in causal/dispositional terms.453 And 
O’Connor says that it is ‘always appropriate’ to account for fundamental, systematic 
discontinuity with new properties.454 One option for the objector could be to rule out 
complexes as things to which these principles of property individuation apply, but this 
stipulation would require independent metaphysical reasoning. 
The counter-argument goes like this then: when we are in the situation of identifying a set of 
powers {m, n, p} with a property M, where {m, n, p} is a ‘precisely specifiable’ causal profile, 
                                               
452 See chapter 10 for an answer to this question. 
453 O’Connor Wong 2005 
454 O’Connor 2000a 
137 
 
we would not complicate this profile - like {m, n, p, q}, say - in a way that is not precisely 
specifiable. And, likewise, when we are in the situation of deriving a set of powers {x, y, z} of 
a complex object (E1, M, E2, R, G, E3), where {x, y, z} is a ‘precisely specifiable’ causal 
profile, we would not complicate this profile - like {x, y, z, a, b, c}, say - in a way that is not 
precisely specifiable. In the case of M, we would rather postulate the instantiation of a further 
property, N, than postulate that M is identified with {m, n, p, q} instead of {m, n, p}. Likewise 
for the complex object (E1, M, E2, R, G, E3): we would rather postulate the instantiation of a 
further property, Ԑ, than postulate that {x, y, z, a, b, c} is derived from (E1, M, E2, R, G, E3). 
What is meant by ‘precisely specifiable’ in these circumstances? Does the discontinuous 
behaviour at the macroscopic level really require complicated disjunct micro-powers? One 
option for the objector could be to point to the difference between the identification of 
particular properties with their powers and the derivation of powers from a complex object. In 
the model, the derived powers x, y, and z are not necessarily identified with any of the 
particulars in the sequence (E1, M, E2, R, G, E3). Perhaps the powers of a complex system 
are quite unlike the powers of the particulars. This derivation is not as straightforward as the 
identification of powers with properties, so it is not obvious that an analogous rule should 
apply when it comes to the postulation of new powers. The derivation of causal powers is 
relevantly dissimilar to the identification of causal powers with properties. More on these 
issues in chapters 8-10. 
7.8 New Latent Micro-Powers 
The next option is to appeal to latent micro-powers. O’Connor attributes this objection to 
Shoemaker.455 Just as the emergentist posits latent micro-powers that are manifested in 
circumstances of the requisite complexity to produce an emergent, the objector can also 
posit new micro-powers to account for systemic discontinuities. These latent micro-powers 
are also invisible in the lower complexity systems observed in fundamental physics, but 
instead of the tendency to produce emergent properties, they have the power to directly 
produce the macroscale effects. This power still seems to be radically different to the powers 
of fundamental physics because it is triggered by complex macroscopic circumstances and 
is directed to complex macroscopic effects. 
These latent micro-powers must be able to give a full account of the macroscale phenomena 
in order to have the same explanatory power and gain preference over the emergent theory. 
However, it seems that in order to do this, the micro-powers would have to have different 
characteristic effects in response to macroscale situations, different micro-effects that would 
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aggregate with the other micro-effects to produce the discontinuities. Compared with the 
emergent property, which, being the property of a complex, has a macroscale causal profile, 
the micro-powers would require either a complicated causal profile, or some sort of 
responsiveness at a distance. O’Connor finds the second option mysterious.456  
The first option suffers from the same objection about disjunct causal profiles as before. It 
doesn’t matter whether micro-powers are latent or not, the systemic discontinuities require 
immense complexity at the micro-level:  
Consider the complexity of the effects that will be directly ascribed to the 
microphysical particles (acting in tandem): in quantum-mechanical terms, a large-
scale distribution of qualities unevenly distributed across the region in question (and 
perhaps not at all in some sub-regions). We are thus required to suppose that each 
of the basic particles is disposed towards a highly complex result.457  
For this reason, O’Connor considers the latent micro-powers approach to be implausible. 
The latent micro-powers theory has the advantage of greater ontological economy than 
emergentism: the only additional entities are some latent micro-powers, rather than latent 
emergent-producing micro-powers plus an emergent property. The theory also benefits from 
an economy of kinds of entity – its properties are had only by simples, rather than there 
being a kind of property had by simples and a kind of property had by complexes. The set of 
properties would be richer, and no longer just those properties observed in fundamental 
physics, but all of what happens would share the feature that it is produced by micro-
properties.  
There are also drawbacks to the theory. It would require one of two options, both of which 
are potentially incongruent with other metaphysical tenets. First of all the latent micro-powers 
seem to be responsive to non-local situations. This is mysterious and would require a 
metaphysically plausible account, or else weigh heavily in considerations of theory choice.458 
Secondly, the micro-powers seem to be directed towards non-local effects, which would 
require a compex, disjunct causal profile operating in aggregate. This second option is not 
compatible with common theories of property identity and would also sacrifice one kind of 
theoretical simplicity in order to gain another. 
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7.9 Structured Latent Micro-Powers 
There is a variation on the above proposal, whereby the structure of the complex has some 
influence on which powers a property manifests. Here is what O’Connor has to say about 
such a proposition: 
As an alternative to the claim that there are further micro-properties, one might 
maintain that the micro-properties there are have causal features that don't come into 
play until the particles having the micro-properties become parts of systems having 
certain structures and degrees of complexity. 
But, if I am understanding this idea properly, it seems to involve a micro-particle's 
having different effects in the same sort of local situation, depending on the broader 
context in which that local situation is itself imbedded. But here we avoid the sort of 
'downward' causal influence that the emergentist hypothesis envisages only at the 
cost of a causally inexplicable 'responsiveness' of micro-level behavior to macro-level 
circumstances.459 
And here is O’Connor and Wong: 
A variation on the latent-micro-dispositions proposal will suppose instead subtle 
differences in the specific dispositions being exercised by the different particles, 
depending on their location within the appropriate type of complex. Since the 
particles are of the same type, each has all of these dispositions, but they exercise 
only those that their different circumstances permit. While perhaps more realistic than 
the original idea, the variation needs to posit a wide range of hidden dispositions (the 
number depending on the empirical details) for each specifiable dynamical 
discontinuity. Our view is simpler and so to be preferred: for each discontinuity, just 
one basic disposition -- to give rise to an emergent property under suitable 
circumstances -- that is had by every fundamental constituent.460 
This response, and the premises above, rest on assumptions about what simple properties 
can do in a complex system that are simply incorrect. Remember the examples of statistical 
physics, chaotic systems and self-reinforcing systems in chapter 1, and even systems with 
so-called ‘classical’ structure. All illustrate that this assumption is an error. It also leads us to 
some more nuanced metaphysical considerations about the identification of causal powers. 
                                               
459 O’Connor 1994 
460 O’Connor and Wong 2005 
140 
 
7.9.1 Responsiveness to Macro-Contexts and ‘action at a distance’? 
If the thought is that powers acting together at the micro scale could never have a combined 
effect at the macro scale, then this is obviously wrong. System-level effects are not ‘spooky 
action at a distance’. If the thought is that some property of the whole must be a property of 
the parts – this is a famous mistake about complex objects. To ask, why does the system 
respond this way when I push this button? Does not require that every part of the system 
has a power that corresponds to that counterfactual. The counterfactual is made true by the 
system without the parts of the system being responsive. Perhaps the thought is that some 
sort of counterfactual about the whole system implies that there is some sort of power of the 
whole system that could not be derived from facts about parts of the system. But this 
example requires that powers are implied by true counterfactuals, and we will see in chapter 
8 that this is also a mistake. 
7.10 Conclusion 
There is no deep reason that would prevent a metaphysical identification of the profile of 
macro-powers with micro-properties. O’Connor’s and other’s objections do not necessarily 
require complicated micro-properties. We have several options to explain how discontinuous 
system behaviour is caused by the actions of relatively simple powers. Firstly, mere 
aggregation of the simple nodes involved in a connectionist system like a neural net suffices 
to generate discontinuities and macro-responsiveness – this might be true for any self-
regulating aggregate utilising feedback. Secondly, chaotic systems suffice to generate 
discontinuities and macro-responsiveness with simple constituents. Thirdly, and more 
decisively, any structured system can easily generate discontinuities of behaviour and 
macro-responsiveness from simple elements. 
The first two of these options, feedback-reinforced aggregation and chaotic systems, might – 
even if ubiquitous – be considered special cases that do not generalise to all of the cases of 
putative emergence. The third however, is much more general, as can be seen by the 
analogy of the debate between connectionism and classical structure in cognitive science: 
while special self-reinforcing elements of a system – like connectoplasm - can generate 
some systematicity on their own, classically structured systems can guarantee pervasive 
systematicity, which is the basis of the objections we raised on behalf of O’Connor and 
others above. Pervasive discontinuities and systematicity at the macro-level is insufficient 
motivation for reifying apparent macro-properties. At the very least these possibilities 
illustrate that there are many exceptions to the general rules for identifying emergent 
properties proposed by O’Connor and others.  
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The emergentist can counter that these principles still apply to systems that do not 
demonstrate either chaotic features, self-reinforcing behaviour, or classical structure. One 
problem for the emergentist is that many of the systems identified as possessing potential 
emergent properties are organised: sometimes enormously complex nested hierarchies. 
Given that the epistemological problem is compounded by the difficulty of studying such 
systems – which give rise to the examples of epistemological emergence we have seen – 
this raises doubts about the emergentist’s conditions for property identification.  
The problem of decisively identifying when a new emergent property has occurred is kicked 
down the line. We have already shown that the application of the brute force method could 
not make such an identification by isolating the influence of all of the constituents of a 
system. We then examined the suggestion that, in the absence of the brute force method, 
there are principles of property identification that would preference emergentism because 
discontinuous system behaviour necessarily involves disjunct constituent properties. This 
claim is not true. The requirements for identifying new emergent properties have now shifted 
so that making a decisive determination now requires that the system in question lacks any 
of the specific macro-structural features that are capable of influencing the combination of 
the constituent properties in such a way that could produce any putatively emergent macro-
properties. In the face of the enormous, dynamic, massively nested hierarchical systems, it 
seems difficult for the presence of such structural influences – especially when it’s possible 
that they operate in combination with previously unobserved latent micro-powers - to be 
entirely ruled out for a given system. In any case, the abstract metaphysical principles thus 
far advanced by the emergentists are insufficient for resolving the epistemological problem. 
And as we shall see in the next three chapters, the problem is only compounded when one 
properly analyses the causal power properties involved in this theory of emergence. I will 
argue that an alternative, inherent explanation would make a viable alternative to emergence 
within a causal powers ontology. 
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Causal Powers Inherence 
8. Causal Powers Theories of Properties 
8.1 Properties, Causal Powers, and Manifestations  
Sydney Shoemaker says “For something to have a power... is for it to be such that its 
presence in circumstances of a particular sort will have certain effects”.461 The powers of an 
object are conceptually distinct from the properties of an object, and in virtue of which it has 
those powers. The properties of an object determine what causal powers that object has and 
the causal powers of an object in turn determine the object’s behaviour, i.e. which effects 
occur in which circumstances. There are a number of different positions regarding the nature 
of the relationship between powers and properties. Shoemaker for example says that the 
having of properties ‘determines’ or ‘contributes to’ the object’s causal powers.462 Whereas 
others say that causal powers are ‘bestowed’ on their objects by the properties they have.463  
In this chapter I examine what causal powers are and how one might individuate properties 
based on effects. Making the relationship between properties, powers and effects clear, and 
having a firm understanding of what the manifestations of powers are, and in what 
circumstances they occur, is necessary for deciding what can be inferred about properties 
from the behaviour of objects. 
One role played by properties is their role in explanation. It is to properties that we appeal 
when we are trying to explain what an object does or what it would do. If it is the object’s 
properties that explain its behaviour, then this suggests some sort of connection between an 
object’s properties and its powers. A tomato has the properties of sphericalness and 
redness, in virtue of which the tomato has, respectively, the power to roll and the power to 
look red to normal observers in normal conditions. It also has the powers to cause a round 
impression in soft surfaces or to stand out against a green background, etc.  
For our purposes, following on from the arguments in our introduction to causal powers in 
section 2.6., what matters is that properties are individuated by causal powers. This is the 
causal theory of properties. Here is Shoemaker again:  
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[W]hat makes a property the property that it is, what determines its identity, is its 
potential for contributing to the causal powers of the things that have it. This means, 
among other things, that if under all possible circumstances properties X and Y make 
the same contribution to the causal powers of the things that have them, X and Y are 
the same property.464 
O’Connor and Churchill explicitly assume the causal theory of properties.465 
In turn, it is an essential feature of powers that they are directed towards the effects that they 
produce. This is one of the five basic features of powers identified by Molnar:  
I. Directedness. A power has directionality, in the sense that it must be a power 
for, or to, some outcome.466  
Despite being essentially directed to these outcomes, the effects produced by powers are 
distinct from the powers themselves. The other four basic features of powers in Molnar rule 
out the possibility of identifying powers with the effects they produce, or otherwise 
reductively analysing powers: 
II. Independence. Powers are ontologically independent of [the effects they 
produce]. They can exist even when they are not being exercised and will not 
be exercised. 
III. Actuality. A particular strand of anti-realism holds that a power is nothing over 
and above the possibility of [the effects they produce. Powers are fully actual 
and not reducible to analysis of conditionals or counterfactuals.] 
IV. Intrinsicality. Powers are intrinsic [to objects. They cannot be reduced to 
relations or analysed relationally.] 
V. Objectivity. [Powers are features of the world and not] … generated by the 
psychological structure of human observers.467 
Since powers are not the effects they produce nor the possibility of such effects, they will not 
have the same individuation conditions as the effects nor as the mere possibility of such 
effects. Since powers are, assumed here, not extrinsic to their objects, they will not have the 
same individuation conditions as relations that hold between objects. Since they are 
objective, they cannot be individuated in terms that are mind-dependent. Since they are, 
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however, essentially directed to certain effects, they will, at least in part, be individuated by 
the effects that they tend to produce. 
If powers are not individuated by their effects, then how else can they be individuated? 
There is no other obvious candidate. And there are also other reasons to suppose that 
powers are individuated by their effects, other than it being the only criteria revealed by 
looking at this list of the essential features of powers. The first is that it makes sense of the 
language we use to talk about powers that they be individuated by the effects they produce. 
Powers are often defined as “the power to x” or “the power for y”. Though, of course, since 
powers are independent of their effects and not reduced to the possibility of their effects, the 
distinctness of x and y does not in itself entail distinct powers. This will depend on the 
principles we adopt for the individuation of powers. More on this in a bit. 
There is a strong epistemic rationale behind the individuation of powers by their effects. 
Effects seem to be the only way that we can perceive the operations of powers – I see the 
glass shattering, but I cannot directly perceive the fragility of the glass. Shoemaker again: 
“We know and recognize properties by their effects, or, more precisely by the effects of the 
events which are the activations of the causal powers which things have in virtue of having 
the properties.”468 Effects are the only epistemic access we have to the existence and nature 
of powers. If two distinct types of causal power meant the production of exactly the same 
effects in the same circumstances, then there would be no perceivable difference between 
the two distinct powers. 
8.2 Conditional Analysis 
While powers are not reducible to conditional statements469, we might try to appeal to 
conditional statements to individuate powers. Disjunctive conditionals have the advantage 
that they include a consequent describing the power’s effect and an antecedent that 
describes the circumstances in which a powers will produce that effect. This can provide a 
route to criteria for individuation. For instance, one might claim that a power can be 
individuated by the conditional statements the truth of which that power entails. There do 
seem to be readily available subjunctive conditionals that are entailed by the presence of 
certain paradigmatic powers, for instance, it is true that, for a fragile vase:  
 If the vase is hit by a hammer, then it will shatter. 
                                               
468 1980 
469 See Molnar 2003 ch. 3-7 for defence of the points above. 
145 
 
Perhaps the entailment of conditionals like this can be used to individuate powers. The 
simplest version of a general conditional analysis of powers is what Molnar calls the ‘Naïve 
Conditional Analysis’:470 
NCA Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff if x were 
to undergo stimulus s at time t, then x would give response r. 
In order for statements of this form to provide individuation conditions for powers, the 
presence of a power must entail the truth of some conditional of this form. That is: that the 
entailment of the truth of this sort of conditional must be a necessary condition for the 
individuation of powers. It also needs to be shown that two different powers cannot entail the 
truth of the same set of conditionals, otherwise the criteria would be insufficient for the 
individuation of powers. Simple conditionals like NCA face problems on both counts. 
Most of the problems for using statements like NCA result from them being “clumsy and 
inexact linguistic gestures”471 towards powers that fail to represent the essence of powers as 
outlined above. The first problem is no exception. Statements of the form of NCA say 
nothing about what it is about the object that makes the statement true; how is the effect 
produced in these circumstances? This relates to the intrinsicality of powers. By missing out 
this feature, room is left for counterexamples where the entailment of NCA proves 
insufficient for individuating powers. Molnar uses the example of Malebranche-style 
occasionalism.472 Suppose that every time stimulus s occurs, God intervenes to cause the 
object x to give response r. NCA is true, but the truth of NCA is entailed by any set of powers 
of x whatsoever. So the entailing of NCA is insufficient for the individuation of powers. 
A more general problem is the problem of unconditional manifestations. These are powers 
that, while still being independent of their effects, produce those effects without being 
triggered by any stimuli. While most everyday cases of the exercise of powers involve the 
action of some stimulus or trigger, it is not necessarily the case that all powers do. And if a 
power exists for which this is not the case, then the entailment of NCA-form statements is 
not a necessary condition for the individuation of powers.  
Such a power could exist if it produced its effects spontaneously. Such a power would be a 
counterexample to the proposed conditional criteria for power individuation. And in fact, we 
do have good examples of powers that are exercised spontaneously. Particle decay, for 
example. The muon has the power to decay into an electron, a neutrino, and an antineutrino. 
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Its properties produce decay at some point in the life of the muon without any external 
stimulus. Attempts to account for this by invoking an internal trigger are bound to fall into a 
regress because any internal trigger looks to be a spontaneous effect too.473 
A power would also provide a counterexample to the conditional criteria if it continuously 
produced its manifestations. This would be a power that, for as long as it exists, is always 
exercised. It too would have no stimulus and would fail to entail a NCA-form statement. 
Resting mass is an example that has been suggested for this sort of power – objects are 
continuously exercising this power in interaction with space-time. 
Then there are what Martin call ‘finks’. The general form of a finkish case is for the stimulus 
to cause the object to acquire or to lose powers at time t. This can work both ways. The 
object x could be lacking a power D at time t, but, if the stimulus s were to occur, ex 
hypothesi, x would gain D, which would at the same time mean the production of response r. 
Thus the conditional is satisfied without x having D at time t. In this example the object x 
entails the truth of NCA, but this entailment is insufficient for individuating the powers of x. 
Conversely, x could have D at time t, but if it were to undergo s, ex hypothesi, x would lose 
D, and would not produce r. Thus the conditional is not satisfied even though x does in fact 
have D at time t. In this example the object x does not entail the truth of NCA, but entailment 
is not a necessary condition for individuating the powers of x. 
8.3 Identifying Powers I 
The force of the epistemological objection to causal powers emergence depends on how 
causal powers are individuated. If powers are individuated in such a way that the novel 
behaviour of a complex object would imply the existence of new powers – like if there was 
an isomorphism between effects and powers, i.e. a one-to-one mapping – then the causal 
theory of properties implies that new properties are involved. Likewise, if the relationship is 
not isomorphic, but something like the principles of property identity set out by O’Connor and 
others in section 7.6., then the causal theory of properties implies that new properties are 
involved.474 Let’s examine some of the other candidate principles for the individuation of 
powers, illustrating the difference between the manifestation of causal powers and observed 
behaviour. 
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As we mentioned above: powers are essentially directed towards their manifestations. Next 
we will look at two theories of powers that differ in their definition of this essence. According 
to these theories, manifestations are either: 
• the events caused by objects bestowed with those powers; (Martin) 
• or, the contributions to caused events made by objects bestowed with those powers. 
(Molnar/Mumford) 
Either way, powers are distinct from, but necessarily linked to their manifestations. We will 
assume therefore that powers are identified by their manifestations.475 Despite being 
essentially directed to these outcomes, the caused events produced in virtue of powers are 
distinct from the powers themselves. Effects are the only epistemic access we have to the 
existence and nature of powers - if two distinct types of causal power meant the production 
of exactly the same effects in the same circumstances, then there would be no perceivable 
difference between the two distinct powers - but only one of these theories posits a direct 
link between observable effects and powers. The important difference is that on Martin’s 
account we retain the epistemological loading of the term ‘manifestations’, i.e. they are 
manifest. Whereas on the Molnar/Mumford account manifestations are hidden and we 
recognise them only indirectly through caused events. 
8.4 Martin’s Mutual Manifestation 
Here’s one theory in that regard.476 The term mutual manifestation refers to the caused event 
and powers combine as reciprocal partners for their mutual manifestation. The observed 
caused event is produced by a holistic power net that acts in concert where whatever is 
causally operative for that caused event is part of that net. For any individual power, the 
caused events produced by different nets containing that power will differ wildly depending 
on the other manifestation partners for each event. 
In Martin’s words a single power is directed towards an ”infinity of reciprocal disposition 
partners for, against, or neutral with regard to an infinity of manifestations, with an infinity of 
different disposition lines, are actual in the quark itself.”477 If this looks complicated when you 
are trying to define the essence of any individual power then Martin doesn’t consider that a 
problem: “Of course, all of God’s children have identity conditions.” But giving ‘specific and 
                                               
475 It might not be quite so simple, for example, Bird is open to the idea that powers are partially 
individuated by stimulus conditions, and Shoemaker has previously introduced the idea of properties 
having backwards-looking causal profiles as well as the forward-looking ones. Let’s just put that to the 
side. 
476 See Martin 2008 for example. 
477 Ibid, p. 30 
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full’ identity conditions for anything but abstract entities would be ‘endless’. “The demand for 
them is the ploy of the mad logician.”478 
There doesn’t seem to be any real theoretic cost to additional disjunctions in the essences of 
powers on this account. Disposition lines in the power net are a direct connection between 
manifestation partners and caused events. And the combining of powers is all in the power 
net.  When every power is directly connected by dispositional lines to an infinite number of 
caused events towards which it can contribute, there’s no need for the additional step of 
composing those powers.479 
Under Martin’s theory of property identity we see the repudiation of two implicit premises in 
the argument to CPE set out in 7.6: 
1. powers are not complicated or disjunct, and 
2. micro-properties are not responsive to macro-circumstances. 
This is because the direct connection between powers and caused events makes powers 
very complicated anyway, the additional complexity, even disjunctions, would not be 
troubling. Regarding the second implicit premise, micro-powers are responsive to macro-
circumstances on the theory of mutual manifestation because these power nets are going to 
be thrown pretty wide for every caused event. 
Given that the arguments to CPE presented don’t work in Martin’s ontology, it’s not 
surprising to find out that O’Connor and his co-authors are explicitly committed to a different 
theory, which we will now introduce. 
8.5 Manifestations as Causal Contribution 
One key difference between Martin’s theory and the theory of powers set out in the work of, 
for example, Molnar and Mumford,480 is the definition of the manifestation of a power. In the 
latter theories, the manifestation is the causal contribution of that power to different potential 
effects. In the former the manifestations of a power were the caused events themselves. 
Both the theory of mutual manifestation and the theory of causal contribution posit that any 
given power is disposed to multiple caused events, but whereas the theory of mutual 
                                               
478 Ibid, p. 47. For more on the potential problem of infinities in the universe, compare Heil 2013 ch. 3 
and 4; and Schaffer 2010a. 
479 Ibid, p. 30 
480 Molnar 2003; and e.g. Mumford and Anjum 2011b 
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manifestation posits multiple (indeed, infinite) potential manifestations of a power, the theory 
of causal contribution posits only one manifestation per power. 
According to this theory, a power is continuously manifesting and the manifestation of a 
power is the same in all circumstances. There is no longer the direct connection between the 
powers and the caused event. Causal contributions combine in the production of caused 
events rather than being connected by disposition lines in a power net. Crucially, the 
compositional principles at work in causation will determine how the presence of powers 
from observed behaviour can be traced. 
8.6 Conclusions 
Multi-tracking or mutual manifestations cast doubt on O’Connor and co-authors’ objections 
regarding ‘disjunct’ properties. However, O’Connor is committed to a theory of powers where 
the manifestations of powers are unitary causal contributions.481 However, this theory of 
powers does not imply that changes in the observed behaviour in a complex object are the 
result of changes in the properties had by that object. Properties are not strictly identified by 
the events they cause. This is because these events are not, according to this theory of 
powers, the manifestations to which powers are essentially directed.482 The theory adopted 
by O’Connor requires a mediation between caused events and powers – there is not a direct 
connection between the two. This has the potential to undermine O’Connor’s claim that a 
change in observed behaviour implies a change in properties. 
O’Connor assumes a theory of properties. What we’re pointing out here is not a problem for 
that theory, but it is a theoretical cost. The weakness is just that it depends on a theory of 
property identification with extra commitments beyond those of the underlying theory of 
powers. One might choose to defend those commitments, and in sections 7.6-10. we raised 
some preliminary problems that would have to be accommodated in such a theory. Or, we 
can say that, while a discontinuity in observed behaviour does not “demand” an explanation 
in terms of new properties, it should be taken as evidence of a change in properties present. 
This second option does not require the commitments discussed in sections 7.6-10, all that 
is required is for it to be bad for powers to be overly complicated on a single-track theory of 
powers like unitary causal contribution, and that some discontinuities in observed behaviour 
do imply complications in the underlying powers, a possibility we left open at the end of 
chapter 7. However, in addition to the cases raised in that section, this complexity can come 
from somewhere else once the manifestation of a power is distinct from its causal effects. 
                                               
481 Explicitly in O’Connor and Churchill 2010, p. 4 
482 Compare the definition of causal powers in section 8.1. 
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This is complexity through the combination of powers. In an analogous fashion to the 
example of complexity through structure, it is possible for there to be a combination of 
powers beyond aggregation. We will examine this possibility in the next section. 
Unitary causal contribution (that is, the single-track, mutual manifestation theory) suggests 
that simple powers (with a single manifestation) can contribute to various complicated 
effects. This is the theory assumed by O’Connor, but without his supplementary premises it 
is congruent with the examples given in chapter 1 (and sections 7.9-10) of systems that 
violate those premises. We shall also see that the theory of unitary causal contribution also 
enables a metaphysical form of combinatorial complexity through compositional pluralism – 
the ability of powers to compose non-linearly. Conclusion: from the perspective of the 
individuation of powers, there is no principled reason to prefer emergence over inherence. 
9. Powers-Based Causation 
Coming up with principled identity conditions in terms of observed behaviour is made even 
more difficult because many different powers are typically involved in the production of any 
macroscopic behaviour, and the same power can be involved in the production of many 
different behaviours depending on its combination with other powers. In other words, I’m 
taking this from Molnar here, who took it from somebody else: events are polygenic and 
powers are pleiotropic.483 There’s an analogy here with the genotype/phenotype distinction 
in biology, where the expression of any individual gene is dependent on the rest of the 
genome and any observed behaviour results from the whole genotype in combination with 
environmental and developmental factors. 
This is to say that we cannot ‘read off’ the nature of powers from caused events. Power 
identification will depend on how powers combine in the production of caused events – how 
we move from genotype to phenotype. The identification of properties is going to depend on 
how this combination of powers works. 
9.1 Getting from Powers to Causation 
A theory of causation based on an ontology of powers proposes that caused events are 
produced by one or more powers manifesting. The solution to the epistemological problem in 
chapter 7 depends on how one individuates basic powers from the salient macro-behaviour. 
If we are to individuate powers based on caused events then we need to know specifics 
about how powers work. We have already discussed the debate about the nature of powers 
                                               
483 Molnar 2003 
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in relation to their manifestations and the effects to which they contribute: we concluded in 
the previous chapter that a single property may contribute to a wide array of effects but this 
does not imply that the property has, or confers, a wide array of powers. 
Properties are individuated by the powers they have, but this relation is not isomorphic, there 
can be more than one power per property.484 There is no separate entity that is a power. 
Each power is in turn individuated by its causal contribution, and this relation is isomorphic. 
In fact, the manifestation of a power just is its causal contribution. In the sense of 
manifestation, the power is always manifesting, always making that contribution.485 In 
practice, we can only individuate powers when that causal contribution is in a context that 
produces an effect. The language around the term ‘manifestation’ can be a bit slippery, since 
‘manifestation’ is often and ordinarily used to mean the salient effects of the operation of 
powers and not a power’s essential and constant contribution toward those effects.  
When a power’s contribution is in a context in which it does not produce an effect, it is latent. 
When it is producing an effect, it is salient. What makes individuation difficult is that the 
same power can contribute to many different effects, depending on its context. The salient 
effects are but a clue to the nature of the powers behind them. Furthermore, for each of 
those effects, in each of those contexts, the causal influence of the power remains the same. 
Powers have a unitary causal influence, but this influence is pleiotropic – it contributes to a 
variety of effects that each involve various other partners. This is what we established in the 
last section and it also seems that O’Connor and Churchill have the same theory of powers 
in mind.486 
The effects are a clue to, but not identical with, the contribution of the power. In order to 
identify the contribution in these circumstances – and thereby individuate the power – we 
need to know more about how the effects relate to powers. In the previous section we looked 
at arguments about the difficulty of individuating powers and what this might tell us about the 
nature of powers. And the pleiotropic nature of powers is compounded by complexity, which 
makes the epistemological difficulty for a theory of emergent powers, mentioned above, 
drastically worse. 
9.2 Modelling Powers-Based Causation 
“[T]he way in which we choose to represent some phenomenon can shape the way in which 
we think about that phenomenon”487. While we’re investigating a theory of causation and its 
                                               
484 See e.g. Molnar 2003 
485 ibid 
486 O’Connor and Churchill 2010, p. 4 
487 Hitchcock 2006, 69 
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implications for property identification, our choice of model matters. Stephen Mumford and 
Rani Lill Anjum object to the reliance on neuron diagrams488 to represent causation on the 
basis that they are not metaphysically neutral representations. These commitments are likely 
to be more acceptable to a Humean or Lewisian than to an upholder of powers.489 Neuron 
diagrams misrepresent two key features of the powers view thus far explicated, which is 
impressive considering neuron diagrams only feature two basic elements, see figure 1 
below. 
A neuron diagram represents causation as a stimulatory connection that holds between 
events. Neurons can fire, corresponding to the occurrence of an event, and when they do so 
they send a stimulatory signal to the next neuron causing it to also fire, and so on.490  
In general, however, this is not a good model for powers-based causation, and this is 
because it is not a good representation of the nature of powers. The model depicts events as 
discrete and independent of their causal connections. The events themselves are self-
contained neurons, distinct from the causal connections that they bear. If they are read this 
way, the implication is that the individuation conditions for these events are independent of 
their stimulatory connections to other events. The result of the diagram apparently depicting 
the event and its stimulatory connection as separate (separable) entities is to suggest that 
they are two entities when in fact they are not. This is not conducive to a powers-based 
approach because events that involve powers are essentially directed towards certain 
manifestations: powers are individuated by their causal contribution, so the stimulatory 
connection here is at least partly constitutive of the event bearing them. In the diagram, 
event a would still be event a without the arrow. For a powers theorist, the arrow is either 
essential to what a is (its causal contribution), or follows from the nature of a. 
 
As well as suggesting that a power’s causal contribution is contingent to the nature of that 
power, the neuron diagram also suggests that the stimulatory connection between events is 
a necessary connection. This too reduces its suitability as a way of thinking about how 
                                               
488 Popularised by, for instance, Lewis 1973 
489 Mumford and Anjum 2011a, p.55 
490 The similarities that exist here with the stimulus-manifestation view of powers are perhaps telling. 
a b c 
Figure 1: A neuron diagram 
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powers work.491 The firing of a in figure 1 guarantees the firing of b, so a seems to be an 
entirely sufficient cause for b. This will be true if the power instantiated in a just so happens 
to be a sufficient cause of the power instantiated in b and this is a fine representation in 
those circumstances; but often this will not be the case. As was suggested in the previous 
section, the causal contribution a power makes is not alone sufficient for most effects to 
which it contributes.492 Stimulatory connections in neuron diagrams are bad representations 
of this causal contribution because stimulatory connections are entirely sufficient stimuli for 
the proceeding manifestation. In the absence of inhibitors, stimulatory connections 
necessitate the effect rather than merely contributing to it.  
We cannot read the nature of our powers off of a neuron diagram. Considered this way, not 
only would the neuron diagram suggest that a power’s essence is not constituted at least 
partly by that to which it is directed, it would also suggests that the power’s directedness is 
stronger than it is. Is this really a problem for neuron diagrams as models of causation? Well, 
it depends what you are interested in. We are interested in the relationship between the 
nature of powers and causation. As a model of powers-based causation these diagrams are 
unhelpful because they do not properly represent the nature of powers. At best it can show 
us is that there is a connection between certain powers and certain effects, but it offers no 
further illumination about how we might individuate powers based on effects. 
9.3 Practical Problems 
Aside from being a bad representation of the entities involved, neuron diagrams also have 
problems modelling the complexities of causation. There are certain everyday features of 
causal situations that are problematic. Firstly, neurons are a binary model of causation; a 
given cause or effect either occurs or it doesn’t. But what of the possibility of an effect that 
has degrees (say, degrees Celsius)? Or the fact that many different things seemed to be 
directed towards the same effect, but to different degrees.493 Maybe we can model this by 
being precise about the events that feature in the neuron diagram, but in general it seems a 
poor representation of causes and effects that can form a continuum to insist on 
discreteness.  
The main problem with neuron diagrams is their inability to model complexity. The causes of 
effects can involve many different powers operating together. Since we are particularly 
                                               
491 See Schrenk 2010 for argument on this point. 
492 At least, this is a corollary of both Martin’s theory of mutual manifestation and the theory of 
manifestations as causal contribution. 
493 Mumford and Anjum use the example of sunlight and a kettle being both disposed to heat water, 
but the kettle does so to a higher degree than the sunlight. (2011a p.57) 
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interested in the essences of powers in complex systems, it is best that we look to another 
model for insight. 
9.4 Vector Addition 
Vector diagrams represent one or more properties on a quality space, with each dimension 
representing one property. We then plot powers as vectors according to how they act on the 
quality spaces, the direction of the vector representing what a power is directed towards on 
that quality space, and the length of the vector representing the magnitude of the power – 
how much it contributes to the change in property. 
Resultant powers are identified with the causal profile of a system with several component 
powers. These component powers come together and produce something that none of the 
component powers could produce alone. The question of how powers can be composed and 
the ontological status of the resultant powers is central to the theoretical attractiveness of 
emergence. 
Vector diagrams represents one or more properties on a quality space, with each dimension 
representing one property.  
 
The resultant power, R, is composed of the component powers of the system, a and b. 
There is no longer a direct connection between caused events and the component powers 
because the manifestation of those powers is the causal contribution they make to the 
resultant power R. Indeed, the caused event is now one more step removed, because not 
only are the component powers not essentially linked to that event by their manifestations, 
they also contribute only to the composition of a resultant power, itself only essentially 
directed to the contribution it makes and not necessarily to any particular caused event. 
We can begin to see why, even if you knew which powers were implicated in any given 
event, one cannot simply read off the essences of those powers from the observed 
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behaviour. In this theory it is necessary to also consider how the causal contributions 
combine to produce the caused events. 
9.5 Resultant Powers 
Resultant powers are identified with the causal profile of a system with several component 
powers. These component powers come together and produce something that none of the 
component powers could produce alone. The question of how powers can be composed and 
the ontological status of the resultant powers is central to the theoretical attractiveness of 
emergence. If resultant powers are not distinct entities – if for instance they are identical to 
their component powers and the relations between them - then resultant powers are not 
emergent.  
This is not necessarily a problem for the emergentist, who is likely to hold that there are 
resultant powers and emergent powers and that the relation between them and their 
components is in each case different (for instance, that the relation between component 
powers and resultant powers is a relation of composition and the relation between 
component powers and emergent powers is a relation of causation). My intention here is to 
show that the relation between component powers and resultant powers can be non-linear 
and pluralistic. And if component powers can produce resultant powers in non-linear, 
pluralistic ways, then emergence loses one of its main explanatory advantages. The non-
linearity of the putatively emergent properties in relation to their components is frequently 
appealed to in order to motivate the identification of those putative properties as distinct 
entities.494 Of course, if resultant powers themselves are distinct entities, then it is open to 
the emergentist to suggest that the resultant powers just are emergent entities, so the 
ontological status of resultant powers is an important part of the case too. We will examine 
the two issues in turn. 
9.6 Nonlinearity 
When discussing how powers might combine a good place to start is the notion of vector 
addition. O’Connor appeals to vector addition several times to flesh out the idea that a 
certain level of complexity is required for an emergent to be produced.495 (Though O’Connor 
explicitly remains uncommitted to this model.)496 We have already suggested one reason 
why vector addition might be a bad model for the systems that are generally thought to be 
emergent, like the brain and certain chaotic systems.497 This is because the simple addition 
                                               
494 There are plenty of good examples in Wilson 2013 
495 O’Connor and Wong 2005, p. 670 
496 ibid 
497 See section 7.9. 
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of powers considered separately and independently of one another fails to capture the 
additional complexity created by the structure of a system. We’ll raise this problem again in 
support of a compositional pluralism, but for the current purpose what is required is just to 
show that powers can be composed in non-linear ways. This result will be more secure if it 
does not rely on the additional thesis of compositional pluralism. If powers can combine non-
linearly using only vector addition, then our case will be stronger.  
I will now make that case using a famous example: simple molecular symmetry breaking of 
the sort invoked by P.W. Anderson in support of emergence.498 He used the example of the  
ammonia molecule, which has the power to undergo rapid nitrogen inversion at room 
temperature because the nitrogen atom exhibits quantum tunnelling between the two low 
energy states of the system. The power to invert is not a power had by the nitrogen atom or 
any other components, nor is it the result of any of their powers being somehow “added” 
together in a straightforward way. If we make a list of the powers of the nitrogen atom and 
three hydrogen atoms that compose an ammonia molecule, and we were to list only those 
powers that each atom has in isolation, we might include the power to form molecular bonds 
and the power to exhibit quantum tunnelling behaviour; however, it is not at all clear that 
these powers, considered in isolation, could add up to or feature as vectors in a quality 
space for rapid nitrogen inversion. Indeed, it barely makes sense to talk about vector 
addition in a quality space for rapid nitrogen inversion where those vectors are not powers of 
the molecule as a whole, rather than its component atoms, because rapid nitrogen inversion 
is a power that can only be had by the molecule. In so far as the component powers produce 
a vector in that space, they do so obliquely; while the power of each atom to make molecular 
bonds obviously contributes to the ammonia’s power to invert, this contribution is necessary 
but not sufficient.  
 
Figure 3: Nitrogen inversion in an Ammonia molecule 
The difference between the powers of the component atoms and the power of the ammonia 
molecule to invert is the manner in which they are composed – the structure of the system. 
This is a necessary component in the nitrogen-inversion quality space. The atoms are 
                                               
498 Anderson 1972 
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composed in a bonded structure in a pyramidal shape that produces two potential low-
energy states for the system. Without that structure there wouldn’t be the two low-energy 
states, the system wouldn’t have a dipole moment and the symmetry of the system wouldn’t 
be broken - and the nitrogen atom would not rapidly tunnel from one position to the other. 
Perhaps then we should include the energy barrier as a power vector in our quality space?  
To recap, when adding vectors in the nitrogen-inversion quality space, the powers of the 
atoms to form bonds is necessary, so should be included as a vector; however, bond-
forming powers alone are insufficient for nitrogen inversion: the energy barrier is also 
necessary. What is odd about the situation is that, of course, the power to form molecular 
bonds is what produces the energy barrier in the first place. It is through that structure and 
only through that structure that the basic component powers of the atoms compose the 
resultant nitrogen inversion power. In a neuron diagram this causal chain is easily modelled: 
one power produces another power which produces a third. Modelling the same using 
vectors addition is more difficult.  
 
Figure 4: Neuron diagram of nitrogen inversion 
Here is how it might be done. We would include among the range of powers of the 
components the power to form bonds up to the threshold set by their outer electron shells. If 
we wanted to finesse the resultant vectors we could also include among the powers involved 
the power for lone electron pairs to repel more strongly than electron bond pairs. If we were 
to add these together as two oppositely-directed vectors of differing magnitude, then the 
resultant vector would determine the bond angle between the central nitrogen atom and 
each of the hydrogen atoms. Here vector addition has produced the angle of the pyramid 
structure. The magnitude of the resultant vector would also determine the energy barrier. 
Incorporating such magnitudes is vexing in a neuron diagram, so this demonstrates an 
advantage of the vector model. Only one more power has to be included to produce the 
inversion effect: the tendency of atoms to exhibit quantum tunnelling. This tending becomes 
less likely the higher the energy barrier, so the inversion rate of the ammonia molecule can 
still be modelled as vector addition. The power of the nitrogen atom to exhibit quantum 
tunnelling is one vector, the energy barrier of the ammonia molecule – a resultant vector of 
a b c 
Bond-forming powers Energy barrier Nitrogen inversion 
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the power of different electron bonds to repulse – is another, opposed, vector. When these 
two vectors are added together the resultant vector is the power of the ammonia molecule to 
invert, which produces, in combination with other vectors like temperature, the manifestation 
rate of nitrogen inversion.  
What the above example shows, apart from the fact that P.W. Anderson-type cases can be 
regarded as resultant powers, is that simple vector addition can successfully model the 
production of some putatively “different” powers of composed systems; “different”, that is, 
than the powers of the components. The success of vector addition is perhaps surprising 
because of two features of the account given above. These are possible drawbacks of the 
vector model over neuron diagrams. Firstly, vector diagrams model only one quality space at 
one moment, so in order to get from the more basic powers to nitrogen inversion we had to 
add vectors in multiple quality spaces. Secondly, resultant vectors in one quality space 
become component vectors in another. The account goes like this: 
Electron pair bonds, a, have a smaller power to repel than lone electron pairs, b. 
 
Figure 5: Repulsion powers composing an energy barrier 
In the energy-barrier quality space, E, the electron-bond repulsion power vectors (a, b) 
together produce the resultant vector of the energy barrier of the molecule to the nitrogen’s 
position, E. 
Nitrogen atoms have the power to exhibit quantum tunnelling. 
E 
a 
a 
a 
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Figure 6: The energy barrier as a power vector in a different quality space 
In the nitrogen-inversion quality space, N, the power of the molecules’ energy barrier to the 
nitrogen’s position, E, and the nitrogen’s power to exhibit quantum tunnelling, q, together 
produce the resultant vector of the nitrogen-inversion quality space. 
While the presentation is verbose, this model seems like a natural way of characterising the 
way that component powers have come together to produce the power of the ammonia 
molecule to invert. Notice how the resultant vector in one quality space is a component 
vector in a different quality space. The basic powers of the atoms compose powers of the 
system in which they are components – molecular powers - and those powers of the system 
are the ones it makes most sense to use in quality spaces concerning that system.  
Here there are only two stages, but imagine a more complex system where powers are 
combined to produce resultants in many stages of quality space. Basic powers would 
combine to produce resultants that combine with other resultants which combine with other 
resultants to compose powers in a myriad of different quality spaces in differently composed, 
overlapping systems. If one were then simply to look at the final quality space, featuring 
resultant powers many times removed from the basic ones of which they are composed, it 
would not appear that the final powers were the results of simple addition of the basic ones.  
In complex systems, the multiple stages through which vector additions must be run will 
often produce non-linear functions when the most basic component powers and the most 
complicated resultant powers are compared. If the only explanatory role of emergence was 
to account for these non-linear functions, then it would not be necessary. The existence of 
many levels of quality space means that non-linearity is to be expected in complex systems, 
even when powers are only ever composed linearly in any single quality space. 
N 
q 
E 
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9.7 How Vector Addition Can Generate Nonlinearities: Part 2 
Let’s look at the example of diminishing marginal utility. I’ve included this as an example 
because you can account for it on a simple set of successive vector diagrams using only 
additive composition, and while not as iconic or perhaps as radical as the example of 
symmetry breaking, it is still a classic of systemic nonlinearity. Using the first vector diagram 
from above: 
 
Let’s make the component vector a represent the sum of the intrinsic power of some good to 
create utility – like the intrinsic deliciousness of an ice-cream. The quality space Q is utility 
and the resultant vector R is the resultant power of the good to produce utility. The 
countervailing vector, b, would be some composite of the physiology of the person 
consuming the good. In each successive vector composition the good would contribute the 
same vector, because the good is the same. But the countervailing vector would increase in 
magnitude with each successive vector diagram as the person became more satiated. This 
would continue until we are so sick of ice-cream that each additional ice-cream actually has 
negative utility, see below. Again, the nonlinearity is only apparent because we are 
producing resultant powers in multiple quality spaces. Here it is successive iterations of the 
same quality space and the same two inputs. Only the inputs are not the same. The 
changing magnitude of the component power b is itself a resultant power produced on a 
quality space of the various physiological components that compose a person’s satedness 
when it comes to, say, ice-cream. The result of this composition changes over time as more 
ice-cream is consumed because the property with the power pf component vector a does not 
only compose a resultant power R in a utility quality space Q, but also has a power that 
contributes to a resultant power in the quality space that itself partially composes the 
physiological resultant power b. The composition of powers takes place over multiple quality 
spaces just because the power to produce utility is not the same as the power to produce 
satedness. It is only when we look at a single quality space over time, and assume that all of 
the component powers are unchanging, that there appears to be a surprising nonlinearity.  
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This is an example of a dynamic composition; it is also an example of negative feedback. 
The effect of consumption – utility – is diminished in the future because what is consumed 
has the power both to produce utility and to produce satedness, which inhibits the good’s 
power to produce utility. The good has the power to produce utility, R, and also the power to 
inhibit the composition of R in the future. But is this because the good has two powers that 
are at work here, one in each quality space, or a single power at work in both? 
9.8 How Vector Addition Can Generate Nonlinearities: Part 3 
Linear vector addition across multiple quality spaces is going to work for some apparently 
nonlinear observations, but it is not clear that all cases of nonlinear behaviour can be 
modelled this way. The use of equilibria, threshold effects and successive vector diagrams 
can model nonlinear causal contributions using only one dimensional quality spaces and 
additive composition in each of the following cases, for example.499 These are all cases in 
which the nonlinearity is shown to be only apparent: the output only seems to be more than 
the input because of the choice of quality spaces. 
• Overdose cases – diminishing contributions, going out of equilibrium, e.g. too much 
ice-cream or watering a plant too much. 
• Escalatory cases – output seems to be more than input – tipping points are 
successive, or thresholds exist. This can account for some chaotic effects like the 
flapping of a butterfly’s wings – cases where the contribution surpasses a tipping 
point or reaches a threshold. 
• Antipathetic cases – composition reverses contribution. Here we might model an 
allergy as a strong component vector within a very specific quality space concerning 
the antipathetic power, and composing a resultant that can override the contribution 
of the power to which there is an allergy in all of the normal quality spaces to which it 
contributes.500 
In each of these cases, the contention is that models representing the full richness of the 
situation are available and they explain resultant powers through addition alone. The use of 
a threshold is somewhat different – it introduces a discontinuity into the quality space itself. 
There is no switching between powers operating in different quality spaces, so this is an 
                                               
499 These examples are from Mumford and Anjum 2011b pp.89-96 
500 This contradicts Mumford and Anjum in e.g. 2011a p.75-6, where antipathetic cases are introduced 
as an example of nonlinear composition that cannot be accounted for on the linear vector model. 
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entirely different example of how additive composition can produce nonlinearity without the 
component vectors being complicated. 
9.9 Multi-Dimensional Powers and Quality Spaces 
When objects that have otherwise simple characteristics come together in systems of some 
complexity, the resultant behaviour often does not follow in any straightforward manner from 
the characteristics of the components. Sometimes linear transformations can succeed in 
modelling these difficult cases with the right choice of quality space, but it is doubtful that 
such a solution will always be available. There are nonlinearities everywhere in complex 
systems, including some examples with which we are already familiar: phase transitions, 
turbulence, chaotic systems in general, strange attractors, Renormalization, degrees of 
freedom. 
Here the vector model of causation can still be instructive: “even if there were irreducibly 
complex causal processes, which cannot be reduced to conjunctions of causes within one 
quality dimension, they could still be accommodated within a vector model.”501 Mumford and 
Anjum argue that considering multi-dimensional powers acting in multiple quality spaces 
simultaneously can lead to more non-additive composition: “We may have two powers 
relating to different quality spaces but such that, when they act together, they interact in a 
nonlinear way that does not decompose into the individual actions of those powers had they 
acted alone.”502 
How to interpret this statement? The addition of vectors is still the only function at work in 
composition here. But once we are used to thinking about vectors operating in multiple 
quality spaces at once, and the quality space being whatever it is that we are interested in, 
we do have a way to explain situations where there is apparently nonlinear composition. 
The first is to point out that the selection of quality spaces matter. It is an abstraction. We 
might identify a power with its contribution in one quality space, but not recognise that this 
power makes contributions in other quality spaces. Then when two or more powers compose 
on the quality space of our choice it would be surprising to see other effects on other quality 
spaces despite nothing but those two powers being involved. 
If we combine this observation with the others from above we can also get to a situation 
where two multi-dimensional powers combine in a radically nonlinear way too. Think about 
the negative feedback in the overdose case. Let’s assume that the ice-cream has a power 
                                               
501 Mumford and Anjum 2011b p.44 
502 Mumford and Anjum 2011a pp.77-8 
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that is individuated by contributions on two quality spaces – it is a multi-dimensional power. 
The two quality spaces were utility and satedness. Now, in that example there were 
successive quality spaces for each iteration of the consumption of ice-cream, separated into 
different time slices. But these interactions need not be diachronic.503 And if they are 
synchronic, it could be possible for multi-dimensional powers to interact in a way that 
simultaneously composes a resultant power on a second quality space that itself affects the 
composition on the first quality space. From the point of view of the first quality space, if that 
was all that we were interested in, there would not only be the potential for surprise caused 
by the unexpected contributions of those powers on a different quality space, there would 
also be the potential for two multi-dimensional powers to compose in a nonlinear way on one 
quality space, through their interactions on another quality space. If compositions are 
simultaneous, and resultant powers can be multi-dimensional (as they must be in the case of 
satedness and utility, since utility is a partially a function of satedness), then even restricting 
the composition of powers to linear additive functions implies the possibility that, on any 
given quality space, two powers could compose in any number of ways that would be 
unpredictable based on their vectors in that space alone. 
9.10 Compositional Pluralism 
We started with a simple model of causation as vector addition in a quality space. We’ve 
outlined several different ways in which this simple model can generate complexity. We can 
go further. So far we have merely stipulated that the vectors representing the manifestation 
of powers are ‘added’ together to compose resultant powers. This stipulation reflects the 
choice of model. Vectors are defined as magnitude and direction, so when two vectors are 
put together in a one dimensional space, the only directions available are represented by a 
positive or negative magnitude, and the combination is a simple sum. 
Even in multiple dimensions, it is possible to abstract away all but the dimension that 
interests us by considering only the magnitudes of each vector in that dimension. Without 
the dynamic influence of multiple quality spaces – which can create apparent nonlinearity in 
various ways as described above – the composition is still straight forwardly additive.  
There are, however, potential cases of causal nonlinearity that are simpler and/or do not 
seem to involve a complex situation with powers acting in multiple quality spaces. One basic 
example might be the production of gravitational force. Here the influence of distance 
reduces the magnitude of gravitational attraction in a non-linear way: it is an inverse square 
function that is applied to the mass of the objects undergoing gravitational pull, not mere 
                                               
503 Mumford and Anjum themselves talk about simultaneity in causation in 2011b. 
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addition.504 And by nonlinearity I mean something quite general, not just the use of a 
nonlinear function. Let’s just say that nonlinearity is the failure of the single-quality-space 
vector model. These are examples where the same power composes in different ways. The 
contribution of each power is changed as part of composition; and not just apparently or 
effectively through their influence on other quality spaces. That can’t happen with simple 
aggregation.505 
This is potentially a problem for the vector model of causation as presented above. If just 
some of these cases cannot be explained by vector addition, then the principle of additive 
composition fails to adequately model how individual powers come together in causation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that there are a variety of ways in which powers compose.  
This may be true, but we are not committed to aggregation as the only kind of composition at 
work in causation, only that vector addition is a useful model to shape our thinking. It might 
be that relying on this model causes our thinking to be led astray. The necessary 
modification to the vector diagram model would be to allow for other principles of 
composition apart from the simple, linear, additive one. These principles do not have to 
reflect the methodology of the model, and so leave us unconstrained when considering how 
causation works in real life. The model is instructive in that it demonstrates a way that 
relatively simple powers can produce behaviour that is radically different to the components, 
with little supporting theoretical apparatus. Once these lessons are learned, the additive 
principle can be taken for what it is – a metaphor for how powers come together – and the 
model of vector addition discarded. Does this suggest a failure of reduction? Here is 
Mumford and Anjum: 
“It would be nice and easy if all composition were additive, for then we could just use 
vector addition to predict an outcome. But we know we cannot. Powers can still 
nevertheless be a basis for prediction, if they and their interactions are understood. 
To understand certain nonlinear causal interactions, therefore, it is not enough that 
we know and understand the individual powers that are involved. That would be too 
simplistic and suggest a reductionist view of the physical world.”506 
                                               
504 This and another example is given in Mumford and Anjum 2011b pp. 96-7 in support of 
compositional pluralism; the other example there, sensitivity to initial conditions in some chaotic 
systems, is less obviously a problem for the vector model insofar as they could be dealt with using 
thresholds. 
505 Mumford and Anjum 2011b refer to this feature of their theory of causation as emergence. I 
disagree. 
506 Mumford and Anjum 2011a p78 
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There may be many different kinds of function that can describe the composition of powers – 
addition is just one kind of composition. Mass and distance produce a gravitational force in a 
non-linear way: not by mere addition but by the inverse-square relationship described by the 
law of gravitational attraction. There are many examples in chaos theory of the output of a 
system not being proportional to its input. There may be many such functions that compose 
powers, not just mathematically simple functions, but perhaps functions that are far more 
complex. 
Furthermore, it’s not only that there is a problem with nonlinear causation that would be 
solved by an expansion to other sorts of general functions. The general form of the problem 
for us is where the caused event does not seem to follow in a straightforward manner from 
everything we know about the powers contributing to the causing of that event in the other 
circumstances in which we find them. This is obviously relevant to emergence in general. 
Mumford and Anjum again: 
 “Composition is, then, a coming together of powers to do work jointly. The effect that 
is produced, H in our case, is not just the conjunction of F and G. Indeed, there might 
be nothing that is recognizably F or G once they have jointly produced their effect. 
Causation often involves change or transformation so there is no reason why the 
cause should survive in the effect.”507 
They then argue that the nonlinear composition of causes introduces a kind of emergentism. 
The resultant power is not just a derivative of the components, but something new, 
something ‘over and above’ the powers composing it.  
Contrary to what Mumford and Anjum claim I argue that this is not ontological emergence as 
we first defined, it is not an addition of being. The resultant powers that are composed 
according to these functions are not entities in their own right – the properties that bestow 
the powers are the basic entities. The resultant power is still derived from these 
fundamentals. The novelty of the position of non-reductive inherence is that it takes 
compositional pluralism seriously and puts it at the core of powers-based causation, rather 
than treating it as an afterthought. 
9.11 The Ontological Status of Resultant Powers 
Resultant powers are identified with the causal profile of a system with several component 
powers. These component powers come together and produce something that none of the 
component powers could produce alone. This is true regardless of whether the composition 
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is linear or nonlinear. When two powers work together in ordinary causation, they are often 
producing an effect for which neither was individually sufficient; likewise when they compose 
a resultant power. Let’s now answer the question: are resultant powers real?508 And is the 
answer to that question different when a resultant power is composed nonlinearly? 
One problem with assuming that resultant powers are real and do causal work is that they 
then seem to compete with the component powers, if they are indeed supposed to be doing 
the same work. This is the problem of causal overdetermination – if both the resultant and 
component powers are supposed to have caused the same effect, then the effect is 
overdetermined.509  
Why would it make a difference that the resultant is composed nonlinearly? The important 
part is that they are composed, and we have already accepted that they are composed 
according to a plurality of principles, including some complex principles. The claim by 
Mumford and Anjum that nonlinear composition of resultants is a kind of emergence is 
incorrect. In saying that it is more than the mere aggregation of the component powers we 
are saying only that it is a different kind of composition and not merely an additive one. Since 
they accept that the composition of resultant powers implies that they do not have a distinct 
existence – I would say that the resultant power does not, in fact, exist – then, by our 
definition of emergence at least, resultant powers are not emergent entities.  
All power compositions result in a transformation of the component powers. If the idea is that 
some transformations result in distinct entities and others do not, then why privilege 
nonlinear resultant properties? In order to argue that nonlinear composition implies 
emergence, it seems that one would have to implicitly assume that only aggregation - or 
composition by an additive principle – is really ‘composition’ in the sense of being a 
transformation into a non-distinct entity. I think this implicit assumption is revealed in 
Mumford and Anjum’s argument for emergence. If one takes the commitment to 
compositional pluralism seriously, then one has to accept that sometimes composition 
transforms the contributions of the component powers without producing a new entity. 
9.12 Conclusion 
Mumford and Anjum’s emergence is not really emergence. The appearance of non-linearity 
when comparing basic powers with resultants is not an indication of emergence. Even if we 
insisted that basic powers must be individuated to minimise their complexity and rule out 
discontinuities and nonlinearities, our theory of causation involves an additional step by 
                                               
508 Molnar 2003 argues that they are not; Compare Mumford and Anjum 2011b, pp. 42-4, 98 
509 See Wilson 2009 for more argument along these lines. 
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which those powers ae transformed. It is this step that implies that the individuation 
conditions for resultant powers are not the same as the individuation conditions for basic 
powers. Nonlinearity in the behaviour of resultant powers in relation to their components is 
therefore insufficient to reify those new powers. The lesson for the emergentist is that you 
don’t just consider the basic powers acting alone when you are comparing with a putative 
macro-power, you also have to consider how the basic powers compose.  
Also, there is a problem familiar from ordinary cases of composition: composition is not 
identity. The statue and the clay that makes it are not identical, in the sense that one could 
persist while the other ceases to exist. This is true even though the statue and the clay are 
not distinct existences. For any causation that the statue and clay enter into, the caused 
event is produced by both. But such an event is also not overdetermined because the two 
properties are not distinct entities. Composition is not identity, in the sense that the statue 
and the clay have different modal properties. And neither is the relation between the two a 
part-whole relation. If it were then that would be amenable to the argument that only the 
additive principle ensures the resultant power and the component powers have non-distinct 
existences.  
A part-whole relation fails to capture the different ways in which a resultant power changes – 
or doesn’t - when its component powers are changed. Sometimes a resultant is changed 
when a component is removed, or when a component is swapped out. Sometimes different 
component powers are fungible in a given composition. Any given set of components only 
ever compose one resultant, but for any single resultant, the set of components that could 
compose it is potentially infinite. As we noted above, the individuation conditions of resultant 
and component powers are often such that they cannot be related as a whole is to its parts. 
The resultant power is not made of ‘parts’.510 
There is also a deeper problem, because there is more than one kind of compositional 
principle: aggregation/addition of the basic powers is not the only one. Yet often the only 
epistemic access we have to either the true natures of the component powers, or the 
composition principles by which they produce causation, is through our experience of the 
behaviour of the resultant powers. We will examine some of the epistemic issues with 
powers theories of causation - and this view of powers in particular - in the next section. 
Before that, let’s deal with some potential objections to the claim that nonlinearities are 
everywhere in causation. First off, it might be pointed out that the only nonlinearity we see in 
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some of these examples is because of our choices of quality space. Is it possible that all 
nonlinearities in causation are caused by the imposition of a quality space – by choosing 
what we are interested in we create an infinity of different quality spaces. If we restricted the 
selection of quality spaces to only those that feature in the essences of the basic powers, we 
could build a model where nonlinearity was impossible except through emergence.  
We’ll say a little bit more about the relationship between the individuation conditions for 
powers and the quality spaces they enter into in the next section. Here it is just worth noting 
that, even if we constructed a model of causation where basic powers were simple and 
composed in merely additive or linear ways, there would still be examples like the law of 
gravitational attraction that seem to require nonlinear principles of composition, and 
examples of fairly simple systems that exhibit behaviour - like, for instance, symmetry 
breaking and molecular behaviour – that is very different to anything seen among the basic 
powers and would seem to justify a new quality space. The objector is left with two 
unpalatable options, either emergence is everywhere, when even just two basic powers 
come together, or basic powers would have to be complicated and disjunct for their 
essences to enable linear transformations of even well understood compositions.511 
Another objection that might be made on behalf of the emergentist is that the transformative 
relation that exists between component powers and resultant powers is not composition, it is 
causation. It is with the causal relation that one expects there to be radical differences 
between the relata, and for it to be possible for there to be nothing of the cause that survives 
in the effect. Compositions, in contrast, derive their features entirely from its components 
and their arrangements. These nonlinear results are either occurring in an evolving dynamic 
process of linear compositions, or they are produced by a causal relation. Since the 
emergent relation is a causal one, this picture is the same as the proposed theory of powers 
based emergence. 
Again, the problem with this objection is that, if we restrict the composition of powers to 
some putative macro-powers but not others, we need principled reasons why the 
composition of powers is so limited. And if the composition of powers is restricted to linear 
principles, while the nonlinear resultant powers are reified by the relation of emergent 
production, then we run into the same dilemma: either emergence is ubiquitous or basic 
powers are complicated and disjunct. The second option in this case being particularly 
                                               
511 These options are unpalatable because they are both uneconomical compared with a theory of 
causation that allows nonlinear transformations in potentially infinite quality spaces. This claim is 
defended in the final chapter and conclusion of this thesis. 
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unattractive because avoiding complicated powers was one of the advantages proffered in 
support of a theory of emergence.  
In order to avoid this dilemma, an emergentist might accept that sometimes powers are 
composed according to established alternative principles and not merely the additive 
principle. These alternatives might include the inverse square law, or the regularities found in 
chaotic systems; wherever there is enough empirical evidence to support these principles. 
But we do not need to accept any other compositional principles. These alternatives are 
limited in their application, so power composition would remain modestly simple and 
emergence won’t be ubiquitous. This seems to be a good way forward for the emergentist: to 
come up with principled empirical reasons why the range of composition functions is limited. 
Unfortunately for this empirical project, there is another version of the epistemological 
problem one encounters when individuating powers, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
10. The Composition Principle Difficulty 
The conclusion of this chapter is that a more sophisticated theory of powers-based causation 
gives rise to a different formulation of the epistemological problem for emergence, in the face 
of which previous arguments are inadequate. We will incorporate the findings of the previous 
chapters and end by identifying some of the most promising positions in the debate. The aim 
is to set out and defend a new position, one with which emergence has not properly been 
compared. 
10.1 Responding to Metaphysical Arguments for Emergence 
We start from the observation that resultant powers can be radically different to the powers 
that compose them. The previous chapters have detailed a variety of ways that this can 
happen. The problem for emergentists becomes most acute if compositional pluralism is 
admitted without limits. In that case, it seems that composition and emergence would look 
precisely the same in terms of macro-behaviour. Emergence therefore faces a new version 
of the epistemological problem: for any observed novel behaviour of a system, unless we 
can give a principled reason to limit the set of compositional principles, then the behaviour 
could just be the same set of entities composing new powers. 
Let’s look back at the premises employed by the defenders of CPE earlier: 
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1. “Properties are posited… to explain differences among various general patterns of 
events”512. Precisely specifiable causal features are the mark of a new power.513   
2. When the causal behaviour of a system meets the same individuation conditions as 
the behaviour of a simple, it is appropriate to posit a new power.514 
3. The behaviour of a non-emergent complex system cannot be somehow additional to 
the powers of its components.515 
4. Accounting for discontinuous system behaviour of a complex system using micro-
powers would require complicated disjunct micro-powers.516 
5. Accounting for a complex system that shows responsiveness to macro-
circumstances using basic powers would require basic powers that are responsive to 
macro-circumstances.517 
The problem for these premises is that they are making incorrect assumptions about how the 
composition of powers works. Indeed, there is an implicit assumption of an additive principle 
of composition.518  
The nonlinear possibilities for the composition of powers furnish us with replies to a couple of 
the metaphysical premises set out above in favour of emergence. In response to premise 4, 
it seems that the apparent nonlinearity produced by equilibria, successive dynamical 
complexity and threshold effects would be a way of accounting for discontinuous macro-
behaviour using basic powers that were simple and linear. So according to our theory of 
causation, this premise is false. 
Premise 5 also doesn’t make much sense with composed powers in general, linear or not. If 
a group of basic properties constitute a complex object and those basic properties compose 
a resultant power then that object is going to be responsive to macro-circumstances and 
engage in macro-causal interactions. There doesn’t seem to be any benefit in positing an 
emergent property when it comes to the question of responsiveness. 
In response to premise 3 compositional pluralism implies that, when powers come together, 
they can be “somehow additional” to when they are apart. The very contribution of the 
                                               
512 O’Connor 2000a p.113 
513 O’Connor 1994, 2000a; O’Connor and Wong 2005, p.682 
514 O’Connor and Wong 2005, p.682 
515 O’Connor 2000a p113 
516 E.g O’Connor 1994, pp. 17-8; O’Connor and Wong 2005, p.682-3 
517 O’Connor 1994, p. 18; O’Connor and Wong 2005, p.683 
518 There are other implicit assumptions about the individuation of powers too. We have assumed a 
theory of powers as unitary causal contributions, which is the same theory of powers assumed by the 
emergentists making these claims. 
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powers is altered by composition. It is the compositional principle that gives us something 
more than the manifestation. 
Premise 1 is going to depend a lot on how you unpack the idea of ‘precisely specifiable’. But 
since premise 2 is false - as illustrated by the falsity of the other three premises - we cannot 
use the individuation conditions of micro-properties to unpack the meaning of premise 1. 
There are differences between the individuation conditions of micro-properties and putative 
macro-properties. Since resultant powers have the extra step of the composition principle, 
their causal behaviour does not relate to their individuation conditions in the same way as 
uncomposed basic powers. 
At least four of these premises then no longer function in a sound argument for emergence. 
They are false for our theory of causation. The real epistemological problem for CPE isn’t 
that for any observed novel behaviour of a system we will always have the option of 
complicating the constituent properties in a disjunctive way instead of postulating a new 
emergent property, like with Martin’s infinitely multi-track theory of properties,519 the problem 
is that, for any observed novel behaviour of a system, unless we can give a principled 
reason to limit the set of compositional principles, then the behaviour could just be the same 
entities we already know about working in new and unexpected ways. 
That’s the form of the epistemological problem that engages with the theory of properties 
within which CPE is developed. The abstract metaphysical arguments presented by 
O’Connor and his co-authors don’t work within that theory of properties.  
10.2 What are Composition Principles? 
In response to both premise 3 and 4, it at first seems that multi-dimensional powers and 
compositional pluralism show that, when powers come together, they can be “somehow 
additional” to when they are apart. Importantly, this ‘something more’ isn’t just the coming 
together of powers to produce an effect that they each couldn’t produce individually – that’s 
true in the most straightforward cases of linear causation – rather, it is instead the coming 
together of powers to compose new powers over and above the composing powers. This 
would also usually imply that behaviour was discontinuous as complexity increased. 
I say ‘at first it seems’ because the extent to which these observations challenge the 
premises depends on what these nonlinear compositional functions actually are. How are 
they physically realized? If there are a plurality of compositional rules that add something 
                                               
519 Because, to be clear, my position assumes that powers make a single-track contribution that are 
internally governed by composition principles. 
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extra when powers come together, then these compositional principles look something like 
natural laws: traditionally it was natural laws that were thought to govern what occurred 
when one property interacted with another. But if it is a natural law that determines these 
nonlinear outcomes, we are left with the question: what are those laws and how do they do 
the work that they do? 
The metaphysics of powers provides alternatives to this nomological account. What look like 
natural laws are just descriptions of how powers behave and interact and there is no need 
for the additional entities in our ontology. So the power to compose nonlinearly is part of the 
nature of the powers involved.520 
A defence of these premises then occurs to us: for, if we recognise a discontinuity in 
behaviour, or powers that seem beyond the powers of the components involved, we should, 
if we are not availing ourselves of emergent explanations, say that nonlinear composition is 
a power and the power to compose nonlinearly rests with the basic components. This 
imputation to the component powers certainly seems to support premise 3. But for it to also 
support premise 4 would require that complicating the essences of our basic powers was the 
only way to incorporate nonlinear compositional principles. 
Our discussion of the individuation of powers in chapter 8 alighted on the fact that, when the 
manifestations of powers are causal contributions and not caused events, powers are not 
individuated by their effects nor the set of their possible effects. One supposed advantage of 
this theory of powers over the radically multi-track theory is that we postulate simple 
essences for our basic powers, and it is desirable that their essences be simple. This is also 
an implicit premise in the argument from premise 4 to the conclusion that emergence is 
preferable to the alternative. Whatever the range of possible effects that can be produced by 
a power, it is up to the theory of causation to explain how that power works to produce 
effects. 
It is difficult to see the motivation for insisting that simple powers should not be complicated 
just because they can lead to a range of possible effects, but they should be complicated 
when they can lead to them by a nonlinear function. This overlooks the complexity that is 
already implied by in the composition of powers. It is as if we are taking the vector diagram 
too seriously, and assuming that the additive principle is the only compositional principle 
allowed for translating the essence of a power into an effect, without that effect having to be 
incorporated into the essence of the power.  
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To illustrate what I mean by this, assume that we do not allow any compositional principle 
that is not already essential to the powers involved. Then, assume that there are two one-
dimensional powers, F and G, that compose one-dimensional power H in a linear fashion. It 
would not be enough to say that the essence of F and G is a directedness towards that to 
which H is directed, with a magnitude that is jointly equal to the magnitude of H. We cannot 
avail ourselves of the compositional principle of addition, so we must say that it is in the 
essence of F that it compose H in combination with G, or something to that effect. If we have 
to insist that compositional principles are essential to powers, then it would seem that 
powers just are very complicated and disjunct by nature, and it is of no great advantage to 
an advocate of emergence that a theory of emergence avoids adding disjuncts in a few of 
the cases. Alternatively, if we allow that compositional principles are in the nature of powers 
because that is how powers work – how they relate, interact, and combine - without being 
imputed to the basic directedness of powers by which one might individuate them,521 then it 
is to be expected that the behaviour of a complex system is ‘somehow additional’ to the 
essences of the basic powers involved. All composition and causation is as well. 
Premise 3 is difficult. In one sense it seems that compositional effects are additional – they 
do not individuate powers. But in another, compositional effects can only follow from the 
powers at work and their natures. It seems that powers are essentially simple, but it is also in 
their nature to combine in ways that result in something new. The reference to ‘somehow 
additional’ in premise 3 is ambiguous as to what part of this picture it is denying. I want to 
say that the compositional principles are essential but non-individuating, e.g. it is of the 
essence of Socrates that he is a man, but being a man doesn’t individuate him (because 
other people are also men). 
This dilemma could of course be avoided if we could find principled reasons why additive 
composition was the only compositional principle that came for free. Relying too much on the 
vector model is not a principled reason. I don’t see any a priori reason why linear functions 
should be the only way that powers compose, and there is plenty of empirical evidence that 
nonlinear outcomes are ubiquitous in causation. 
It is acceptable on this metaphysical view for the resultant powers to bear little or no 
resemblance to the component powers of its parts. Returning to the quote from Mumford and 
Anjum: 
                                               
521 In contrast to Martin’s view. 
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Composition is, then, a coming together of powers to do work jointly. The effect that 
is produced, H in our case, is not just the conjunction of F and G. Indeed, there might 
be nothing that is recognizably F or G once they have jointly produced their effect. 
Causation often involves change or transformation so there is no reason why the 
cause should survive in the effect.522 
Powers in combination act very differently to powers in isolation. More generally, one should 
not expect to always be able to predict the causal profile of a power in one set of 
circumstances based on the causal profile of that same power in other circumstances. In 
similar fashion to the epistemological situation with emergent causal powers, the only sure 
way to find out about the powers of a complex object is to observe how powers interact with 
each other. Experiments conducted on systems below the requisite level of complexity will 
fail to tell us about how a power works in combination with other powers. Here is Mumford 
and Anjum again: 
It would be nice and easy if all composition were additive, for then we could just use 
vector addition to predict an outcome. But we know we cannot. Powers can still 
nevertheless be a basis for prediction, if they and their interactions are understood. 
To understand certain nonlinear causal interactions, therefore, it is not enough that 
we know and understand the individual powers that are involved. That would be too 
simplistic and suggest a reductionist view of the physical world.523 
The composition principles are to be found in the individual component powers. This leaves 
two options: either the composition principles are essential to that power, which complicates 
the essences of power – though in any case it seems that they would at least have to be 
complicated by the additive principle, which itself is a composition principle – or composition 
principles do not feature in the individuation conditions for a power. Either way, it is not the 
case that any potential resultant power or effect must figure in the individuation conditions of 
component powers. This is because the power is individuated merely by its single-track 
manifestation, which can contribute to a diverse range of effects. 
10.3 The Ontological Status of Component Powers 
The individual powers make the causal truths. But it is only resultant powers and their effects 
that we can observe. This epistemic situation might make some doubtful of the theory of 
causation being presented here. Cartwright presents the following argument: 
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The vector addition story is, I admit, a nice one. But it is just a metaphor. We add 
forces (or the numbers that represent forces) when we do calculations. Nature does 
not ‘add’ forces. For the ‘component’ forces are not there, in any but a metaphorical 
sense, to be added; and the laws that say they are there must also be given a 
metaphorical reading.524 
With one-dimensional, linear vector addition, the magnitude and direction of the resultant 
vector represents a direction that would also have been achieved if all of the component 
vectors had achieved their full effect, one after another. Cartwright argues that, even though 
the destination in this case is the same, whether the resultant vector has its effect or each of 
the components individually have their effects, it is not true that the two component vectors 
actually had their full effects. In fact, only the resultant vector had its effect. If one thinks of 
the vectors as representing movement in a direction, there was not multiple stages on the 
journey, heading first one way then another according to magnitudes and directions of the 
component vectors. In fact, only one movement occurred: the one matching the direction 
and magnitude of the resultant vector.525 
This complements the arguments above because it illustrates that even linear, one-
dimensional compositions involve a transformation. In fact, a transformation from a complex 
of constituent powers to the substantial unity of a resultant power. And that transformation 
does not come for free: a composition, even a simple one, is not the same as letting each of 
the components have their full effects. 
Where Cartwright differs is that she also argues that addition is something that we do, not 
something that is in the world. In reality, she argues, causation does not have a step 
analogous to the calculations we make upon the vectors in our models. This is part of her 
wider argument denying the reality of the component powers in favour of ‘resultant’ 
powers.526 Afterall, it is the behaviour of the resultant powers that we observe.527  
We have already provided reasons during our discussion of derivative properties that would 
lead us to make the opposite assumption. Where we have competing putative causes for the 
same effect, the fundamentalist is likely to reify the component properties instead of the 
derivative properties. The appeal to our better knowledge of the derivative properties also 
doesn’t carry much weight for the causal powers theorist. As we saw in our discussion of 
causal powers, individuating powers is a vexed business. We can take some clues from 
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conditional analysis, but we do not individuate powers that way. Martin’s arguments about 
allegedly finkish dispositions are instructive on this point.528 As Mumford and Anjum put it: 
powers “are often epistemically problematic or even verification transcendent.”529 
Nevertheless there are ways that we can learn about these natures: by making interventions 
and conducting experiments on these systems, we can detect component powers and 
observe the changes in resultant powers to which they contribute in a variety of 
circumstances. The only way to discover the nature and capabilities of the fundamental 
properties is to see what they can do. The mistake of emergence is to presume to know. 
Cartwright elsewhere argues for causal pluralism – the view that there are many different 
types of causation. Indeed, according to her and some other causal pluralists, there is 
nothing that the different kinds of causation have in common. This seems to imply that all-
encompassing theories of causation are bound to fail. Here is part of her argument: 
There are untold numbers of causal laws, all most directly represented using thick 
causal concepts, each with its own truth makers; and there is no single interesting 
truth maker that they all share by virtue of which they are labelled ‘causal’ laws.530 
The ‘thick causal concepts’ here are something like causal verbs. Each of which she says is 
more precise and content rich than the causal words used in philosophy. Perhaps each of 
them represents a different way that one thing causes another: 
The pistons compress the air in the carburettor chamber, the sun attracts the planets, 
the loss of skill among long-term unemployed workers discourages firms from 
opening new jobs.531 
We might apply something like this line of thought to the notion of composition in our theory 
of causation too. Powers don’t really ‘compose’, they are ‘summed’, ‘multiplied’, ‘catalysed’, 
subject to inverse square functions, etc. Causal and compositional pluralism are both 
supported by the heterogeneity of our causal observations. But these observations do not 
threaten our theory of causation or make the existence of causal and compositional relations 
less likely. There are lots of different powers that do lots of different things. What all 
causation and composition have in common is that they occur when powers are doing their 
work. 
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10.4 Individuating Component Powers 
The individuation conditions for basic powers are not the same as the individuation 
conditions for resultant powers. We do not individuate basic powers by reading off the 
effects of resultant powers because the essence of a power is the causal contribution it 
makes – either to the events to which it directly contributes or the resultant powers which it 
helps compose. But since caused events are the only epistemic access we have to a 
power’s essential nature, they are all we have to go on when determining the individuation 
conditions.  
How exactly one goes about doing this is a difficult question with no simple answer. We can 
observe the events caused by the contributions of multiple resultant powers, and we must 
then break down those contributions by analysing how the same resultants perform in 
different combinations, while bearing in mind that resultants themselves may compose in 
various ways. Then, once we have identified the manifestations of the resultant power, we 
must break down the contributions made by all of its component powers to the composition 
of that resultant. Again, it seems that interventions and experiments are necessary to break 
down those contributions and we have to bear in mind that the component powers may 
compose in various ways. 
Just like with basic powers, the resultant powers must come with composition principles in 
order to do causal work.532 If the lack of epistemic access didn’t make the individuation of a 
new power difficult enough, the difficulty is further compounded by the possibility that 
resultant powers might themselves compose other powers. The implication of this is not just 
that there is an extra stage in the detection process for new powers (now that we have to run 
through two or more layers of composition), but also that, whatever resultant powers we are 
able to individuate in a complex object, those powers could be essential directed to 
manifestations that bear nothing but the most attenuated relationship to the basic powers of 
the components of that object. We might not be able to determine that an additional basic 
power is present until we have run through an exhaustive series of nested hierarchical 
compositions. This illustrates the folly of presuming that basic powers must be directed 
towards macro-causal outcomes. The failure of reduction that would be required to prove the 
existence of a new basic power – never mind individuating an emergent power – is very 
different to the kind of reduction that looks at either end of the nested hierarchy of composed 
                                               
532 Whether those principles are essential to the individuation of powers or not, they must be 
grounded in the natures of the basic powers, given that the resultant powers are not distinct entities in 
their own right. 
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powers and concludes that reduction has failed because the most basic micro-power is not 
the sort of entity that is capable of composing the most complex resultant power. 
Might not there be some version of this comparison that would prove the impossibility of the 
basic powers composing the ‘final’ resultants? Perhaps sufficiently radical differences 
between the basic powers and the final resultant powers would demonstrate a relevant 
failure of reduction and thereby form an individuation condition for an emergent power. 
It seems, however, that the only principled way to make such a condition is to know what the 
powers can do. And by this I don’t just mean what the basic powers can do. We would need 
to know what every composed power at every stage in the hierarchy can do. This is because 
once the basic power has composed a resultant, it has then, with respect to the final 
resultant, fully discharged its duty. Whatever the power of the resultant and the composition 
principles it has – whatever the resultant power can do in combination with other powers – it 
does not enter into the individuation conditions of the basic power. This is true whether the 
composition principles feature in the individuation conditions for powers or not.  
For emergence, the Composition Principle Difficulty is much worse than the Epistemological 
Problem. The latter can be overcome by stipulating individuation conditions for powers, like 
those we have been testing above. And, though in our case they have been found lacking, 
these conditions can be supported by independent reasoning, which, if successful, can 
decisively prove that complicating the essences of basic powers or positing new ones to 
account for a phenomenon is at least undesirable. In comparison, it does not seem that the 
Composition Principle Difficulty can be overcome this way. To form individuation conditions 
that would be effective in an argument to emergence requires assumptions about what 
composition principles exist. But that is the very question at issue. Once the theory of 
powers is adopted, it seems that observing how powers actually work in a given 
circumstance is the only way to discover what composition principles exist. To argue that 
existing powers alone cannot account for observed behaviour one would need to already 
know what existing powers can do. This begs the question against causal powers inherence. 
Bottom line: we do not need to alter our basic powers in order to account for macro-powers. 
There could always be unknown resultants while still having exactly the same basic powers. 
This is possible because the essence of basic powers can stay the same – nothing about 
them is straightforwardly entailed by what we observe to be putative macro-properties (it 
could be an extremely complex process). We therefore reject the following premise:  
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Further, newness of property, in this sense, entails new primitive causal powers, 
reflected in laws which connect complex physical structures to the emergent 
features. (Broad's trans-ordinal laws are laws of this sort.)533  
We have to use the macro-behaviour as a guide for the individuation of our basic powers, 
but unexpected resultants will often occur in complex systems – especially ones with 
intricate structure. That is the Composition Principle Difficult. And in that situation, O’Connor 
and Wong’s arguments must assume a premise that we reject: the direct individuation of 
basic powers by the effects of their resultants. And without this premise, it is hard to find an 
alternative argument about power individuation that does not just assume that the putative 
macro-powers could not be resultants just because they are so different to micro-powers, 
which is of course to beg the question in favour of emergence. 
10.5 What is a Quality Space? 
A quality space is a pragmatic construction looking at what concerns us in any situation. 
These pragmatic constructions rarely map directly onto the essences of the component 
powers acting on that quality space because our concerns are rarely just the nature of those 
interactions. As such we inevitably observe nonlinearities when we switch from one quality 
space to another. We know that these nonlinear results are everywhere in composition – 
whether a system is random or organised. In a structured system the most basic mechanism 
produces nonlinear results in relation to the properties of the components. We’ve already 
discussed one way that the vector model can illuminate the source of surprising 
nonlinearities: the unfounded assumption that all powers aggregate – and only aggregate - 
and that this aggregation comes for free. The notion of quality space is another source of 
surprising nonlinearity.  
We’ve already discussed how the multi-dimensionality of powers and the switching between 
quality spaces can generate apparent nonlinearities. The notion of a quality space 
represents how we change the manner in which we look at system-wide characteristics 
relative to components. This means that even when compositions are essentially linear, our 
observations are not. 
I illustrated this possibility in chapter 9. And I mention it again in relation to the 
epistemological difficulty of compositional pluralism because it suggests a question: is it 
perhaps, whenever we see nonlinearity, merely a matter of quality spaces? Are we just 
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imposing a different quality space, or asking different questions about the behaviour of the 
system? 
When we looked at some purportedly nonlinear examples of the composition of powers in 
chapter 9534, I argued that, when one considered the situation in full, only linear compositions 
were required.535 The objection occurs to us that perhaps all purported cases are like this, 
but with the apparent non-linearity massively compounded by the multiple stages of the 
composition of powers and obscuring the real situation. If this were the case, then is it 
necessary to advance a theory of causation involving many principles of composition? In 
effect, the suggestion is that we can select our quality spaces and thereby ‘iron out’ 
compositional pluralism and turn it into aggregation – we can ignore the essence of the 
composing powers except for the one aspect that contributes to this space.  
I don’t think this is a threat to the line of argument we’ve developed. It might be true that 
quality spaces are merely pragmatic constructions representing what concerns us in the 
world, and that there are potentially an infinite number of such quality spaces.536 But it is not 
true that the ability to come up with gerrymandered quality spaces that abstract away 
nonlinear compositions tells us anything about the individuating essences of fundamental 
powers or the principles by which they combine. That sort of gerrymandering would have to 
define quality spaces in terms of the composition principles they seek to eliminate. In so 
doing, they would be defining away unwanted compositions by implicating a new power, one 
caused by the outcome of the powers acting on the gerrymandered space.  
Indeed, this is exactly how an emergent power would appear on the composition model. The 
emergentist supposes that, instead of component powers composing a resultant nonlinearly, 
they are acting linearly on an alternative quality space for the occurrence of an emergent 
power in that same situation. The emergent power will then be the one to act on the initial 
quality space with its own magnitude. 
Far from being a problem for the line of argument here, the pragmatic nature and potentially 
infinite possibilities of quality spaces only illustrate the epistemological difficulty. Without 
already knowing the essences of powers, how does one choose between these two 
                                               
534 Sections 9.6-9 
535 Mumford and Anjum briefly raise this possibility when they introduce multi-dimensional powers, but 
I think that applying this strategy more broadly can eliminate the nonlinearities in some of the cases 
they advance in favour of compositional pluralism. 
536 This is analogus to Williams’ arguments about the pragmatic choices we make when individuating 
powers in general. See Williams 2011 
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competing theories? In the final concluding chapter of this thesis we will consider some 
relevant factors in making that choice. 
10.6 Conclusion 
My conclusion is that, given a theory of powers as unitary causal contributions (like that of 
Molnar, Mumford and Anjum, or O’Connor and Churchill, etc.) combined with the widespread 
nonlinear outcomes of complex systems, arguments for a theory of emergence are under-
motivated by considerations like the existence of powers at the macro-level that are radically 
different to powers at the micro-level. It is to be expected that resultant powers in a complex 
system will bear little resemblance to basic powers. 
The solution to the Problem of Reduction is a not a choice between the emergence of a new 
property and the inherence of a new property. I have been arguing that a third option within 
the inherence position is possible where no changes to the properties inhering in the objects 
are implicated, only a difference in their resultant powers as the complexity of the system 
increases. For any given observation about the behaviour of a complex object, the 
inherentist has a range of possible explanations: these include, resultant powers composed 
by previously latent properties;537 resultant powers composed by previously active powers 
that have individuating essences not fully known before;538 and resultant powers composed 
by previously active powers but in new combinations.539  
In the following and final chapter we will consider some general theoretical considerations 
that might help us to choose between emergentism, the latent powers view, and my 
compositional view. For now I’ve shown that, in order for an emergentist to make a 
conclusive argument to emergence using abstract metaphysical principles about the 
individuation of powers, they would have to overcome both the Epistemological Problem and 
the Composition Principle Difficulty. 
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Conclusion 
This section will alight on some future work that can be done in this area.  We will sketch out 
some of the theoretical considerations that might help to settle the debate between 
emergentism, latent powers, and my compositional view. The three positions all offer 
sufficient explanations for the Problem of Reduction but each follows a broadly different 
strategy: emergence invokes a new macro-property; what I will call reductive inherence 
invokes new or previously unknown micro-properties; and non-reductive inherence, or the 
compositional view, invokes new or previously unknown principles of composition.  
In this chapter we will briefly describe some of the advantages of each position over the 
alternatives. These will be described in relation to a few criteria for theory choice, specifically 
ontological economy, ideological economy, and explanatory power. Their relative 
advantages and disadvantages are summarised and it is concluded that, if powers are 
complex (wherever that complexity consists in), then emergence is unnecessary. My aim 
has not been to settle the debate, but merely to show that there is a strong competitor to 
emergence that is underexplored and worthy of further consideration.540 By outlining some of 
the theoretical advantages of the view, I’m also providing reasons for some people to accept 
it (depending on which theoretical virtues they think trump others). 
11.1 The Power of Compositional Pluralism 
The lesson of the previous two chapters is that radical discontinuities in system level 
behaviour do not imply new fundamental properties, nor do they imply that the essences of 
properties are radically disjunct (in the way that they are in, say, Martin’s theory of powers.) 
There is some additional complexity among the fundamental entities and this suffices to 
generate a nested structure of resultant powers belonging to complex objects. These 
resultant powers are not, however, really existing entities: they are merely derivative entities, 
so no new properties are implicated in their generation. 
There is a question in the metaphysics of powers as to whether properties bestow their 
powers or whether properties are powers. Shoemaker, for example, seems to have shifted 
position on the point: moving from the latter to the former sometime between 1980 and 
1999.541 Mumford believes the latter.542 I don’t want to assert pandispositionalism here or 
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questions about the relative weighting of different theoretical virtues. 
541 See Shoemaker 1980 and 1999 
542 1998 
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rule out the grounding of powers in categorical properties, because I’m not sure what, if 
anything, in this argument would turn on this point. The natural characterisation of non-
reductive inherence would be that composed powers are not the powers of fundamental 
properties and neither are they directly bestowed by fundamental properties. I think this is an 
open option whether fundamental properties bestow powers or if they just are powers. If 
fundamental properties just are powers, it doesn’t mean that the resultant powers of 
derivative or structural properties have to be a fundamental property: that would be to 
confuse necessity and sufficiency.543 
What we’re seeing here with the compositional view is a failure of resultant powers to reduce 
to individual basic powers (while still being reductive in the sense of admitting no addition of 
being). The composition of powers starts to look a little more like causation rather than 
metaphysical dependence – we’re used to seeing one kind of caused event following from a 
completely different kind of caused event – we don’t expect to find the effect in the cause. Or 
as Martin puts it, “The medieval doctrine (or a twist on it) that all of the perfections (intrinsic 
properties) in the effect must be present in the cause is not self-evidently true.”544 That was 
why it was reasonable for the causal powers emergentist to postulate that emergent 
properties would be produced in a relatively straightforwardly causal fashion by the micro-
properties of a system.545 
Compositional pluralism can explain new types of causation in new types of quality space 
that no powers contributed to before. This removes the need to go to fundamental ontology 
to explain them. Here is Molnar hinting at this possibility: “While ontologically there is nothing 
over and above individuals and their properties… causally there is.”546 In emergentism these 
new types are not reduced to the powers producing them, because causal production is not 
a relation of reduction. In non-reductive inherence these new causal possibilities are not the 
causal products of powers, but the composed products of basic powers in millions of nested 
quality spaces – and the composition of powers looks more like causation than metaphysical 
dependence. It is true that, since there are no new entities in the fundamental ontology, 
there is a sense in which these causal possibilities reduce to the basic powers. It is also true 
that they do not reduce in the sense that we would expect to find these causal possibilities 
among the basic powers individually. 
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545 See chapter 5. 
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Here is an extract from O’Connor about how causal powers, of nomological necessity, are 
capable of producing a property of a radically different kind – in this case to explain agent 
causation: 
Can we make sense of agent causation as an emergent capacity of a fundamentally 
biological system? Note that such a theorist is committed to the emergence of a very 
different sort of property altogether. Instead of producing certain effects in the 
appropriate circumstances itself, of necessity, this property enables the individual 
that has it in a certain range of circumstances to freely and directly bring about (or 
not bring about) any of a range of effects. It might be thought that because of this 
distinctive character, it isn't possible that it could naturally emerge from other 
properties. Such a property could be instantiated only in a very different kind of 
substance from material substances, as on the problematic Cartesian view. 
This thought does not bear well under scrutiny, however. Given that there is nothing 
inconsistent about the emergence of an "ordinary" causal property, able to causally 
influence the environments in which it is instantiated, it is hard to see just why there 
could not be a variety of emergent property whose novelty consists in enabling its 
possessor directly to effect changes at will (within a narrowly limited range, and in 
appropriate  circumstances). If properties are able, as a matter of nomological 
necessity, to produce an entirely novel type of property, what reason do we have to 
assert that, when it comes to the property-kind distinction just noted, properties can 
spawn others of their own kind alone? At least, this would seem to be an empirical, 
not philosophical or conceptual, matter.547 
One factor that will affect the explanatory power of the compositional view is the extent to 
which powers can compose “entirely novel types of property”, or, rather, resultant powers. 
The closer this ability comes to the capabilities of the causation relation, the more that 
composition will be able to explain, including, perhaps, agent causation. I agree with 
O’Connor’s implication that, if properties are able, as a matter of nomological necessity, to 
compose an entirely novel type of power, I do not see why we should assert that, when it 
comes to the property-kind distinction, properties can only spawn others of their “kind”. At 
least, for the argument I have been making, it suffices that this is an empirical rather than a 
philosophical or conceptual matter. If the only way to determine what compositional 
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principles exist is to observe what powers can do in combination, then the compositional 
view seems to always be a viable alternative to emergence.  
11.2 Theory Choice 
Let’s defend three methodological principles that can help us to decide between viable 
metaphysical theories. The Principle of Quantitative Ontological Economy, The Principle of 
Qualitative Ontological Economy, and The Principle of Avoidance of Ad Hoc Ontology. 
11.2.1 Quantitative Ontological Economy 
If C and E are theories competing in the explanation of phenomenon M, and C has greater 
quantitative ontological economy, then this is a reason (though a defeasible one) to prefer C 
over E. 
A theory is ontologically economical quantitatively if it postulates relatively few entities of any 
kinds. This is a theoretic virtue that might be supported by a standard result in statistical 
theory: that if the conjuncts of a theory have a probability of being true, then a smaller 
number of independent conjuncts would make the theory more likely to be true.548 Non-
reductive inherence seems to have the obvious advantage in terms of quantitative 
ontological economy because the compositional principles are not further entities in their 
own right. Reductive inherence, depending on how the theory is fleshed out, potentially 
posits a great many micro-properties. Emergence, since it implicates latent micro-properties 
of its own – the emergent-producing ones – posits perhaps as many or more micro-
properties as reductive inherence; but in addition, emergence also posits additional 
emergent entities. 
11.2.2 Qualitative Ontological Economy 
If C and E are theories competing in the explanation of phenomenon M, and C has greater 
qualitative ontological economy, then this is a reason (though a defeasible one) to prefer C 
over E. 
A theory is ontologically economical qualitatively if it postulates relatively few kinds of 
entities. The same probability improvement can be seen as with quantitative economy: if the 
universe consists in a conjunction of different kinds of entity, then a list of postulated kinds of 
entity will each have an associated probability that any entities of that kind do, in fact, exist. 
An ontological theory with a smaller list would therefore, as a matter of basic statistics, have 
a higher probability of being true. Again non-reductive inherence has an advantage – it 
posits only simples – as does reductive inherence. And the composition principles and 
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resultant powers should not be considered distinct kinds of things. Emergence is 
disadvantaged – it postulates both micro- and macro- properties. 
11.2.3 Avoidance of Ad Hoc Ontology 
If C and E are theories competing in the explanation of phenomenon M, and C postulates 
fewer ad hoc entities for that purpose, then this is a reason (though a defeasible one) to 
prefer C over E. 
Ad hoc entities are those entities postulated for the main reason that they play a certain 
theoretical role. Avoiding these entities is a theoretic virtue because an ontology without 
these entities has an independent credibility whereas an ontology with them has credibility 
only to the extent that the theory has credibility. This is related to Russell’s “supreme maxim 
of scientific philosophising”: that wherever possible, logical constructions are to be 
substituted for inferred entities549 and “in dealing with any subject-matter, find out what 
entities are undeniably involved, and state everything in terms of these entities.”550 
The theories here offer explanations of the Problem of Reduction. For non-reductive 
inherence there is no question of ad hoc ontology because there are no new inferred 
entities. Everything rests with those entities we already know about and that are undeniably 
involved. The entities that are invoked to explain the Problem of Reduction are not 
postulated for the main reason that they play a certain theoretic role. Are the additional 
properties posited by reductive inherence ad hoc? I think the answer is yes. These micro-
latent entities are only theorised because it is thought that the existing micro-properties that 
we believe exist could not solve the Problem of Reduction. But emergence is worst of all – 
while the emergentist does not think it’s ad hoc because they do not think anything else 
could play the same theoretical roles as emergent properties, I’ve blocked that response by 
introducing an alternative picture. If the alternative is viable, then emergence has ad hoc 
emergent properties and ad hoc emergence-producing latent properties. 
11.3 The Complexity of Compositional Pluralism 
All of these theoretic virtues are debatable, and of course the brief justifications we’ve given 
are far from conclusive. Furthermore, each criterion is in any case only a defeasible reason 
to prefer one theory over another. The work in this conclusion is only a quick sketch of the 
work that must be done in order to make a choice between the theories we have been 
describing. 
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There is also at least one criterion by which the compositional view seems to fare relatively 
badly, and that is ideological economy. In this case we might consider it to be a drawback to 
the theoretical attractiveness of non-reductive inherence that it involves complicating the 
essences of our basic powers. Let’s make a few observations about the relative complexity 
of the entities involved in this view. 
According to our theory of powers, powers are single-track but can make causal 
contributions to many different effects.551 This is because they combine with other powers 
and they act in many different quality spaces. Because a single-track power on this view 
manifests in multiple dimensions of quality space at once, this allows single-track powers to 
do some of the things that a multi-track power appears to do. 
Combination increases the number of dimensions that single-track powers operate in. Since 
the number of potential combinations and quality spaces are infinite, this allows single-track 
powers to do everything that a multi-track theory can do. Combination in complex systems 
radically changes the dimensions that single-track powers operate in, in ways that are not 
always predictable based on the individuating essences of the basic powers in that system. 
This allows basic powers to do some of the things that an emergentist says they are needed 
for. 
Combination in complex, structured systems radically changes the dimensions that single-
track powers operate in, in ways that are seemingly unrelated to the individual basic powers 
in that system. This is not to say that the resultant powers are actually unrelated to the 
essence of the basic powers, it is just that a massive multitude of powers are possible using 
the same basic powers, so one cannot read off the resultant powers’ causal profile from the 
basic one, or impute anything about the basic powers based simply on the resultant causal 
profile. The epistemological problem is even more vexed than the problem of the 
individuation of powers based on effects that must be tackled in multi-tracking powers 
theory. 
The essences of powers are difficult to know. And on both the single-track and multi-track 
theories of powers they must be exceptionally complicated. The main difference between the 
two is that, because the manifestation of the single-track powers is a causal contribution 
                                               
551 As we’ve already mentioned, there are other single-track theories of powers. For ease of reference 
assume that ‘single-track’ here refers only to the theory of powers as unitary causal contributions. Ellis 
2001 or Bird 2007 both have theories of powers that are single-track, and neither encounters the 
same issues being discussed here because both theories have a closer connection to dispositional 
characterisations of powers. Likewise, all references to multi-track powers should be assumed to refer 
to a view like Martin’s theory. 
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rather than the caused events, the multi-track powers have direct connections between 
observable behaviour and their individuating essences. Powers are individuated by their 
manifestations, so the multi-tracker individuates their powers by their effects. All these multi-
track powers are mutually manifesting, so individual powers are both infinitely complex and 
combinatorial. The manifestations of single-track powers are just their contributions, not the 
compositional principles that transform those contributions in combination. So their 
individuating essences are less accessible because they must be abstracted,552 but they are 
also ideologically simpler.  
Whereas in Martin’s account one might need a new disjunction for the new event that might 
be caused by a new combination of objects, with compositional pluralism you would have the 
resultants for multiple complex objects and then their combination, rather than the 
combination of all of the individual entities that compose those complex objects. The 
simplification is that compositional principles are general and not like disposition lines draw 
between disposition partners. 
What is at issue with single-track powers is that, though they do seem to be individually 
simpler in this way, they must also have some connection to potentially infinite quality 
spaces, and they must have compositional principles in their non-individuating essences. But 
is this a problem for the relative theoretical attractiveness of non-reductive inherence? Only if 
there is an alternative that does away with this complexity; but it’s not at all clear that 
emergentism or reductive inherence would, assuming the same theory of powers, make 
much of an improvement. Bear in mind that the ontological emergentist must allow quite a lot 
of nonlinear composition, they can’t limit composition only to addition. If nonlinearity is 
ubiquitous then the ontological reductionist must be able to help themselves to these 
principles or else you have eliminated the possibility of that reduction. I will concede, 
however, that whichever compositional principles emergence replaces, those complications 
at least will be removed from the essences of micro-properties. 
11.4 Different Epistemic Values 
Perhaps there are examples of epistemic values that favour emergence when making this 
choice. We’ve already seen some examples of supposed differences between the epistemic 
stances of emergentists and reductionists. 
There was Alexander’s notion of ‘natural piety’: 
                                               
552 This in itself might be considered a theoretical cost. 
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The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, as 
some would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact or, as I should prefer to 
say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the "natural piety" of the investigator. It 
admits no explanation.553 
Tim Crane concludes his essay on emergence by arguing that the distinguishing feature of 
emergentism in relation to non-reductive physicalism is also ‘natural piety’, an attitude which 
recommends the former position over the latter: 
It is here that we encounter the deep difference between emergentism and 
nonreductive physicalism. It is not a metaphysical difference, but a difference in the 
reactions of the two theories to limitations in our knowledge. Both emergentism and 
nonreductionism agree that we do not currently understand how the nonmental 
properties of the brain are related to its mental properties. But they react to this in 
different ways: the nonreductionists react by claiming that there must nonetheless be 
an account of why “we experience qualitative character of the sort we do,” an 
account that does not just state the complex correlations between the nonmental and 
the mental. The emergentists deny that this must be so. If it turns out that the relation 
between consciousness and the brain is inexplicable, this ends up being one of the 
facts that must be accepted with natural piety.554 
Firstly, non-reductive inherence has clear metaphysical differences with emergence, so our 
case is disanalogous with the kind of nonreductionism Crane is arguing against. But 
secondly, in both of these cases the supposed epistemic virtue of ‘natural piety’ is tied to the 
supposed inexplicability of emergence. I’ve argued in this essay that theories of emergence 
can and should offer sufficient specificity to explain the problems for which they are invoked. 
And insofar as these explanations are sui generis with respect to known ‘nonmental 
properties’ of the brain, positing new composition principles to do the same work is perhaps 
just as sui generis. When the only way to discover what our basic powers can do is to 
observe the resultant powers in different systems, I would say, adopting the “more authentic 
position for a genuine naturalist”,555 that these facts of composition must also be accepted 
with the natural piety. 
Lastly here is O’Connor and Wong on the superior epistemic stance of emergence 
compared with reduction: 
                                               
553 Alexander 1920 pp. 46-7 
554 Crane 2001, p. 221 
555 Ibid, p. 222 
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We contend, to the contrary, that it is sweeping judgments such as McLaughlin's, 
based on partial evidence, that fall afoul of sober scientific practice -- practice that 
includes measured scepticism regarding broad extrapolation of confirmed results. We 
allowed above that we reasonably suppose theories to have broader application than 
to just those types of cases actually tested. However, the further removed a scenario 
is from the well-confirmed range along a scale of increased structured complexity, 
the less confident one should be that the theory is fully adequate to the situation.556 
I contend, of course, that non-reductive inherence possesses a similar virtue of reasonable 
inductive scepticism. This is a sensible stance when there are potentially unknown emergent 
properties or composition principles both. 
But there is of course one way in which emergence assumes less natural piety than non-
reductive inherence, and that is in the tacit assumptions it must make about the limitations of 
principles by which powers combine, and the amazingly varied effects to which basic 
properties can contribute. I contend that it is the emergentist that makes sweeping 
judgements and falls “afoul of sober scientific practice” when they presume to know a priori 
about the essential nature of basic powers and the limits of their capacities. Emergentists 
merely shift the emphasis of their scepticism away from additions to the fundamental 
ontology onto the complexities of causation. This is no more pious than supposing that 
causation is more complex than we previously thought.  
The stance of the emergentist would seem to indicate a preference for making additions to 
our fundamental ontology over complicating our theory of causation. But choosing to read off 
features of the world as new additions in your fundamental ontology is ad hoc ontology, the 
avoidance of which is an important epistemic value for fundamentalists. For a fundamentalist 
emergentist it is insufficient motivation that we don’t have a reductive story: we do not make 
new additions to fundamental ontology whenever we don’t understand how a macro-
phenomenon is produced by our current ontology. 
11.5 Further Work 
In conclusion, there is nothing about the nature of powers and how they compose that 
supports an emergent explanation over one that employs only inherent principles of 
production and composition. The latter has no special problems dealing with macro-
phenomena unless one assumes a restricted principle of the composition of powers. 
                                               
556 O’Connor and Wong 2005, p. 686 
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Emergence is still of course a coherent theory, while it doesn’t have the supposed 
advantages set out in chapter 3, it may have others. For instance, the preceding sketches 
notwithstanding, it may have greater simplicity, or greater explanatory power. Productive 
further work can be done in this area by analysing the uses to which emergence has been 
put to see if the causal relation is really necessary for those purposes.557 Closer analysis of 
potential compositional principles could also help to decide the issue – if abstract reasoning 
leads us to a principled limitation on the principles that could exist, then that could potentially 
be a boon for the emergentist. 
There are, of course, excellent arguments in philosophy of mind why mental properties are 
very different form the physical properties we know, but do any of these arguments also rule 
out that mental properties could be the result of compositional pluralism in combination with 
those basic latent properties? I don’t think this is often addressed. One can point out the 
differences between mental and physical properties, but metaphysics must decide whether it 
could be composition or not. 
An emergent theory of properties has costs. There are trade-offs in the causal theory of 
properties that make carving out a theoretically attractive space for emergence more difficult 
than is generally supposed. The argument is that even if causal novelty, holistic effects and 
“top-down” causation are apparent in a system, a properly developed causal powers 
ontology can account for them without positing new fundamental properties. Crucially, issues 
in the fundamental ontology of properties determine the viable positions one can hold within 
this emergence/inherence debate. Developing these options allows for a more fruitful 
analysis of the metaphysics of emergence.  
 
 
                                               
557 A powers-compositional approach to the combination problem would be one example. 
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